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FORElt.QRD 
The study results described in this report are a part of an ongoing analysis to 
determlne the feaslbl1ity and preferred approaches for disposal of selected 
high-level nuclear wastes in space. The Boeing Aerospace Company (BAC) study 
is an 1ntegral part of the ongoing Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation (ONWI) 
managed DOE/NASA program for study of nuclear waste disposal in space. The 
research effort reported here was performed by the Boeing Aerospace Company 
Upper Stages and Launch Vehicles Organization under NASA Contract NAS8-33847 
from May of 1980 until March of 1981. The study objective was to identify, 
define and evaluate reasonable alternative concepts for the space disposal of 
nuclear waste, selecting alternative concepts of high merit for further 
evaluatlon, and documenting the evaluation and selection process. 
The 1nformat1on developed during the study period is contained in this two-
volume final report. The title of each volume is listed below: 
Volume I Execut1ve Summary 
Volume II Techn1cal Report 
Inqu1r1es regard1ng th1S study should be addressed to: 
w. (B111) Galloway 
NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center 
Attention: PS04 
Huntsville, Alabama 35812 
Telephone: (205) 453-2769 
or 
Richard P. Reinert, Study Manager 
Boeing Aerospace Company 
Mai 1 Stop 8F -74 
P. O. Box 3999 
Seattle, WA 98124 
Telephone (206) 773-4545 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Since 1970 a number of concepts for space systems for nuclear waste disposal 
have been studied and evaluated. This study has integrated the results of 
these previous studies in a systematic fashion to identify and document viable 
alternative space system concepts having hiqh merit. This effort is an inte-
gral part of the ongoing NASA/DOE program for evaluation of the space option 
for disposal of certain high level nuclear wastes in space as a complement of 
mined geologic respositories. This introduction provides a brief overview of 
the study background, scope, objective, and contents. 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The need to isolate safely or dispose of nuclear waste materials is a problem 
for this nation and other nations of the world. This problem has been studied 
for many years, but comprehensive studies of space as a disposal site did not 
begin until early 1970 ls when the NASA Lewis Research Center (LeRC) began 
studies which included comprehensive design analyses and concept testinq of a 
nuclear waste payload that could survive Earth atmospheric reentry and impact 
from space. The payload was to be launched into low Earth orbit by the Space 
Shuttle and then delivered to solar system escape by a space tug. The major 
problem with this concept was that it provided for a relatively small payload 
mass. This was due to three reasons: (1) the aerodynamic and radiation shield 
was carried all the way to the space destination, (2) waste loading was low, 
and (3) the space destination was solar system escape, a high energy option. 
In 1975, the NASAls Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) initiated a further 
study of the disposal in space of nuclear waste. During this study, it was con-
cluded that aerodynamic and radiation shielding could be carried only to low 
Earth orbit and that, beyond orbit, significant safety precautions for opera-
tional failures, including space rescue, were necessary to make this space 
option viable. In 1978, a concept was developed from these studies that was es-
sentially an extension of the earlier LeRC and MSFC concepts. This concept 
involved: using the Space Shuttle to launch an aerodynamic and radiation 
shielded waste payload to a low Earth orbit; removal of the shielding; and use 
of an Orbit Transfer Vehicle (OTV) - formerly called a space tug - to inject 
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the payload (without aerodynamic or radiation shielding) to a space destination 
transfer trajectory. A variety of destinations were treated. In J976, the 
NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) initiated studies to investigate the long-term 
safety of space disposal of hazardous material. These analyses led to the con-
clusion that 'long-term (millions of years) stability of several lower enerqy 
space destinations was possible, leading to selection of two potential sites 
for further investigation: (1) a solar orbit at 0.85 AU and (2) the lunar 
surface. A considerable amount of data on other destinations was also 
developed. 
During 1978, the MSFC study activities addressed the preliminary evaluation of 
the space disposal of defense nuclear waste from three defense waste storage 
sites. The analyses included the development of a reference concept employing 
the solar orbit at 0.85 AU as the space destination, the safety of the space 
disposal approach, and the environmental impact of selected credible accidents. 
The study concluded that space disposal of defense waste at the solar orbit des-
tination was feasible. 
The 1979-80 study program conducted by MSFC and the Battelle-Columbus 
Laboratories has continued the development of space option concept definitions; 
tradeoffs among transportation options, waste container, shielding, and reentry 
protection; transportation cost analysis; further characterization of the 
defense and commercial waste; and safety, risk, and environmental analyses. 
These efforts provided the bases for the preparation of the comprehensive sys-
tem safety design requirements summarized in Appendix E. These requirements, 
in combination with the data on space disposal destinations provided by the 
earlier AMES and MSFC contracted studies, have provided for the first time a 
systematic and comprehensive set of requirements for evaluation and design of 
space systems for the disposal of nuclear waste. These requirements, together 
with the extensive data base on space systems provided by the MSFC 79-80 study 
efforts, have provided the basis for this study. 
OJ 80-26426-2 
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1.2 OBJECTIVES 
The overall objective of the NASA/DOE space system study activity is to select 
a baseline space system concept which shows positive risk benefits when used as 
a complement to the reference Mined Geologic Repositor (MGR). 
Specific objectives of this study included (1) identification and definition of 
space systems concepts, (2) documentation of the definition of each concept, 
(3) aiding the ONWI/NASA program management effort in the development of space 
system concept selection criteria, (4) evaluation of these concepts as to their 
performance, risk, and technical v;ability, (5) selection of the most attrac-
tive space system concepts for further consideration, (6) documentation of the 
evaluation and selection process, and (7) providing of appropriate engineerinq, 
reliability, environmental impact and cost information to other program tasks 
as a part of the integrated NASA/DOE program. 
1.3 SCOPE 
This study covers the systematic identification, definition and evaluation of 
reasonable space system concepts leading to the integration and evaluation of 
total system concepts for space disposal of nuclear waste. Specific study 
areas included space destinations, space transportation options, launch site 
options, nuclear waste payload protection approaches, and payload rescue tech-
niques. Maximum use was made of the previous studies and assessments of the 
space disposal of nuclear waste. Definition of the space system concepts was 
on a common basis, consistent with the study groundrules. Additional analyses 
and definition were performed only on space system concepts not thoroughly 
assessed in previous studies. Total system concepts resulting were evaluated 
for performance and risk, leading to selection of four concepts of high merit 
for further evaluation. 
1.4 CONTENT 
The following paragraphs briefly describe the contents of this volume (Volume 
2). Volume 1 serves as the Executive Summary for Volume 2. 
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Section 2 summarizes the study effort on space disposal destinations. Primary 
topics include an initial screening of all reasonable destinations which 
resulted in the identification of 14 for deflnition; deflnition of the charac-
teristics of the selected destinations; and the final screening and evaluation 
which selected a reference destination (0.85 AU heliocentric orbit) for the 
design and evaluation of alternative space systems. 
Section 3 reports the work accomplished on mission analysis, operations and mis-
sion control. Delivery mission profiles are presented for both chemical and 
electric propulsion stages in Section 3.2, along with the analyses conducted in 
support of mission definition. In Section ~.3, Rescue Mission Analysis, rescue 
mission abort options are discussed, and rescue mission profiles for both Earth 
orbit and deep space transfer system failures are discussed. Section 3.4, Oper-
ations Analysis, describes a qeneric operations flow diaqram which is shown 
along with the more detailed breakdown of operations for injection/placement 
stage separation derived to aid mission analysis. Section 3.5, Mission Con-
trol, describes general mission control issues and presents detailed definltion 
of SOlS control requirements used for definition of SOlS avionics in Section 4. 
Section 4 documents the study of orbit transfer systems which resulted in selec-
ting four options for integration of total system options in Task 8. Section 
4.2 describes the identification of orbit transfer options, which identified a 
total of 12 systems for further consideration. Section 4.3 describes the de-
tailed characterization of the elements (stages) and the total orbit transfer 
systems. The selection of the final candidates is treated in Section 4.4, 
while Section 4.5 describes rescue system requirements and configurations for 
both chemical and electric orbit transfer systems. A flnal section identifies 
contingency rescue mission study areas. 
Section 5 describes the evaluation and selection of launch vehicle systems for 
the space disposal mission. Section 5.2 describes the initial screening of can-
didate launch vehicle categories, which resulted in the selection of four candi-
date systems for further evaluation, and describes the key characteristics of 
the vehicles selected. Section 5.3 describes the selection criteria developed 
and their use in selection of launch system options for single launch and dual 
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launch mission scenarios. Unique requirements imposed on launch systems by the 
space disposal mission are described in Section 5.4. 
Section 6, Waste Payload Systems, reports the results of trade studies 
conducted to determine the best approach to protection of the waste payload for 
all mission phases. Section 6.2 discusses the use of past studies in 
definition of waste payload system requirements. Trade studies which evaluated 
the utility of radiation shield hardening, ejection from the launch vehicle, 
and shield removal as protection options are described in Section 6.3, alonq 
with the results of waste payload thermal and aerothermal analyses. 
The resulting waste payload configurations and parametric weight estimating 
relationships are reported in Section 6.4. 1 Section 6.5 describes the 
aereodynamic configuration studies used in definition of the ejectable waste 
payload protection system (WPPS). A description of the resulting configuration 
and derivation of WPPS weight estimating relationships complete the section. 
Section 7, Flight Support Systems, describes the requirements and 
configurations of flight support systems used to support waste payloads in the 
launch vehicle. Section 7.2 describes the functional requirements identified 
for flight support systems. Configurations evolved to meet these requirements 
for both single and dual waste payloads are described in Section 7.3. 
Section 8, Systems Integration and Evaluation, describes the integration, 
evaluation and selection of alternative total system concepts for space 
disposal judged to have sufficient merit for further study. Section 8.2 
describes the systems integration effort resulting in selection of 12 candidate 
concepts for evaluation. Key characteristics and performance of the candidate 
systems are reported in Section 8.3. Section 8.4 describes the total system 
risk criteria and the evaluation of the relative risk of the 12 candidates. 
Final screening and selection of the four alternative systems of high merit are 
described in Section 8.5; Section 8.6 describes mission scenarios for the 
selected systems. 
Section 9, Launch Slte Systems, summarizes the assessment of impact of nuclear 
waste disposal mission on the KSC launch site. A brief assessment of an 
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alternate launch site was also conducted. Section 9.2 summarizes the required 
launch rates for the selected total system options. Sections 9.3 and 9.4 
describe the evaluation of space system support facilities and specialized 
waste payload processing facilities, respectively. Section 9.S discusses the 
alternate launch site evaluation conducted. 
Sections 10 and 11 present the primary conclusions and recommendations that 
have resulted from the study. 
Appendix A prov1des definitions for the acronyms and abbreviations used in this 
volume; Appendix B contains a list of the references indicated 1n the text and 
a bibliography. Appendix C presents summary evaluations of the space disposal 
concepts from past studies evaluated in Task 8. Appendix D provides a 
description of the reference system for space disposal resulting from the MSFC 
79-80 study; Appendix E describes the system safety design requirements for the 
reference system. Appendixes F through I support various aspects of the 
analyses performed in Sections 3, 4, 6, and 7. 
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2.0 SPACE DISPOSAL DESTINATIONS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of an investigation of locations in space, or 
destinations, where nuclear waste payloads could be deposited for permanent iso-
lation from the terrestrial biosphere. The investigation was aimed at defining 
a single distination to be used in definition of the space transportation sys-
tems required for the space disposal mission. Because of its pivotal role in 
setting space system performance requirements, this task was performed at the 
beginning of the study. 
The primary issue was to determine if there was a safer or cheaper destination 
than the circular heliocentric orbit at 0.85 AU chosen as a reference destina-
tion in the 79-80 study effort. 
An initial screening which encompassed every reasonable destination in the 
solar system as well as solar system escape orbits resulted in tHe selection of 
14 candidate destinations for evaluation in depth. The candidate destinations 
included orbits about the Sun, Moon and Earth and the surfaces of planets, 
asteroids, and the Moon. The selected candidate destinations were evaluated 
for cost related factors primarily based on performance, risk related factors 
including potential for return of waste material to the terrestrial biosphere, 
and other factors including implications for future use and retrievability. 
A final screening was conducted in which each candidate destination was ranked 
in terms of these three criteria. Candidates with costs and risks higher than 
those of the reference helicentric orbit destination were rejected for further 
consideration as were those which evidenced a problem with contamination of des-
tinations which could compromise potential future usage. 
Six candidate destinations satisfied all three criteria for selection: Both 
posigrade and retrograde hiqh Earth orbits (HEO), orbits about the Earth-Moon 
Trojan points, lunar orbits, and heliocentric circular orbits at both 0.85 and 
1.15 AU radius. From these six, the 0.85 AU radius heliocentric orbit was 
selected as a reference for the study. It offers a combination of the lowest 
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long term risk of any destination studied and excellent characterization from 
previous studies not shared by the other selected destinations. 
A high Earth orbit destination was recommended for evaluation as an alternate 
to the heliocentric orbit reference. A full evaluation of 10nq term risk for 
this class of destination is not available, but potential risk could be compara-
ble to the reference and some attractive cost benefits would result from fac-
tors such as lower performance requirements for orbit transfer systems. When 
evaluated, these cost benefits would indicate the potential payoff which could 
justify a later in-depth investigation of the concept's lonq term risk. 
2.2 IDENTIFICATION OF CANDIDATE DESTINATIONS 
The objective of the identification effort was to systematically survey the en-
tire field of potential space disposal destinations, making maximum use of past 
studies but also identifying locations not previously treated. No locations 
were categorically ruled out for the first level of screening. Candidate desti-
nations were identified in two steps: in the first, general destination 
categories were identified by reference to past studies; in the second step, in-
dividual "best" destinations were selected within each category. 
2.2.1 Identification of Destination Categories. Categorization of destina-
tions was accomplished to make sure no possibilities were overlooked. Broad 
distinctions were drawn between surface destinations (where the waste would be 
placed on a solid body such as a planet, asteroid or moon) and orbital destina-
tions and between destinations in the geolunar (Earth-Moon) system and destina-
tions in deep space. 
Candidate destination categories identified are illustrated in Fiqure 2.2-1 and 
are tabulated as surface or orbit types with locations in the geolunar system 
or in deep space. The categories shown contain all reasonable destinations for 
space disposal of nuclear waste. 
Surface Desti~ation Categories. Surface destinatlons in the geolunar system 
are limited to Luna and the Earth. Ruling out Earth as a disposal site not di-
rectly relevant to studies of space disposal leaves Luna as the only surface 
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LOCATION TYPE SURFACE ORBITS 
GEOLUNAR • LUNA HEO POSIGRADE 
HEO RETROGRADE 
LUNAR ORB ITS 
~ L1BRATION POINTS 
[INNER PLANETS HEll OCENTRI C 
DEEP MOONS OUTER SPACE PLANETARY ORBITS SUN 
ASTEROIDS LIBRATION POINTS 
SOLAR SYSTEM ESCAPE , 
• SELECT CANDIDATE DESTINATIONS WITHIN CATEGORIES 
• SELECT FOR UNIQUE ATTRIBUTE WITHIN CATEGORY 
Figure 2.2-1: Candidate Destination Categories 
disposal site in the geolunar system. Surface destination categories in deep 
space are more numerous. In principle, eight planets (excluding the Earth) are 
candidates along with about 40 moons (the exact count is expected to change 
with each Voyager planetary flyby) and some thousands of asteroids located in 
a belt between Mars and Jupiter, in the Jupiter-Sun libration or Trojan points, 
in the Apollo-Amor group with orbital radii of about 1 AU, and in a variety of 
irregular orbits. The only remaining deep space "surface" disposal site is the 
Sun. 
Orbital Destination Categories. Orbital destination categories in the geolunar 
system include orbits about the Earth (both posigrade and retrograde at a range 
of orbital altitudes), orbits around the Moon, and orbits around the leading 
and trailing Earth-Moon libration points designated l4 and l5. 
Orbital destination categories identified in deep space include circular helio-
centric orbits both inside and outside the Earth's orbital radius of 1.0 AU; 
orbits about the planets; orbits about the Earth-Sun or Jupiter-Sun libration 
points; and solar system escape orbits which would carry the waste payload 
completely out of the solar system. 
2.2.2 ~~lecti~~_~f_~~~~~dat~_~es~~~~tions. Choices were based on which unique 
attribute of a given category was best represented by a given candidate destina-
tion within the category. In some cases the cateqory possessed several favor-
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able attributes, leading to the selection of more than one candidate destina-
tion within the category. Figure 2.2-2 illustrates the candidate destinations 
selected, showing in summary form the rationale for their selection. 
LOCATION TYPE CATEGORY CANDIDATE: DESTINATION REF RATIONALE FOR SELECTION NO 
SURfACE MOON LUNAR SURFACE 1 ONLY AVAILABLE 
GEOLUNAA HEO POSIGRAD[ 2 LOWEST 6" HEO 
JY$T~ HEO RETROGRADE 3 ENHANCED STABILITY 
ORBITS IBRATION POINTS L4 TROJAN ORBITS 4 ENHANCED STABILITY 
LUNAIt ORBITS LUNAR ORBITS 6. MINIMIZE: RE·ENCOUNTER PROBABILITY 
VENUS IMPACT S. LOWEST 6'1 
I PLANETS 
JUPITER ENTRY 7 NO LONG TERM CONTAMINATION 
SUR PACE 
MOONS LUNA 
DE" ... 
1 LOWEST 6'1 (SEE GEOLUNARI 
APOLLO· AMOUR GROUP 8 LOWEST l:>v. TRUE TIMES SPACE ASTEROID SOFT LANDING 
SUN SOLAR IMPACT 
" 
ONLY AVAILABLE 
EARTH ESCAPE I:LLlPTICAL 10 LOWEST 6'1 FOR EHLlOCENTRIC 
HELIOCENTRIC 
0.86 AU CIRCULAR 11. LOWEST llv FOR VERIFIED STABILITY 
ORBITS 1 16 AU CIRCULAR 12 SEE GEOLUNAR 
LIB RATION POINTS SUN-EARTH "T ADPOLEH ORBITS 13 LOWEST llv • STABILITY VERIFIED 
SOLAR SYSTEM 
ESCAPE HYPERBOLA 14 lOW LONG TERM RISK ESCAPE 
Figure 2.2-2: Candidate DestinatIons 
Geolunar System. Within the geolunar system, surface destinations (excluding 
the Earth) are restricted to the Moon. Orbital destinations chosen include: 
1) Posigrade High Earth Orbits - Offer the lowest delta-V requirements for 
destinations in the Earth-Moon system. 
2) Retrograde Orbits - Retroqrade high Earth orbits, which offer enhanced 
stability with respect to posigrade orbits (1)* at the cost of higher 
delta-V requirements. 
3) hi~~~ion ~oints - Orbits around the L4 (or leadinq) Earth-Moon Trojan 
point. Analytlcal studles (1) indlcate enhanced stability relative to 
posigrade high Earth orblts with comparable delta-V requirements. 
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4) Lunar Orbits - Lunar orbits which require delta-V's comparable to high 
Earth orbits, but offer a lower risk of re-encounter of the waste pay-
load with the Earth by constraining re-encounter to the lunar surface. 
Deep Space. Selection of destinations outside the Earth-Moon system provides 
a wide range of both surface and orbital destination choice.. Surface destina-
tion choices include planets, moons, asteroids, and the Sun. Orbits were cho-
sen about the Sun, about Sun-Earth libration points, and direct to solar system 
escape. 
1) Plane~~ - The surfaces of planets offer the possibility of eliminating the 
return of waste payloads by burying them deep in a planetary gravity well. 
Attributes of importance in selection of planets as waste disposal destina-
tions include low delta-V for delivery, lack of solid surface to prevent 
permanent contamination, and frequency of launch windows. 
Two planetary surface destinations were selected: 
a) Venus - Requires the lowest delta-V of any planet for approach and land-
ing. Its extremely hostile surface environment (carbon dioxide atmos-
phere at a pressure of about 90 atmospheres, with a surface tempera-
ture of 9000 F) precludes any near term exploration or exploitation. 
The thick atmosphere would facilitate a soft landing; a number of 
probes have been landed by both the U.S. and the USSR. 
b) Jupiter - Requires a high delta-V for approach and landing but, since 
it lacks a solid surface, the waste payload would continue to descend 
through the atmosphere until, in theory, it reached the dense core at 
a depth of over 60,000 km, rendering it completely inaccessible and 
eliminating any possibility of return. 
The remaininq planets were rejected as having higher delta-V requirements 
than Venus and possessing a surface immediately accessible for exploration 
or exploitation (Mercury, Mars) or sharing Jupiter's ability to dispose of 
the waste in deep atmosphere, but at the expense of increased delta-V. 
*( ) denotes a reference listed 1n Appendix B. 
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2) Moons - The nearest planet having sizable moons 1S Jupiter. Mercury and 
Venus have no moons and the two moons of Mars are small (apparently 
captured asteroids). Jupiter's four Galilean satellites, while as big or 
bigger than Earth's Moon, offer no disposal advantages not offered by 
Jupiter itself. Accordingly, consideration of moons was restricted to 
Luna. 
• 
3) Asteroids - Asteroids as destinations for waste payloads would provide some 
of the advantages of planets without requiring a high delta-V penalty for 
soft landing. Advantages include partial meteroid shielding (at least 2pi 
steradians), a gravity well which would reduce risk of Earth re-encounter, 
and demonstrated orbital stability. Even small asteroids (radius of about 
1 km) would provide suff1cient surface area to accommodate large numbers of 
waste packages. Investigation of suitable asteroids has resulted 1n selec-
tion of the group of Apollo-Amor (Earth approaching) asteroids as the desti-
nations of choice. These objects are in stable orbits and require a lower 
delta-V for rendezvous than any other objects outside the geolunar system 
(approx. 5.5 km/sec) (2). 
4) Sun - The Sun offers the same advantages as Jupiter as a destination, plus 
the certainty that there will be no future exploitation activities to be 
compromised. The chief obstacle to use of the Sun is the high delta-V 
required for impact. Direct injection to solar impact was chosen for inves-
tigation; Jupiter flyby as an aid to solar impact was rejected as inferior 
to Jupiter impact. 
Orbits. Orbits investigated as disposal sites included heliocentric orbits, 
orbits about Sun-planet libration points, and hyperbolic escape orbits which 
would allow the waste payload to escape the solar system altogether. Orbits 
about planets were rejected as having delta-V's higher than those required for 
selected planetary impact destinations, penalizing performance and offering no 
long term risk benefits. 
1) Heliocentric Orbits - Consideration of heliocentric orbits was limited to 
circular orbits between Earth and Mars and Earth and Venus and elliptical 
orbits tangent to Earth's orbit at aphelion, with perihelions between 1.0 
and 0.85 AU. Other closed heliocentric orbits were rejected as imposing a 
higher de1ta-V penalty with essentially no risk benefit. 
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a) Heliocentric Circular Orbits at 0.85 and 1.15 AU were selected as 
having the lowest delta-V for a heliocentric orbit compatible with 
analytically verified stability. 
b) Earth Escape Elliptical orbits were proposed in an early study (3) 
and treated analytically in later NASA-sponsored efforts (4). This 
class of orbits has the lowest delta-V requirements of any ex-
,~ geolunar system destinations, lower in some cases than the delta-
V to high Earth orbit. 
-
2) Libration Point Orbits were investigated because of their inherent stabil-
ity. Stable libration points at the Jovian Trojan points have been veri-
fied by telescopic observation of asteroids orbiting the points. Lonq term 
stability of these orbits is beyond question (5). Stability of objects in 
the so called "tadpole" orbits about the Earth-Sun Trojan points have been 
studied analytically, (6,5) with results implying positive stability for 
times on the order of 104 years. Tadpole orbits about the Sun-Earth Trojan 
points were selected for investigation because of the low potential delta-
V and analytically verified stability. 
3) Escape Hyperbolic Orbits allowing the waste to exit the solar system di-
rectly were chosen as the most direct and reliable implementation of the 
solar system escape option. Jupiter flybys as aids to escape were rejected 
as inferior to Jupiter impact. 
2.3 DEFINE CANDIDATE DESTINATION CHARACTERISTICS 
With 14 candidate destinations identified, the next step was to characterize 
them in areas suitable for comparison. Three broad areas for comparison were 
identified: 
1) Long term risk of Earth re-encounter with the waste payload 
2) Factors relating to mission cost 
3) Implications for future use 
The characterization effort was executed in two phases. In the first, past 
studies were reviewed to identify specific characteristics within the areas 
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identified above which could be characterized in a fashion suitable for compari-
son. In the second phase, values for each characterlstic identified were calcu-
lated or derived for each of the 14 candidate destinations. 
2.3.1 Identify K~ Characteristics. Identification of characteristics for def-
inition was based on a series of studies for NASA conducted between 1977 and 
1980. Key characteristics were identified for the areas described above. 
Factors related to mission risk identified in a review of past studies included 
rescue options (4), long-term risk of Earth re-encounter (5,4), and lonq-term 
containment requirements. 
Rescue Options allow continuation of a failed deployment mission by staging a 
dedicated rescue mission which would rendezvous with a failed deployment sys-
tem, retrieve the waste payload, and deliver it to the original destination. 
With the rescue option it is not necessary to have deployment systems of ex-
tremely high reliability in order to achieve very low risk. Instead, the res-
cue mission provides this assurance through the powerful mechanism of redun-
dancy. Such redundancy on a mission level is the best approach identifled to 
date for achieving sufficient mlssion reliability to make space disposal a prac-
tical proposition (4). Accordingly, each candidate destination has been rated 
on its compatibility with incorporation of a rescue mission capabillty. 
Long Term Risk of Earth Re-Encounter - Earth re-encounter refers to the possi-
bility, however unlikely, that the waste payload could re-encounter the Earth, 
resulting in a high speed entry into the Earth's atmosphere with the subsequent 
possibility of waste form dispersion due to atmospheric burnup or high speed 
ground impact. Re-encounter can occur due to three primary causes: (1) a 
deployment system failure, (2) fallback of waste particles resultinq from 
meteoroid fragmentation of the waste form, and (3) intersection of the waste 
payload destination orbit with the Earth's orbit. Intersecting orbits will 
eventually lead to re-encounter when both the Earth and the waste payload 
arrive at the intersection of the two orbits at the same time (4). 
Long Term Containment_Requir~ments - The thlrd factor investigated was the re-
quirement for long term containment for calclne or other powder waste forms. 
Liberation of powdered waste in Earth orbit would result in relatively rapid 
fallback to Earth (1). 
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Cost Related Factors - Factors related to mission cost were included to provide 
a differentiator for destinations having equivalent risk. Factors were evalu-
ated for generic systems similar to the MSFC reference system, which uses chemi-
cal propellant injection stages and placement stage~, except for the solar 
impact destination which requlres a more advanced system because of its ex-
tremely high performance requirements. Evaluation of destinations against a 
common, generic transfer system allowed the relevant cost related factors to be 
evaluated on characteristics unique to the destinations. 
Primary cost related factors identified included: de1ta-V or performance, in-
jection and placement propulsion requirements, vehicle re-use options, and 
launch window requirements. 
De1ta-V - As the primary index of performance, the velocity increment from low 
Earth orbit is the primary factor in determining how much payload can be 
delivered to the specified destination for each shuttle launch. The net 
delivered payload per shuttle launch is the most important sinq1e factor in 
cost. 
Injection and Placement Propulsion Re~irements - Propulsion requirements were 
studied to determine the number of burns required of the injection and place-
ment stage main propulsion and attitude control systems in a nominal mission. 
This provides an indicator of mission complexity. Injection and placement mis-
sion profiles were also investigated for critical guidance and navigation re-
quirements (such as lunar soft landing or asteroid rendezvous) which require 
significant increases in capability when compared to the guidance requirements 
of the MSFC reference system. These critical requirements are reflected in 
higher costs for expended vehicles. 
Vehicle Re-Use Options were identlfied as a function of destination to allow 
for the cost increases incurred by expending vehicles. Some options, such as 
lunar soft landing, mandate expending a relatively expensive stage; other 
options expend only a relatively low cost placement stage or allow recovery of 
all delivery vehicles. Re-use options were tabulated for each destination for 
injection, placement, and solar electric stages. 
Launch Window Req~~rements - Some candidate destinations (such as those 
involving planetary surfaces) restrict launches of waste payloads to certain 
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"windows" or periods of the year. This can have the effect of compressing 
a year's worth of launches into a period of 3 months, which leads to an in-
crease in launch rate and the ground facilities needed to support launch. 
Launch windows were tabulated for each candidate destination in terms of per-
centage of the year available for launch. 
Other Factors - Factors considered, in addition to risk and cost, include the 
ability to retrieve a waste form after it is placed at a destination, passive 
monitoring or the ability to detect and track a passive waste payload after 
deployment, and implications for future use. 
Retrieval - Capability would allow use of space as a storage, rather than a per-
manent isolation site (7). Storage is not a requirement for the reference con-
cept, but its adoption in the future is difficult to categorically rule out. 
Accordingly, the potential of each destination for use as a storage rather than 
permanent disposal site has been tabulated. 
Passive Monitoring of waste payloads after delivery to the destination would 
allow determination of location and velocity to verify correct placement and 
would be necessary to any long term retrieval capability. Candldate destina-
tions were examined to determine if they were close enough to the Earth for pas-
sive monitoring from the ground or from low Earth orbit (LEO). 
Implications for Future Use - Removing nuclear waste from Earth is less desir-
able if an alternate useful location will be contaminated. Candldate destina-
tions were examined in two areas to evaluate the likelihood of impacting future 
use: 
1) Potential uses for candidate destinations were identified - examples 
include use of the L4 libration point as a site for space habitats or 
large scale exploitation of the lunar surface as a source of raw mate-
rials. No rigorous attempt at screening the feasibility of applica-
tions was made; in view of the uncertainty about what could happen in 
a thousand years, it is difficult to categorically exclude any future 
applications. 
2) The degree of contamination of the destination was estimated. 
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Future use was considered to be compromised only lf a potential use for the des-
tination was identified, and the potential for widespread contamination was 
found. 
2.3.2 Characterize Candidate Destinations. Identiflcation of key characteris-
tics allowed their evaluation for each candidate destination. Evaluations were 
based on results of past studies, supplemented by new analyses as required. 
Key characteristics determined are summarized in Figure 2.3-1. The following 
section provides a detailed description of each destination, includlng for 
each: 
1. Mission scenario summary 
2. Evaluation of long term risk of Earth re-encounter 
3. Factors related to mission cost 
4. Other factors, including implications for future use 
0180-26426-2 
17 
C a. 
... 
00 
9 a. 
I\) 
00 0) 
~ .. 
I\) 
0) 
N .. 
.VALUATION 
C.U,.UA 
._ .... - .... _._ .. 
-va-
-
I'OIIQRADI c:. LA. 
NtGH IAfITH 0Re1T 
-W ... 
-
.TROGAAOI< ..... 
IAftTKIMOON TIIOMN 
-va-
-
Oft.'UIU. 
LUNAR Oft.'T -ya-
-
-Ya-
-
-NO-
...... ftOP
I ,., .. 
_Y~I 
OftOiIi OP 
-NO- •• ". 
-'II .... -+-
-YII-
-
-ya-
-+-
-ya-
-
-rADlOLI" QIII"'1 
-NO- ""D"'"" I 
, ... 4 
EXP EXPEND 
RCVR = RECOVER 
E,R, = EARTH RADIUS 
"" ..... "" 
" 
II 
GRotll Of 
It 
CMDlRCJII 
" 
- a 
-
II 
-
-
-
---
-
-
-
-
II 
1 I. 
• I • I • I YI' ('21 I • I I I I I II I I I ANY DAY I nftAIOHT N -- .. - -_ IReVR -- ftCYfII WlTH1AJ11G1T 'Of!IWAIIO 
• I • I • I NO ... 1 '1
'
1--1--111 N II ftCVft I lX' IftCVftIWINOO!III;)N NO NO 
OAOI.IIOf 
hI" 
__ I IYIELOrI QADiR NO "'0 12 1 liN 1--1--1 __ 1 ftCVftl-- IftCVftl ANY DAY I DI"tCULT NO -. 
NO ... 1 2 liN 1 I 1 I I" 1 ftCVftl ... IftCVftl ANY DAY I D1"ICUl.T I NO 1 -. 
-. 
_. 
U.u.~"'~F' Jtifl (ji-QifOEft NO .. ,. I I I--I--I--I--I--I'::-;.I--I~-':.I ANY~Y NO NO _. 
Figure 2.3-1: CandIdate Destmation Characteristics Summary 
--
,--
--
, 
CANDIDATE DESTINATION 1. LUNAR SURFACE SOFT LANDING 
1) Mission Scenario Summary 
The mission includes the following primary events: (1) delivery of the 
waste payload to low Earth orbit by the uprated shuttle and subsequent 
transfer to the OTV, (2) a velocity impulse maneuver to place the payload 
into lunar capture orbit, (3) a lunar velocity impulse maneuver to place 
the payload into lunar capture orbit, and (4) final burns to soft land the 
package and OTV in the selected landing area on the Moonls surface in the 
crater Billy (selenographic coordinates of -500 longitude and -140 
1 at i tude) ( 7) • 
2) Long Term Risk of Earth Re-Encounter 
Long term risk is negligible after deployment. Proper biasing of the deliv-
ery trajectory will allow rescue after failure at any point in the delivery 
trajectory (1); rescue is the chosen method for elimination of Earth 
encountered due to deployment failure (8). 
3) Factors Related to Mission Cost 
The relatively high delta-V of this mission reduces the delivered payload 
per shuttle launch relative to the MSFC defined reference mission payload. 
The mission also expends a capable and relatively expensive orbit transfer 
vehicle and, by restricting launch to about 50% of the available time to 
avoid possible high risk abort modes, would have a substantial impact on 
launch facilities. Extensive lunar surface operations required to protect 
waste payloads from subsequent landinqs would also add to mission cost (9). 
4) Othe~Factors 
Waste payload retrieval (if desired) would be expensive in terms of perform-
ance and would also require extensive lunar surface operations (possibly 
manned). Monitoring and tracking would be simplified as the payloads loca-
tion would be fixed once delivered. 
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An examination of implications for future use indicates that a considerable 
body of work has been generated concerning use of lunar resources for construc-
tion of space habitats (10) and solar power satellites (11,12). Use of the 
Moon as a location for science and astronomical bases is also likely (9). The 
possibility of large scale contamination, however, is small. Reasonable 
precautions should reduce the probability of a payload impact outside the tar-
get crater to extremely low values (8). Even if a payload did impact outside 
the selected crater, it is highly probable that the impact effects would be 
confined to a total area of considerably less than 1 km due to burial of the 
waste payload (13) and would not be a serious obstacle to exploitation of the 
remaining 3.8 x 107 km2 of lunar surface. 
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CANDIDATE DESTINATION 2. POSIGRADE HIGH EARTH ORBIT 
1) Miss10n Scenar10 Summary 
Pr1mary events include: (1) delivery of the waste payload to low Earth 
orbit by the uprated space shuttle with subsequent transfer to the OTV, (2) 
a veloclty impulse maneuver to an elliptical transfer orbit with apoapsis 
at the target orb1t altitude of 55,000 km (7), (3) a circularizing velocity 
impulse maneuver to place the payload into a circular orb1t at the destina-
tion alt1tude, and (4) recovery of the OTV or re-use after payload release 
by reverslng the maneuvers descrlbed above. 
2) Destination Stab!!!!l 
Stabilltyof prograde high Earth orbits has been extensively studied by Sci-
ence Applications Incorporated (SAl) for NASA/ARC (1). Analys1s has 
indicated that stable, low inclination prograde orbits must be inside about 
25 Earth radll (ER) (159,000 km) for long term stability. Numerical inte-
grations used for stab1llty calculatlons were run over time periods about 
three orders of magnitude shorter than the 1 x 106 time perlods of inter-
est; 1t 1S quite possible that further integration would have shown insta-
blllty for the 25 ER case. Further analysis is required to define the 
upper altitude bounds for long term stab1lity. The 55,000 km orbit radius 
chosen as the reference HEO destlnation is sufficiently inside the 25 ER 
limlt to represent conditions required for long term stability. 
3) Long Term Risk of Earth Re-Encounter 
The low eccentric1ty ell1ptical transfer orbits and circular destination 
orbits chosen allow ample orbital lifetime for rescue mission staging for 
OTV fallure at any pOlnt in the mission. Rescue from the possible failure 
orbits is stra1ghtforward and will ensure against waste payload re-entry 
due to fa1lure durlng deployment. 
The total mass liberated by meteoroid strikes for fallback to Earth was cal-
culated by combinlng stat1stlcal odds of meteor str1kes and characteristics 
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of waste payload fragment llberation from Reference 14 w1th estlmates of 
Earth orblt llfetlme for a range of fragment Slzes from Reference 1. 
F1gures 1ndlcate that in a 1x106 year period, about 2 out of 580 deployed waste 
payloads would exper1ence meteor str1kes which would liberate a total of 0.2% 
of the material 1n the payloads. Of approximately 25.5 kg of llberated mate-
rial, about 28% would be fragments in the size range which would fall back to 
Earth within lx106 years, resulting 1n a total expected fallback 1n 1xl06 years 
of about 10 kg. The maximum deposition rate result1ng, based on part1cle Slze 
d1str1but10n and orbital 11fetime, w111 be approximately 10 mg/yr. Calc1ne or 
other powdered waste forms in these orbits would require containment for 
per10ds of about 1x106 years. If conta1nment were ruptured, approxlmately half 
of the 11berated waste form would fall back in 1xl06 years. 
4) Factors Related to M1ssion Cost 
The veloc1ty increment (delta-V) from low Earth orbit required for disposal 
1n h1gh Earth orb1t 1S 4.0 km/sec (7), the third lowest for the 14 cand1-
date dest1nations considered. The lower delta-V provides several 
advantages: 
o The payload deployed is increased 
o No separate placement stage 1S required 
o The injection stage is recovered for reuse 
o Launch windows are available any day, at any time (7) 
These factors offer the potential for significant cost savings when 
compared to the reference hel10centric orbit destinat1on. 
5) Other Factors 
Waste payload retr1eval from the HEO dest1nation is straightforward 
operat10nally and relatively undemanding 1n terms of performance, making 
HEU a val1d candldate for storage as well as long term 1solation (7). POS1-
tlon and veloc1ty of waste payloads 1n HEO could be monitored from the 
ground uS1ng pass1ve optlcal sensors such as the GEOOSS (ground-based 
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electro-optical deep space surveillance) system being developed for the 
USAF by TRW (15) or by active laser radars similar to those used on the 
ALSEP and LAGEOS programs. The SIRTF (Shuttle Infrared Telescope Facility) 
planned by NASA would be capable of tracking waste payloads by their own in-
frared emission from LEO (14). Passive tracking could be used to verify 
orbit elements independent of active beacon transponders and could ald in 
rescue or recovery operations. 
Implications for future use are minimized by choosing an orbit higher than 
the geosynchronous orbit altitude of 42,241 km with an inclination of 28 
deg (7). Traffic outside the geosynchronous arc is expected to be minimal. 
6) Comments 
The high number of payloads to be deployed (perhaps 60 to 100 per year) has 
led to consideration of grouping them at depots (16). A depot capable of 
handling 100 payloads would be deployed about once a year; 100 years of oper-
ation would lead to a depot population in the disposal orbit about the same 
as the 1980 population of satellites at GEO (approximately gO satellites) 
with a minimum average intra-depot spacing of 3840 km. Depots could sim-
plify keeping track of waste payloads and could minimize the already low 
probability of collisions between waste payloads or between previously 
deployed waste payloads and delivery vehicles. Against this must be weighed 
the increased mission complexity associated with depot rendezvous and the 
additional transfer operations associated with attaching the waste payload 
to the depot. 
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CANDIDATE DESTINATION 3. RETROGRADE HIGH EARTH ORBIT 
The demanding performance requirements imposed in achievement of a retro-
grade Earth orbit (equivalent to a 180 deg plane change) led to a short 
trade study aimed at defining the minimum energy delivery trajectory. The 
results led to a selection of a mission scenario somewhat more complex than 
that for the proqrade HEO destination. Primary events after dellvery of 
the OTV and waste payload to LEO include: (1) a velocity impulse maneuver 
to an elliptical outbound transfer orbit with an apoapsis at 4xlO~ km 
(about lunar distance); (2) a second velocity impulse maneuver at apoapsis 
of the transfer orbit which simultaneously accomplishes a 180 deq plane 
change and inserts vehicle and payload into an elliptical inbound transfer 
orbit with periapsis at the destination orbit radius of 160,000 km (just at 
the 1imlt determined for long term orbit stability at 25 Earth radil (1) to 
minimize delta-V); (3) a third velocity impulse which circularizes vehicle 
and payload in the destination orbit. Recovery of the OTV for reuse after 
payload release is accomplished by reversing the maneuvers described above. 
2) Destinati~n Stability 
Stability of retroqrade high Earth orbits was addressed by the same study 
which looked at prograde orbits (1). Analysis has indicated enhanced sta-
bility compared to prograde orblts at the same radius and inclination. 
3) ~Term Risk of Eart~ Re-Encounter 
Rescue Options. Failure of the delivery vehicle at most points in the deliv-
ery mission would leave the vehicle and payload in stable orbits with ample 
time for staging of rescue missions, providing sufflcient insurance against 
Earth re-encounter. Failure during approximately the last 20 sec of the 
first velocity impulse would, however, leave the vehicle in a highly eccen-
tric orbit (e > 0.95) subject to solar perturbatlons of peri apsis altitude 
for certain cholces of launch date. Absolute insurance aqalnst encounter 
within 100 days of launch (adequate time for rescue) could require 
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restricting launches to about 120 days of the year when the Sun is at solar 
longitudes of -200 to 450 or 1600 to 2250 (1). Two alternate strategies 
were evaluated which would allow launch at any time: (1) provide an inde-
pendent propulsion and gUldance system capable of inserting the vehicle 
into an abort orblt with eccentricity low enouqh and periapsis high enouqh 
to ensure against re-encounter until rescue can be effected (the delta-V 
required for this maneuver is about 50 m/sec); (2) implement an intermedi-
ate velocity impulse between the first and second, in effect inserting the 
vehicle into a low eccentricity transfer ellipse to an apoapsis of about 
6,000 km, and then initiating the insertion to the transfer to 4xl05 km 
when 6,000 km radius is reached (this trajectory will leave the vehicle in 
a stable orbit after a failure at any arbitrary point at a delta-V penalty 
of 1.8 km/sec). 
The abort orbit option has been selected as baseline for the study because 
of its substantially lower delta-V penalty. 
Deployment SystemJFai1ure. Abort orbit provisions plus rescue capability are 
the primary insurance against Earth encounter due to deployment system failure. 
Due to Particle Fallback After Me~eroid Strike. Total expected return, maximum 
deposition rate, and long term containment requirements are identical to desti-
nation 2, HEO posigrade. 
3) Factors Related to Mission Cost 
The delta-V required for the retrograde destination is 0.4 km/sec higher 
than for the posigrade orbit. This and the requirement to add redundant 
altitude control and auxiliary propulsion penalize the payload slightly com-
pared to the prograde case, but the other important cost saving features 
are identical: 
o No separate placement stage 
o Injection stage recovered and reused 
o Launch window any day at any time (with abort orbit redundancy 
prov is lOns) 
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The major cost difference remains the higher velocity increment. 
4) Other Factors 
Retrievability, compatibility with passive tracking, and lmplicat;ons for 
future use are identical to destination 2. 
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CANDIDATE DESTINATION 4. EARTH-MOON LIBRATION POINT ORBITS (L4) 
1) Mi~i~~ Scenario Summary 
Placement of the waste payload in a libration point orbit is similar to in-
jection into a high Earth orbit at a radius of about 314,000 km. The tar-
get orbit is approximately elliptical in shape and close to but not exactly 
centered on the L4 or leading Earth-Moon Trojan point. The orbit has a 
semi-minor axis of 71,000 km aligned with a line connecting the orbit cen-
ter with the center of the Earth; the semi-major axis is about 144,000 km. 
Waste payloads would make one rotation about the orbit in about 28.8 days; 
the motion is phase-locked with the relative angle of the Sun to the orbit 
center (17). 
The mission profile has been adapted from reference 7 to eliminate near 
term risk of Earth encounter in the event of a system failure, allowinq res-
cue. Primary events after injection of payload and OTV into LEO by the 
uprated STS include: 
(]) A velocity impulse maneuver which injects the vehicle into an interme-
diate transfer ellipse. The major axis and eccentricity of the inter-
mediate orbit is limited so that, in the event of failure during or 
after the injection burn, lunar and solar perturbations will not cause 
a re-encounter with Earth prior to execution of a rescue mission. 
(2) At apoapsis of the intermediate orbit, a second velocity impulse maneu-
ver accomplishes a plane change aligning the inclination of the OTV 
orbit to a value compatible with destination orbit insertion targeting 
requirements, and raiSing the peri apsis to an altitude of 5000 km, 
ensuring stability of the final transfer orbit against solar 
perturbation induced peri apsis lowering into the Earth's atmosphere. 
(3) A third velocity impulse at the new peri apsis injects the OTV and pay-
load into the final transfer orbit with apoapsis at the destination 
orbit radius of 318,000 km. 
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(4) The fourth velocity increase inserts the waste payload into the desti-
nation Trojan point orbit. 
Return of the OTV 1S accomplished by a single de-orbit and plane change 
burn followed by a direct descent along an inbound transfer ellipse to an 
aerobraked deceleration into LEO and recovery for reuse by the shuttle. 
Total mission duration is about 9.5 days. 
2) Destination Stability 
The L4 Trojan point orbit stability has been demonstrated analytically 
using linear stability analysis (17). Further analyses using numerical 
methods similar to those of Katz (18) are suggested if further verlfication 
is required. 
3) Lo~~rm Risk of Earth Re-Encounter 
Rescue Options. The reference trajectory described leaves the OTV and payload 
in a stable orbit after an OTV failure at any point in the delivery m1ssion. 
Sufficient time is available for multiple rescue attempts. 
Deployment System Failure. Ensured rescue capability after a failure at any 
point in the deployment orbit allows mission continuation after deployment sys-
tem failure. 
Due to Particle Fallback After Meteoriod Strike. Total expected return, maxi-
mum deposition rate, and long term containment requirements are identical to 
destination 2, HEO prograde. 
Du~J:.<Ll~,=-1:.~ Inters~c:.t i~,!_wi ~h Nomi.,!~!._De~~i..'!~~i..~'l_Orbit. Earth i ntersecti on 
with the Trojan point orbit is impossible. 
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4) Factors Related to Mlssion Cost 
The delta-V for the Trojan point orbit deployment is 3.9 km/sec from LEO (10). 
This is about 0.1 km/sec lower than the delta-V required for HEO disposal; 
other factors are similar: 
o The payload deployed is increased when compared to the reference heliocen-
tric orbit destination 
o No separate placement stage is required 
o The injection stage is recovered for reuse 
o Launch windows can be chosen for any day at any time 
Except for the minor decrease in velocity increment, cost should be essentially 
similar to the cost for HEO disposal. 
5) Other Factors 
Retrievability and compatibility are essentially identical to destination 2. 
Retrieval is facilitated by the relatively low delta-V; passive tracking from 
ground or LEO is possible using laser radar or the shuttle based infrared tele-
scope facility. 
Implications for future use are not indicated. No alternate uses for Trojan 
point orbits have been proposed; even the proposed space colonies which ~'ould 
occupy the L4 point itself have been "moved" to a perturbed high Earth orbit at 
an altitude of about 2x10 5 km (10). Other uses for the L4 and L5 points have 
been proposed; large radio telescopes are one possibility. Use of the 
libration points for these purposes should not be compromised as the closest ap-
proach of the waste payloads in their orbit will be about 71,000 km. 
6) Comments 
Use of orbiting depots (similar to those discussed for destination 2, hiqh 
Earth orbit) deserves consideration to avoid crowding of individual payloads. 
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CANDIDATE DESTINATION 5. LUNAR ORBIT 
1) Mission Scenario Summary 
Placement of the waste payload lnto a lunar orbit with radlus of 21,700 km is 
broadly similar to the HEO destination mission, but sliqhtly more complex, 
requiring four OTV main propulsion system (MPS) burns plus midcollrse correc-
tions usinq the reaction control system (ReS). The mission profile has been 
adapted from Reference 7 to eliminate near term risk of Earth re-encounter in 
event of a system failure. Primary events after lnjection of payload and OTV 
into LEO by the updated space shuttle include: 
(1) A velocity impulse maneuver which injects the vehicle into an intermediate 
transfer ellipse. The major axis and eccentricity of the intermediate 
orbit is limited so that, in the event of failure during or after the 
periapsis burn, lunar and solar perturbations will not cause a re-
encounter with Earth prior to execution of a rescue mission. 
(2) At apoapsis of the intermediate orbit, a second velocity impulse maneuver 
accomplishes a plane change aligning the inclination of the OTV orbit to 
a value compatible with destination orbit insertion targeting requirements 
and raising the periapsis to an altitude of 5000 km, ensuring stability of 
the final transfer orbit against solar perturbation induced peri apsis 
lowering into the Earth's atmosphere. 
(3) A third velocity impulse at the new peri apsis injects the OTV and payload 
into the final transfer orbit which places the OTV within the lunar sphere 
of influence and near the desired close approach to the Moon. 
(4) Burn four lnjects the OTV into the desired lunar orbit. 
Return of the OTV is accomplished by a sinqle de-orbit and plane change burn 
followed by a direct descent along an inbound transfer ellipse to an aerobraked 
deceleratlon into LEO and recovery for re-use by the shuttle. Total mission du-
ration is about 10 days. 
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2) Destination Stabili!y 
Lunar orbits in the Earth-Moon travel plane are expected to be stable for ex-
tremely long periods of time (7). Further analysis using numerical methods sim-
ilar to those described in Reference 1 are suggested if further verification is 
required. 
Rescue Options. The reference trajectory described leaves the OTV and payload 
in a stable orbit after an OTV failure at any point in the delivery mission. 
Sufficient time is available for multiple rescue attempts. 
Deployment_~tem Failure. Ensured rescue capability after failure at any 
point in the deployment orbit allows mission continuation after deployment sys-
tem fai lure. 
Due to Particle Fallback After Meteoroid Strike. The lunar orbit option is po-
tentially less susceptible to Earth re-encounter due to particle fallback as 
liberated particles from a payload in lunar orbit would have a tendency to fall 
into the lunar surface. The exact benefits in terms of reduction in fallback 
to Earth require further investigation (7). 
Due to Earth Intersection with Nominal Destination Orbit. Earth intersection 
with the lunar orbit is impossible. 
4) Factors Related to Mission Cost 
The total delta-V to lunar orbit deployment is 4.25 km/sec from LEO (7). This 
is about 0.15 km/sec higher than the delta-V required for HEO disposal re-
sulting in a slight decrease in payload delivered per mission; other factors 
are s imil ar: 
o No separate placement stage is required. 
o The inJection stage is recovered for re-use. 
o Launch windows can be chosen for any day at any time. 
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Except for the payload decrease due to the sliqhtly higher velocity increment, 
costs should be essentially simllar to the cost for HEO disposal. 
5) Other Factors 
Retrievability and compatibility with passive remote tracking are similar to 
destination 2; retrieval delta-V is approximately equivalent, and passive track-
ing from ground or LEO could be accomplished using laser radar or the shuttle 
based infrared telescope facility. Implications for future use are minor to 
negligible if orbits are chosen which will not interfere with future Earth-Moon 
transport. No alternative uses have been identified for the lunar orbit desti-
nation and lunar fallback should have negligible impact on proposed habitats 
which are universally viewed as being radiation hardened aqainst solar flares 
and cosmic radiation. 
6) Comments 
Use of orbiting depots similar to those considered for destination 2, high 
Earth orbit should be considered to avoid crowding of lndividual payloads. 
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DESTINATION 6. VENUS IMPACT 
1) Mission Scenario Summary 
Injection to the transfer orbit to Venus impact is one of the simplest mission 
profiles studied. Primary events after injection of payload and OTV into low 
Earth orbit by the uprated space shuttle include: (1) a primary velocity im-
pulse maneuver which injects OTV and payload into the minimum energy Venus 
impact transfer orbit; (2) separation of the waste payload attached to an 
orbit correction stage; (3) an initial midcourse correction performed by the 
orbit correction stage at about injection plus 5 days to correct for injection 
errors; (4) if required a second maneuver at entry minus 30 days to correct ex-
ecution errors from the preceding maneuvers; and (5) Venus entry at injection 
plus 160 days. The orbit correction staqe enters with the payload and is 
expended. 
Injection stage (OTV) recovery begins with a retroburn immediately following 
separation of the payload. This injects the staqe into an elliptical return 
orbit. An aerobraking maneuver at periapsis inserts the OTV into a phaslng 
orbit. Burn at apoapsis of the phasing orbit raises peri apsis to 260 km and is 
followed in half a revolution by LEO circularization. OTV recovery operations 
and shuttle landing complexes the mission. Total OTV mission duratlon away 
from LEO is about 62 hours. 
2) Destination Stability 
Stability of the Venus surface destination against Earth re-encounter is 
absolute. 
3) Lo~~_Term Risk of Earth Re-Encounter 
Rescue Opti~~~. The selected injection trajectory allows the waste payload and 
associated orbit transfer systems to be rescued after failure at any point in 
the deployment sequence with sufflclent time before re-encounter to allow multi-
ple rescue attempts. 
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Due to Deployment System Failure. Capability for execution of multiple rescue 
attempts after deployment system failure at any point ensures mission continua-
tion after deployment system failure. 
Due to Particle Fallback After Meteoroid Strike. Fallback from the Venus sur-
face destination is impossible. 
Due to Earth Intersection with the Nominal Destination Orblt. Earth intersec-
tion with Venus orbit is impossible. 
4) Factors Related to Mission Cost 
Total delta-V from LEO to the Venus impact transfer orbit is 3.99 km/sec, lower 
than all but one of the geolunar system destination options. Total delta-V 
required for the orbit correction stage is about 50 m/sec, and the orbit correc-
tion stage mass is negligible compared to the payload mass (about 5% of the 
waste payload mass). 
Primary additional influences on cost include: 
o Recovery of the injection stage for re-use. 
o An expendable placement stage is used up with each mission. 
o Launch windows are available for only 3 months out of each 19. ThlS 
amounts to about 16% availability, and could require an excessive launch 
rate of very close to one launch per day for 3 months. 
Except for the excessive launch rate, costs should not differ greatly from 
costs of dlsposal at destinations in the geolunar system. 
5) Other Factors 
Retrievability or passive trackinq are impossible for payloads once delivered 
to the surface of Venus. 
Implications for future use are serious. The potential for widespread contami-
nation exists and could seriously compromise the terraforming of Venus as 
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speculated on by Sagan et ale The ambient temperature (4820 C) and corrosive en-
vironment at the surface could lead to early loss of containment and waste form 
integrity. Venus surface probes have discovered surface winds of several 
km/hr, which at the very high pressure and density (C02 at 100 atmospheres pres-
sure) present on the surface, could spread the degraded waste forms across the 
surface. 
6) Comments 
Launch wlndow constraints would probably limit consideration of Venus surface 
disposal to waste mixes requiring much lower launch rates than the rpference 
PW-4B waste mix. 
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DESTINATION 7. JUPITER IMPACT 
1 ) ~!.~!.~~ Scenari 0 Summary 
The mission scenario for Jupiter impact is one of the slmplest studied, as no 
stage recovery operations are involved. A long 11fe placement staqe is used 
for trajectory corrections after separat10n from the expended injection stage. 
Primary events after injection of payload and orb1t transfer system into low 
Earth orbit by the uprated space shuttle include: (1) a primary velocity im-
pulse maneuver which injects OTV and payload into the min1mum energy Jupiter 
impact transfer orbit (the injection stage is expended 1n this maneuver); (2) 
separation of the waste payload attached to an orbit correction stage; (3) an 
initial course correction maneuver at about injection plus 5 days to correct 
for injection errors; (4) if required, a second course correction and targeting 
maneuver at about entry minus 60 days to correct execution errors from preced-
ing maneuvers; and (5) Jupiter entry at approximately injection plus 1000 days 
(2.74 yrs). 
2) Destination Stability 
Stability of the Jupiter surface destination against Earth re-encounter is 
absolute. 
3) Long Term Risk of Earth Re-Encounter 
Rescue ~tions. Because of the relatively larqe hyperbolic excess velocity, 
extended duration, and extreme ranges (up to 6 AU) lnvolved in transfer to 
Jupiter, rescue is beyond the capabilitles of the orbit transfer systems used 
for deployment. As development of high capability, advanced space systems 
strictly for rescue is not considered feasible, the Jupiter impact option is 
considered to preclude ~escue as an option for coping with deployment system 
fail ures. 
Due to Deployment~tem ~ail~~~. Probability of Earth re-encounter due to 
deployment system fa11ure was evaluated using data from Reference 5. The as-
sumption was made that, due to similarity in departure hyperbolic excess 
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veloc1ty, the probab1l1ty of re-encounter for Jup1ter impact was 1dentical to 
the calculated value 1n Reference 5 for re-encounter due to deployment fa1lure 
dur1ng solar system escape. 
The probab1l1ty as calculated of Earth re-encounter w1th1n lx106 years due to 
deployment system fa1lure 1S 0.006 for a slngle mission (5). The probable num-
ber of Earth re-encounters for the 580 m1SS1ons in the reference miss10n set 
becomes (0.006)(580) or about 3.5 payloads. For the reference payload of 3270 
kg, th1S 1S equ1valent to a rounded total depos1t1on of about 10,000 kg. Even 
more 1mportant lS the depos1t1on rate. Instead of be1ng dlstr1buted over a 
1xl00 year span, the waste payload would be deposited 1n the atmosphere 1n 3270 
kg 1ncrements over a per10d of 30 sec. Three or more such events are probable 
1n the m1ll1on years follow1ng deployment. Atmospher1c dispersion of the waste 
payload 1S probable due to an entry veloc1ty of between 11 and 41 km/sec. Most 
entr1es would occur at veloc1t1es between 11.2 and 12 km/sec, w1th about 10% 
rang1ng upwards between 12 and 41 km/sec (5). The higher velocities 1n this 
range would pose a severe r1sk to waste payload containment. 
Due to Partlcle Fallback After Meteoro1d Strike. Fallback from the Jup1ter at-
mosphere dest1nat1on lS 1mposs1ble. 
Uue to Earth Intersect10n w1th the Nom1nal Destination Orbit. Earth 1ntersec-
-------
t10n w1th the Jup1ter orb1t lS imposs1ble. 
4) Factors Related to M1SS1on Cost 
Total delta-V from LEO to Jup1ter 1mpact transfer orbit 1nsertion is about 7 
km/sec (3). An orb1t correct1on stage w1th 50 m/sec delta-V capability is 
used. The relat1vely h1gh veloc1ty 1ncrement reduces payload by about 1/3 
compared to the reference destination, and requires expending a capable and rel-
at1vely costly cryogen1c propellant OTV. Primary additional influences on cost 
i ncl ude: 
o An expendable placement stage lS used up w1th each mlSSlon. 
o Launch wlndoW5 are ava1lable for only 3 months out of each 13 (3). 
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This amounts to about 23% availability and would require an exceSSlve launch 
rate of two launches every 3 days. 
This destination shows the potential for significant cost increase compared to 
the reference heliocentric orbit destination. 
5} Other Factors 
Retrieval or passive tracking are impossible for payloads delivered into the at-
mosphere of Jupiter. 
Implications for future use are negligible. Waste payloads or dispersed parti-
cles of waste payloads are compelled, because of their high molecular weight, 
to sink rapidly to depths in the Jovian atmosphere where pressure and tempera-
ture are high enough to preclude exploration or exploitation. Glven enough 
time, waste particles will diffuse all the way to Jupiter's dense metallic 
core; about 60,000 km below the cloud tops. 
6) Comments 
Launch window constraints, high long-term risk of re-encounter, and low perform-
ance make this option relatively unattractive despite very efficient isolation 
of delivered payloads. 
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DESTINATION 8. ASTEROID SOFT LANDING 
1) Mission Scenario Summary 
The asteroid soft landing is, along with lunar soft landing, the most complex 
mission scenario studied. In addition to the re-usable injection stage, an ex-
pendable placement stage with a primary propulsion capability of 1.0 km/sec and 
autonomous rendezvous and landing capability is required for terminal rendez-
vous with the asteroid destination. 
Primary events after injection of the payload and orbit transfer system into 
low Earth orbit by the uprated space shuttle include: (1) a primary velocity 
impulse maneuver which injects the OTV and payload into the minimum energy as-
teroid transfer orbit; (2) separation of the waste payload attached to the 
placement stage; (3) an initial midcourse correction performed by the placement 
stage at about injection plus 5 days to correct for injection errors; (4) if 
required, a second maneuver at rendezvous minus 30 days to correct execution 
errors from the preceding maneuvers; (5) a second primary propulsion maneuver 
which leaves placement stage and payload in the same orbit with the asteroid at 
a distance of about 750 km; (6) terminal rendezvous operations; and (7) 
landing/docking operations followed by explosive anchoring to the asteroid sur-
face. 
Injection stage (OTV) recovery begins with a retroburn immediately following 
separation of the payload. This injects the stage into an elliptical return 
orbit. An aerobraking maneuver at periapsis injects the OTV into a phasing 
orbit. Burn at apoapsis of the phasing orbit raises peri apsis to 1260 km and 
is followed in half a revolution by LEO circularization. OTV recovery opera-
tions and shuttle landing complete the mission. Total OTV mission duration 
away from LEO is about 62 hours. 
2) Destination Stability 
Stability of the asteroid surface destlnation against Earth re-encounter is 
absolute. 
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3) Long Term Risk of Earth Re-Encounter 
Rescue Options. The selected injection trajectory allows the waste payload and 
associated orbit transfer systems to be rescued after failure at any point in 
the deployment stages with sufficient time before re-encounter to allow multi-
ple rescue attempts. 
Due to De~~~~~_~stem Failure. Capability for execution of multiple rescue 
attempts after deployment system failure at any point ensures mission comple-
tion after deployment system failure. 
Due to Particle Fallback after Meteoroid Strike. Fallback from the asteroid 
surface destination is impossible. 
Due to Earth Intersection with the Nominal Destination Orbit. Earth intersec-
tion with the asteroid orbit is impossible. 
4) Factors Related to Mlssion Cost 
Typical delta-V from LEO to the asteroid surface destination (1943 Anteros) is 
5.50 km/sec, divided approximately into a 4.6 km/sec injection maneuver and a 
0.9 km/sec asteroid orbit insertion maneuver. Due to the requirement for 0.9 
km/sec placement delta-V, the placement stage mass is equal to about 60% of the 
payload mass; delivered payload mass is almost identical to the mass of payload 
delivered by the reference heliocentric orbit mission. Primary addltional in-
fluences on cost include: 
o Recovery of the injection stage for re-use. 
o Complexity/cost of the automated rendezvous and "landing" capability 
required by the placement stage. 
o Expending of the placement stage with each mission. 
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o Launch windows are available for only 3 months out of each 19. This amounts 
to about 16% availability and would require an excessive launch rate of very 
close to one launch per day for 3 months. 
The excessive launch rate and the complex guidance required for the placement 
stage combine to increase the cost of this option relative to disposal at the 
reference heliocentric orbit destination. 
5) Other Factors 
Retrievability of payloads is not considered feasible due to energy (delta-V) 
requirements and the operational difflculties involved in waste payload loca-
tion and pickup on the asteroid surface. 
Passive tracking of waste payloads from Earth surface or LEO locations is impos-
sible for existinq technology due to the extreme range required. 
Implications for future use are minimal. Any asteroid selected could be at 
least partly barred from other uses but, with a total of 47 asteroids 
identified so far in the Apollo-Amor group (2), designation of one for space 
disposal is a reasonable approach. 
6) Comments 
The asteroid, in effect, serves as a waste "depot" with a stable orbit. The 
relatively high velocity requirements, the cost of expending a complex place-
ment stage, and the limited launch window weigh against the assured stability 
of the destinatlon in assessment of this option. 
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DESTINATION 9. SOLAR IMPACT 
1) Mission Scenario Summary 
The extreme energy requirements of the solar impact destination (C3=725 
km2/sec2) are equivalent to an impulsive hyperbolic excess velocity of about 24 
km/sec (5) and are beyond the practical capabilities of chemical propulsion sys-
tems. Reference 5 examined advanced propulsion options for solar impact dis-
posal of nuclear waste and selected two nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) 
options as feasible. For this study, the most economical option in terms of 
shuttle launches was used. The mission scenario is simple. Primary events 
after injection of the NEP stage and waste payload into low Earth orbit by the 
approved space shuttle include: (1) engine startup and spiral to Earth escape 
injection (about 800 days); (2) a continuous low acceleration propulsion maneu-
ver which results in placement in a solar impact trajectory (about 560 days); 
and (3) passive inbound fall to solar impact (355 days) (total mission duration 
from start burn in LEO to photosphere entry is 1120 days or about 3 years). 
Stability of the solar impact destination against Earth re-encounter is 
absolute. 
3) Long Term Risk of Earth Re-Encounter 
Rescue Options. Because of the high hyperbolic excess velocity required (in ex-
cess of 24 km/sec) and extreme ranges (in excess of 3.5 AU) involved in the 
transfer to the solar impact orbit, rescue in times shorter than reasonable sys-
tem lifetimes for the deplo~ent orbit transfer systems is beyond their capabil-
ities. Failure of a beacon transponder at the ranges required would render the 
vehicle untrackable, also preventinq rescue. Accordingly, the solar impact 
option is considered to EFeclude rescue as an option for coping wlth deployment 
system failures. 
Due to Deployment ~ste~ Fallure. Probability of Earth re-encounter due to 
deployment system failure within 1 x 106 years wa~ calculated as 6 x 10-3 for 
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a single mission (5). This is identlcal to the probability calculated for des-
tination 6, Juplter impact, and followinQ the analysis conducted for destina-
tion 7, lt is probable that this wlll result in three or more waste payload 
reentries in 1 x 106 years. Entry velocities would range between 12 and 45 
km/sec, but in thlS case the chance of entry velocity being over 15 km/sec is 
65% wlth a signlficant (greater than 20%) probability that the velocity will be 
over 40 km/sec. The extreme entry velocities increase the likelihood of loss 
of containment during entry, allowing some portion of the waste payload to dis-
perse in the atmosphere. 
Du~~~Parti~l~_~~l~ack_tc~~ Meteroid Strike. Fallback from the solar impact 
destination is impossible. 
Due to Earth Intersection with the Nominal Destination Orbit. Earth intersec-
tion with the solar impact destination is impossible. 
4) Factors Related to Mission Cost 
Total cost for the solar impact mission studied is dominated by the cost of 
expending the nuclear electric propulsion stage. Costs for the stage were 
estimated from Reference 15 at approximately $115M per unit (lQSO $). 
Exercising this over a range of assumptions on unit production costs led to se-
--- lection of an average cost per stage of ,$100M per unit. This figure so domi-
nates mission cost that other factors wete neglected. 
5) Other Factors 
Retrieval and passive tracking are impossible with existing technology; implica-
tions for future use or other impact are negllgib1e. 
6) COlTJT1ents 
The combination of high cost, due to expendlnq an extremely expensive upper 
stage, and high rlsk, due to lack of rescue capah,llty, must be weiqhed against 
the security of the solar surface dS a destinatlon. 
0180-26426-2 
43 
DESTINATION 10. EARTH ESCAPE ELLIPSE 
1) ~ission Scenario Summary 
The injection to a minimum energy Earth escape ellipse requires less energy 
than any other destination studied and shares the simplest injection mission 
profile with solar system escape. Primary events after injection of payload 
and orbit transfer system into low Earth orbit by the upgraded space shuttle 
are limited to a single velocity impulse maneuver which injects the waste pay-
load into an elliptical heliocentric orbit with a perihelion at about 0.85 AU. 
Injection stage recovery from the escape orbit begins with a retroburn immedi-
ately following separation of the payload. This injects the stage into an el-
liptical return orbit. An aerobraking maneuver at peri apsis inserts the OTV 
into a phasing orbit; a burn at apoapsis of the phasing orbit raises periapsis 
to 260 km and is followed in half a revolution by LEO circularization. OTV re-
covery operations and shuttle landing complete the mission. Total OTV mission 
duration away from LEO is about 62 hours. 
Probability of re-encounter of a single waste payload deployed in a heliocen-
tric, elliptical orbit tangent to the Earth's orbit has been calculated in ref-
erence 4 as about 0.2 for a period of 1 x 106 years. This result, calculated 
using a numerical Monte Carlo simulation of planetary encounters, is lower than 
the probabilties as predicted by analytical methods by a factor of 4, but still 
implies (within a factor of 2 to 5) that 20% of all payloads deployed will re-
encounter the Earth within 1 x 106 years. For the nominal mission model of 530 
waste payloads, this is equivalent to re-entry of 116 waste payloads within the 
first 1 x 106 years. Using the most optimistic value for the range of uncer-
tainty, this becomes 23 waste payloads or on the order of 1 x 105 kg of waste 
form returned. Each unprotected entering waste payload would liberate up to 
1500 kg of waste form in a period of about 30 sec (14). The remainder would 
hit the ground and be buried. This is equivalent to a better than 95% 
probabilty that the first re-encounter will take place in the first 1000 years. 
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Accordingly, this destination cannot be considered stable; risk of Earth re-
encounter is unacceptable and this destination will not be considered further. 
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DESTINATION 11. HELIOCENTRIC ORBIT (INNER) AT 0.85 AU 
This misslon was chosen as the reference concept for space disposal of nuclear 
waste by the 1979-80 Battelle/MSFC study. Its characterlstics have been used 
as the standard for evaluatlon of other concepts. The reference mlssion sce-
narlO uses a two-stage orbit transfer system: a cryogenic, re-usable OTV is 
used as the injection staqe with a simpler, storable propellant second staqe 
used for placement. Primary events after injection of payload and orblt trans-
fer system into low Earth orbit include: (1) a primary veloclty lmpulse maneu-
ver which injects OTV and payload into the minimum enerqy transfer orbit; (2) 
separation of the waste payload attached to the placement staqe; (3) lf 
required, a midcourse correction performed by the placement stage at about In-
jection plus 5 days to correct for injection errors; and (4) a second primary 
propulsion maneuver which leaves placement stage and payload in the destlnatlon 
heliocentrlc orbit. 
Injection stage (OTV) recovery begins with a retroburn lmmediately following 
separation of the payload. This inserts the stage into an elliptical return 
orbit. An aerobraking maneuver at periapsis inserts the OTV into a phasing 
orbit; a burn at apoapsis of the phasing orbit raises peri apsis to 260 km and 
lS followed in half a revolution by LEO circularization. OTV recovery opera-
tions and shuttle landinq complete the mission. Total OTV mission duration 
away from LEO is about 62 hours. 
2) Destination Stabil~!l 
Stability of the heliocentric orblt destlnation against Earth re-encounter has 
been analytically verifled to 1 x 106 years (27). 
Rescue Options. The selected lnjection trajectory allows the waste payload and 
associated orbit transfer systems to be rescued after failure at any point in 
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the deployment sequence with sufflcient time before re-encounter to allow multi-
ple rescue attempts. 
Due to Deployment System Failure. Capability for execution of multiple rescue 
~ attempts after deployment system failure at any point ensures mission continua-
tion after deployment system failure. 
--
( 
Due to Particle Fallback After Meteoroid Strike. Fallback from the heliocen-
tric orbit destination is negligible (14). 
Due to Earth Intersection with the Nominal Destination Orbit. Earth intersec-
tion with the heliocentric orbit destination is impossible. 
4) Factors Relat~~~~_~i~sion Cost 
The delta-V from LEO to the 0.85 AU heliocentric orbit destination is 4.S4 
km/sec divided approximately into a 3.4 km/sec injection maneuver and a 1.3 
km/sec heliocentric orbit placement maneuver. The 1.3 km/sec delta-V capabil-
ity required for the placement stage results in a stage mass equal to about 70% 
of the waste payload mass; the payload mass delivered by this option (5075 kg) 
has been used in this study as a standard of comparison for the other destina-
tions studied. Additional cost characteristics of the reference mission 
include: 
o Recovery of the injection staqe for re-use 
o The placement stage is expended 
o Launch windows can be chosen any day at any time 
This option has the lowest analytically verified risk level and except for the 
rejected Earth escape ellipse destination is the lowest cost option outside the 
geolunar system. 
5) Other Factors 
Retrieval from the hellocentrlc orblt destination is prohibitively expensive 
due to the delta-V requlred and duration of the retrleval mission; passive 
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tracking is prohibited by the dlstance from the disposal site to Earth (a mini-
mum of about 22 million km). 
Implications for future use are not indicated. No alternate uses have been 
identified for the destination orbit. 
6) Comments 
Risk and cost factors make this the logical choice as a reference destination. 
The risk is as low as practically achievable, and the cost is lowest of viable 
deep space options considered. 
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DESTINATION 12. HELIOCENTRIC ORBIT (OUTER) AT 1.15 AU 
The characteristics of destinatlon 12 are substantially identical to those of 
destination 11. 
0180-26426-2 
49 
DESTINATION 13. SUN/EARTH LIBRATION POINT "TADPOLE" ORBITS 
Tadpole orbits about the L4 Sun/Earth libration points were investigated in Ref-
erence 5 which concluded that the orbits could be stable for long periods of 
time and might be accessible with delta-V's comparable to or lower than those 
for the reference heliocentric orbit. A further investigation was undertaken 
using Reference 4. 
The chosen orbit passes within 75,000 km of the Sun/Earth L4 point and is repre-
sentatlve of the most stable tadpole orbit confiqurations. Other configura-
tions require lower delta-V's but exhibit reduced stability (17). 
The mlssion scenario is similar to that for the heliocentric orbit destination 
but involves a circularization at about 1.0 AU rather than 0.85 AU. The two-
staqe orbit transfer system used is also similar. A cryogenic, reusable OTV is 
used as the injection stage with a simple, storable propellant upper stage used 
for placement. Prlmary events after insertion of payload and orbit transfer 
system into low Earth orbit by the uprated space shuttle include: (1) a primary 
velocity impulse maneuver which injects OTV and payload into an elliptical 
phasing orblt; (2) separation of the waste payload and placement stage; (3) if 
required, a midcourse correction at about injection plus 5 days to correct for 
injection errors; (4) an aphelion trim burn at perihelion of the transfer orbit 
at about lnjection plus 150 days (this burn fixes the aphelion radius to within 
about 0.001 AU in preparation for placement); and (5) a final placement burn at 
about injection plus 300 days which inserts the payload and expended placement 
stage into the destination "tadpole" orbit about the Sun/Earth L4 point. 
Injectlon stage (OTV) recovery begins with a retroburn immediately following 
separation of the payload which injects the stage into an elliptical return 
orbit. An aerobraklng maneuver at peri apsis injects the OTV into a phasing 
orbit; a burn at apoapsis of the phasing orbit raises peri apsis to 1260 km and 
is followed in half a revolution by LEO circularization. OTV recovery opera-
tions and shuttle landing complete the mission. Total OTV mission duration 
away from LEO is about 62 hours. 
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-2) Dest1nation ~tab1l1ty 
The extensive investigations documented 1n Reference 17 indicate that 1I ••• the 
tadpole orb1ts are stable aga1nst perturbations ... for at least 104 years. The 
lack of any change in the librat10n ampl1tude suggests that the orbits are sta-
ble for considerably longer periods. 1I Further numerical integrat10n of the 
type conducted in Reference 17 is recommended 1f further 1nvestigations show 
prom1se for th1S dest1nation but there appears to be good reason to believe 
that these orb1ts w1ll have stab1lity at least equ1valent to the reference he-
110centr1c orb1ts. 
3) Long Term R1Sk of Earth Re-Encounter 
Rescue~ions. The selected 1nJect1on traJectory allows the waste payload and 
assoc1ated orb1t transfer systems to be rescued after failure at any point in 
the deployment sequence w1th suff1c1ent t1me before re-encounter to allow mult1-
ple rescue attempts. 
Due to Deployment System Fa1lur~. Capability for execution of multiple rescue 
attempts after deployment system failure at any point ensures mission comple-
t10n after deployment system failure. 
Due to Part1cle Fallback after Meteoroid Strike. Fallback from the tadpole 
orb1t 1S 1mposs1ble. 
Uue to Earth Intersect10n w1th the Nominal Destination Orbit. Earth intersec-
t10n w1th the tadpole orb1t is 1mposs1ble. 
4) Factors Related to M1ss~on Cost 
TYP1cal veloc1ty 1ncrements requ1red for tadpole orbit 1njection vary from 
about 4.2 km/sec to 5.5 km/sec, depend1ng on the exact tadpole orbit chosen, 
and constra1n1ng the t1me spent 1n transfer orb1t to less than 1 year. A typi-
cal value would prov1de a veloc1ty split ident1cal to the reference heliocen-
tr1c orb1t dest1nation, w1th a total delta-V of about 4.5 km/sec divided 1nto 
a 3.4 km/sec 1nJect1on maneuver and a 1.3 km/sec tadpole orbit placement 
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maneuver. The 1.3 km/sec delta-V capabillty required for the placement stage 
results in a stage mass equal to about 70% of the waste payload mass; the pay-
load mass dellvered by this option (5075 kg) would be identical to that of the 
reference system. Additional cost characteristics of the reference mission 
include: 
o Recovery of the injectlon stage for re-use 
o The placement stage is expended 
o Launch windows can be chosen any day at any time 
This option offers both cost and risk comparable to the reference system; some 
savings in delta-V are possible with further verification of tadpole orbit sta-
bility parameters. 
5) Other Factors 
Retrieval from the tadpole orbit destination would be very expensive due to the 
delta-V required and duration of the retrieval mission; passive tracking is 
prohibited by the distance from the disposal orbit to Earth (a minimum of about 
80 million km). 
Implications for future use are not indicated. No alternate uses have been 
identified for the destinatlon orbit. 
6) Comments 
This option offers the best alternative to the reference heliocentric orbit des-
tination among the deep space destinations investigated. Any savings in 
delta-V must be weighed against the increased navigational accuracy required 
for placement and the longer (300 to 330 day vs. 160 day) mission duration. 
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DESTINATION 14. SOLAR SYSTEM ESCAPE 
1) Mission_Scenario Summary 
The mission profile for solar system escape is the simplest of the 14 studied. 
The orbit transfer system is a single stage expendable cryogenic OTV. The sin-
gle primary event after insertion of payload and orbit transfer system into low 
Earth orbit by the uprated space shuttle is a IS-min injection burn which pro-
vides payload and OTV with the 8.75 km/sec delta-V required for insertion into 
the hyperbollc solar system escape orbit. The OTV is expended. No placement 
stage is required as the OTV is capable of achieving the required accuracy at 
initial injection. 
2) Destination Stability 
Stability of the payload against Earth re-encounter once injected into a hyper-
bolic escape orbit is absolute. 
3} Long Term Risk of Earth Re-Encounter 
Rescue Options. Because of the unique characteristics of the solar system es-
cape mission, rescue for all possible failure modes of the orbit transfer sys-
tem is impossible. Failure of the OTV propulsion system late in the injection 
burn could leave the payload on a pseudo-cometary Earth crossing orbit with a 
period ranging from one to hundreds or thousands of years. Rescue missions 
using orbit transfer systems similar to the deployment system would take simi-
lar periods to accomplish rescue. These durations, however, are far beyond the 
capabllity of existing or planned systems, making rescue impossible. In ef-
fect, the failed vehicle would slmply outrun any pursuing rescue vehicle. 
An equally dangerous failure mode would be failure of the onboard transponder, 
which would eliminate the abillty to carry out the long term tracking required 
to determine the vehicle trajectory with any degree of accuracy. A subsequent 
(or simultaneous) propulsion system failure would leave the waste payload in an 
unpredictable Earth crossing orblt; lack of detailed trajectory data would make 
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rendezvous and rescue lmposslble, regardless of the performance of the rescue 
system. 
Due to Deployment System Fallure. Probablllty of Earth re-encounter due to 
deployment system fallure wlthout rescue was evaluated for the solar system es-
cape mlSSlon uSlng data from Reference 5. The probabillty of Earth re-
encounter withln 1 x 106 years due to deployment system fallure lS calculated 
as 0.006 for a slngle mlSSlon (5). The probable number of Earth re-encounters 
for the 580 mlSSlons In the reference mlSSlon set becomes (0.006)(580) or about 
3.5 payloads. For the reference payload of 3270 kg, thlS lS equlvalent to a 
rounded total deposltlon of about 10,000 kg. Even more lmportant 1S the deposl-
tlon rate. Instead of belng dlstrlbuted over a 1 x 106 year span, the waste 
payload would be depos1ted In the atmosphere In 3270 kg lncranents over a 
perlod of 30 sec. Three or more such events are probable in the mllllon years 
following deployment. Efficlent deposltlon lS assured by an entry velocity of 
between 17 and 41 km/sec. Most entrles would occur at veloclt1es between 11.2 
and 12 km/sec, wlth about 10% ranglng upwards between 12 and 41 km/sec (5). 
Due to Partlcle Fallback After Meteorold Strlke. Fallback from the hyperbol1c 
escape orblt destlnatlon lS lmposslble. 
Due to Earth Intersectlon Wlth the Nomlnal Destinatlon Orbit. Earth lntersec-
tlon with the hyperbolic escape orbit is impossible. 
4) Factors Related to Mlsslon Cost 
Total delta-V from LEO to solar system escape orblt is about 8.75 km/sec (7). 
The relatlvely hlgh veloclty lncrement reduces payload by about 1/3 compared to 
the reference destlnatlon. The prlmary addltlonal lnfluence on cost is the 
expendlng of a capable and expenS1ve OTV wlth each misslon. 
Use of solar system escape as a space dlsposal destinatlon would cost signlfi-
cantly more than dlsposal at the reference hellocentric orblt destinatlon. 
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5) Other Factors 
Retrieval and passive tracklng are impossible; implications for future use are 
not indlcated; significant contamination of interstellar space is impossible. 
6) Comments 
Both cost and risk of Earth re-encounter are significantly higher for solar sys-
tem escape than for the heliocentric orbit reference. The increased risk illus-
trates the distinction between risk and mission reliability. 
Mission Reliablllty, in the sense of the ratio of successful deployments to 
failed missions, is higher for solar system escape than for hellocentric orbit 
due to the extreme simplicity of the misslon profile. 
Mission Risk, however, is also higher due to the lack of rescue capability, so 
that even with the higher reliability per mission, more payloads re-encounter 
the Earth due to failures during the solar system escape mission. Failures dur-
ing deployment to heliocentric orbit are prevented from resulting in re-
encounter wlth high efflciency by use of the rescue option (4). 
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2.4 EVALUATION UF CANDIDATE DESTINATIONS 
The dest1nat1on character1stlcs shown In Section 2.3 were compared to prov1de 
relat1ve evaluat10ns of the worth of the dest1nat1ons 1n the three pr1mary 
areas of r1sk, costs, and 1mpl1cat1ons for future use. 
2.4.1 Eval~at1o~Lo~~Term R1Sk of Earth Re-Encounter. Long term r1sk lS 
the primary evaluat10n cr1ter1a for destinat1ons. Relat1ve r1sk of the 14 des-
t1nat1ons considered are summar1zed 1n F1gure 2.3-1. R1Sk is expressed 1n 
terms of total expected return of waste form 1n the f1rst m1ll1on years follow-
1ng deployment and 1n terms of the est1mated maximum deposit1on rate 1n k1lo-
grams per year for return1ng payloads. Numbers are based on in1tal deployment 
of 580 waste payloads. 
Four destlnatlons show a slgn1f1cantly greater r1sk than the hel1ocentr1c orbit 
reference dest1nation. All offer the poss1b1l1ty of 1ntact reentry of a waste 
form, an event capable of d1str1but1ng on the order of 1000 kg of waste form 
1nto the atmosphere w1th1n a per10d of 30 sec. Three of the dest1nations 
(dest1nation 7; Jup1ter 1mpact; dest1nat1on 9; solar 1mpact; and destination 
14; solar system escape) are characterized by lack of a rescue capab1l1ty to 
cope w1th fa1lure of the deployment system. 
Analyses of the consequences of deployment system failures are d1scussed 1n Sec-
tion 2.3. Dest1nat1on 10, the Earth escape ell1pse, poses an excessive risk of 
Earth encounter due to the 1ntersect1on of the nominal deployment orbit w1th 
the Earth's orb1t. Studles d1scussed In Section 2.3 indicate that return of 
more than 10 waste payloads could be expected from the Earth escape ell1pse des-
tinat10n 1n the f1rst m1ll1on years follow1ng deployment. 
The rema1n1ng dest1nations are essent1ally equ1valent 1n risk. Dest1nat1on 1, 
lunar surface soft land1ng; dest1nat1on 5, lunar orb1t; dest1nat1on 6, Venus 
1mpact; destinat10n 8, astero1d soft land1ng; dest1nat1ons 11 and 12, hel1ocen-
tric orb1ts; and dest1nat1on 13, Sun/Earth tadpole orbits are characterized by 
essent1al zero return of waste payload In the f1rst mill10n years following 
deployment. For three dest1natlons In the Earth-Moon system (dest1nat1on 2, 
h1gh Earth orb1t; dest1nat1on 3, retrograde h1gh Earth orb1t; and destinat10n 
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4, orblts about the Earth-Moon Trojan pOlnts), the expected return lS on the 
order of 10 kg over a mllllon years due to particle fallback resulting from 
meterold fragmentation of one or more of the orbitlng payloads. The estlmated 
maXlmum deposltlon rate per year due to this fallback, however, lS llmited to 
approxlmately 10 mg/yr; a level far below the threshold of observable affects 
(14). 
2.4.2 Evaluation of Cost Related Factors. Cost factors were evaluated prlmar-
lly as a differentlator for rlsk equivalent destlnatlons. Primary inputs to 
the cost evaluatlon lncluded staglng options, reuse optlons, required launch 
rates and payload deployed per mlssion, a factor strongly dependent on the 
delta-V requlred to reach a partlcular destination. 
The obJectlve was to use these inputs to provide a qualitatlve comparlson of 
the relatlve cost for dlsposal at the 14 destlnatlons. The approach used was 
flrst to determine a factor proportlonal to the number of missions required to 
deploy the reference mass of payloads to a given destination and then to deter-
mine a factor proportlonal to the cost of each mission. These factors were com-
blned to Yleld an overall cost factor for each destination which was then 
normallzed to the cost of dellvery to the reference 0.85 AU heliocentric orblt. 
The flrst step was to determlne a factor proportional to the number of missions 
required for delivery of waste payload to a glven destination. This factor was 
termed the mlSSlon quantlty factor, or MQF, and was derived by dlvidlng the ref-
erence payload by the payload deployed per mission for each of the 14 
destinations. Each destination showed a Sllghtly dlfferent payload deployed 
per launch of a slngle uprated shuttle; the dlfferences were primarily due to 
the delta-V dlfferences between mlSSlons. Values for the payload deployed per 
mlSSlon were obtalned from past studles or calculated as requlred. Values 
shown In Flgure 2.4-1 range from a low of 0.86 for the relatively low delta-V 
Earth/Moon Trojan pOlnt destlnatlon to a hlgh of 3.01 for the high delta-V 
solar system escape mlSSlon with ltS proportlonally smaller payload deployed 
per mlSSlon. 
The next step was to determlne a factor proportlonal to the cost of each lndl-
vldual mlSSlon. Costs determlned were then normallzed to a reference mlSSlon 
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FACTORS RELATED TO COST PER MISSION MCF IooIOF CleF 
DESTINATION FI F2 F3 F4 ItFNI IMCI'XMQfI 
I. LUNAR SURFACE 0.42 0 0 0.71 1.1.3 1. 83 2.07 
2. HEO f'OSlGRADE 0.13 0 0 O. 71 0.84 0.90 0.76 
1 HEO RETROGRADE 0.13 0 0 0.71 0.84 1. 00 0.84 
4 EIMTROJAN 0.13 0 0 0.71 0.84 0.86 0.72 
L LUNAR ORBIT 0.13 0 0 0.71 0.84 0.94 0.79 
.. VENUS ENTRY 0.13 0.08 0.18 0.71 1.11 0.88 0.98 
7. JUPITER ENTRY 0.39 0.08 0.11 0.71 1. 29 1. 54 1. 99 
.. ASTEROID 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.71 1. 13 1. 20 1. 36 
.. SUN INE~ 2.63 0 0 0.71 3.34 1. 00 3.34 
\Q, EARTH ESCAJtE ELLIPSE 0.13 0 0 0.71 0.84 0.84 0.71 
1 I. HIC INNER 0.13 0.16 0 O. 71 1. 00 1. 00 1. 00 
12. HI'COVTER 0.13 0.16 0 0.71 1. 00 1. 04 1. 04 
11 lIE TROJAN 0.13 0.18 0 0.71 1. 03 1. 20 1. 24 
'''' SSE 0.39 0 0 0.71 1. 10 3.01 3.31 
F,gure 2.4-1. Qualitative Cost Factor Determination 
cost of $38 milllon. Four primary mlssion cost factor areas were ldentified. 
The first factor, Fl, was determined as a function of reuse options and stage 
complexity. Values normallzed to the reference system total mission costs are 
shown in Figure 2.4-1 and range from 0.13 for full reuse of the injection stage 
to a high of 2.63 reflectinq the high individual cost of the nuclear electric 
propulsion system used for the solar lmpact mission. 
F2, the second factor, reflected normallzed cost of the placement stage used on 
some misslons. Placement stages were dlfferentiated on the basis of navigation 
system complexity and whether or not they incorporated a primary propulsion sys-
tem. Normalized values for F2 shown ln Figure 2.4-1 range from 0.08 to 0.16, 
illustrating the relatlvely low cost of placement stages relative to total mis-
sion cost. 
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-F3, the third cost factor, reflected the facilities impact cost required by the 
higher launch rates needed by some destinations, distributed over the total num-
ber of missions and normalized to the total mission cost. Distributed 
facilities impact for the most restrictive launch windows considered amounted 
to approximately 20% of the cost per mission. 
F4, the final factor evaluated, reflected launch costs and was common to all 
options, reflecting a $27 million launch cost. When normalized this represents 
71% of the total reference mission cost, and when compared to the other cost 
factors illustrates the dominance of launch cost 1n the nuclear waste disposal 
mission. 
Cost factors F1 through F4 were then added to obtain a single composite mission 
cost factor (MCF). Mission cost factors are shown in Figure 2.4-1. Most 
values are fairly close to the reference value, illustrating again the domi-
nance of launch cost. The only real standout in cost per mission 1S the solar 
impact option reflecting the influence of a $100 million average cost of the nu-
clear electric propulsion stage. 
Mission cost factors were then multiplied by the mission quantity factor to ob-
tain the qualitative cost factor (QCF) shown in Figure 2.4-1. Qualitative cost 
factors range from a low of about 70% of the reference system cost factor to a 
high of about three times the reference system cost for the solar system escape 
and solar impact destinations. 
All together, when compared to the reference destination 11, six destinations 
imply slgnlficant increases in deployment costs. Destination 1, lunar surface, 
is penalized by a relatively low payload per mission and the requirement to ex-
pend the orbit transfer vehicle. Destination 7 deploys a relatively low pay-
load per mission due to the high delta-V involved. The same high delta-V re-
quirement requires expending the injection stage which also adds to the cost. 
Destination 8 combines the d1sadvantages of a high launch rate, an expendable 
placement stage, and a payload smaller than the reference mission payload. Des-
t1nation 9, solar 1mpact, 1S heavlly penalized by the high cost of the nuclear 
electric 1njection stage. Destinatlon 13, orbits around the Sun/Earth Trojan 
points, has costs comparable to but sllqhtly higher than the reference due to 
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the slightly lower payload per mission. Destination 14, solar system escape 1S 
severly penal1zed by the relatlvely low payload deployed per m1ssion which 
requires a total of almost three times the number of flights needed for deploy-
ment to the reference heliocentric orbit destination. 
Three destinations in the geolunar system show the potent1al for sign1ficant 
savings in deployment cost. Destination 2, posigrade high Earth orbit, shows 
a cost factor only three-quarters of that for the reference mission due primar-
ily to increased payload deployed per mission, combined with the ability to re-
cover and reuse the injection stage and the savings involved in not expending 
a placement stage. Essentially the same reasons account for the sim1lar cost 
effectiveness of destination 4, orbits about the Earth/Moon Trojan point, and 
destination 5, lunar orbit. 
2.4.3 Evaluation of Other Factors. Factors besides cost and rlsk investigated 
in evaluation of destinations included lmplications for future use, which was 
ranked with cost and risk as a primary differentiation criteria; and the capa-
bility for passive monitoring from the Earth's surface or low orbit of deployed 
payload position and velocity. A third factor was the ability to retrieve a 
deployed payload rapldly and economically, which was considered as being poten-
tially useful but of secondary importance in destination d1fferent1ation. Only 
one of the destinat10ns studled, destination 6, Venus impact, posed serious con-
tamination problems, combining identifled potential uses for the destination 
with the potential for wide spread contamination. 
Four options in the geolunar system offer straightforward recovery options. 
Posigrade and retrograde high Earth orbits, orbits about the Earth/Moon Trojan 
points, and lunar orbit share the potential for relatively low cost rapld recov-
ery of waste forms. 
The same locations are close enough to the Earth to make passive position moni-
tor using Earth based laser radar or low Earth orbit based lnfrared telescopes 
possible. This passive tracking is a primary factor enabling waste form 
recovery. 
2.5 CANDIDATE DESTINATION SELECTION 
Final screening to select destlnatlons for the study used the character1stics 
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defined in Section 2.4 and the primary crlteria of risk, cost, and lmpllcations 
for future use. 
The criteria were weighted as follows: 
1. Risk. Destinations showing significantly increased risk compared to the 
reference 0.85 AU heliocentric orbit destination were rejected for further 
conslderation. 
2. Cost. Destlnations showing significantly increased cost compared to the 
reference destination were rejected. 
3. Implications for future use. Destinations evaluated as havlng negative im-
plications for future use were rejected. 
Results of the screeninq are illustrated in Figure 2.5-1. 
CANDIDATE 
DESTINATION 
" LUNAR SURFACE 
2, HEO POSI 
3, HEO RETRO 
4, ElM TROJAN 
6, LUNAR ORBIT 
8, VENUS 
1, JUPITER 
8) ASTEROID 
9, SUN 
10, EARTH ESCAPE 
ELLIPSE 
'" HIC INNER 
12, HIC OUTER 
13) S/E/ORBITS 
14) SSE 
RISK COST IMPL FOR INITIAL SCREENING 
SCORE SCORE FUTURE RESULTS USE 
1 X 1 
1 1 1 --HEO POSIGRADE 
1 1 1 ~HEO. RETROGRADE 
1 1 1 ~EARTH/MOON TROJAN 
ORBITS • 
1 1 1 -LUNAR ORBIT 
1 1 X 
1 X 1 
1 X 1 
X X 1 
X 1 1 
1 1 1 f---HELIOCENTRIC ORBIT 
0.85AU • 
1 1 1 --HELIOCENTRIC ORBIT 
115AU 
1 X 1 
X X 1 
FIgure 2.5-1' CandIdate DestmatlOn Screenmg 
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FINAL SCREENING 
EARTH MOON TROJAN 
ORBITS 
• ANALYTIC STABILITY 
• REPRESENTATIVE OF 
GENERAL GEOLUNAR 
DESTINATION 
HELIOCENTRIC ORBIT 
o 85AU 
• BEST CHARACTER IZED 
• EXISTING REF FOR 
COMPARISON 
In the columns marked risk score, cost score and impl1cations for future use, 
a 1 indicates acceptabil1ty, and an X 1ndicates that the destination was 
unacceptable 1n the category 1ndicated. The screeninq 1dentif1ed four 
candidates in the geolunar system satlsfY1ng all criteria: posigrade and retro-
grade high Earth orbits, orbits about the Earth/Moon Trojan p01nts, and orbits 
about the Moon itself. Two destinations are identified in deep space which 
satisfied all criteria: heliocentric orbits at 0.85 AU and heliocentric orbits 
at 1.15 AU. Review of the characteristics tabulated in Section 2.4 indicates 
the characteristics of destinations in both geolunar system and deep space were 
similar enough to allow for selection of a single geolunar destination and a 
single deep space destination as representative of all those considered 
acceptable. 
In the geolunar system the Earth/Moon Trojan orbits were selected as a represen-
tative destination. Among the qeolunar destinations consldered, Earth/Moon 
Trojan orbits demonstrate the best stability and have delta-Vis and mission du-
rations comparable to the other three. 
The hellocentric orbit at 0.85 AU was selected as the reference deep space des-
tination. This destination is the best characterized as a result of the work 
performed by the Marshall Space Flight Center in previous studies and is identi-
cal with the existing reference destination which facilitates comparison of 
alternate space system concepts in other areas. 
2.6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. A top down survey of all reasonable destinations showed none w1th less risk 
than the reference destination. 
2. Several destinatlons in the qeolunar system offer the possibility of signlf-
icant costs savings with risk equivalent to the risk of the reference 
system. 
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-Recommendations include: 
1. Continuation of the 0.85 AU radlus heliocentric circular orbit as reference 
destlnation for the study. ThlS choice provides verified stabllity and the 
best long term risk level identlfled for any destination conSldered. 
2. Evaluation of the geolunar system destination as an alternate. This cholce 
offers equivalent long term risk level for the cermet payload carrled as a 
baseline in the study, and provides potential benefits including better res-
cue options which could act to reduce the overall system risk of Earth re-
encounter. Llfe cycle costs are lower due to use of a better performance 
vehicle, lower total delta-V, the abllity to use a fully reusable orbit 
transfer system, and the ellmination of separate development efforts for 
the placement staqe. 
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3.0 MISSION ANALYSIS AND OPERATIONS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first, analysis of delivery 
mission profiles, describes the characterization of the missions required to 
deliver payloads to the 0.85 AU heliocentric orbit destinations selected in the 
destination task. The second part describes our analysis of mission operations 
for the selected missions, and the third, the studies of mission control for 
the space disposal mission selected. 
3.2 DELIVERY MISSION ANALYSIS 
Objectives of the mission analysis effort were to provide mission proflles in 
terms of events sequences, time lines and performance requirements for the 
delivery mission. Key mission profile events which are shared by all chemical 
propulsion orbit transfer system options are: injection stage (OTV) recovery 
and coast and placement. A separate mission analysis was provided for the solar 
electric orbit transfer system options. 
3.2.1 Injectio~ Mission Profile. The injection mission profile is lllustrated 
in Figure 3.2-1. The profile shown is used with a recoverable OTV, but the in-
jection hyperbolic escape orbit is equally applicable to expendable vehicle 
options. Key events in the injection mission profile are numbered from 1 
through 6 in the illustration. First event is the injection burn into the 
Earth escape hyperbolic orbit followed by event 2, separation of the solar 
orbit insertion or placement stage, followed by a retroburn of the orbit trans-
fer vehicle injection stage which places it into the elliptical return orbit. 
A third maneuver at apoapsis of the return orbit adjusts the peri apsis altitude 
to the correct value for the aerobraking pass. Coast is followed by an 
aerobraking maneuver which provides the bulk of the velocity increment required 
for insertion to low orbit. The final maneuver, shown as 5, raises the 
apoapsis to the 160 nmi value required for rendezvous with and recovery by the 
space shuttle orbiter. A f1nal small burn, event 6, circularizes the orbit 
I 
transfer vehicle In the recovery low Earth orbit. A detailed discussion of the 
injection mission profile and its derivation is contained 1n Appendix D. 
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1 
1. INJECTDON INTO EMtni ESCAPE 3.274 km/SE.'c. 
2. SOlS STAGING AND OTV RETRO 
3. ADJUST PERIGEE 
--
Q5 . O.4~~ 
EARTH ORBITAL TRACK 
RETURN ElllP 
LINE OF A:;CAl ORBIT 
IDES 
4. AERO BRAKING MJlINEUVER 1.0 ~ 
6. RAISE PERIGEE T~ME FROM 2 0 -""'-__ ~.~ES~C~A~PE~TO~.8~5 ~XJ1.~O~ALI.!U~ 
II\IJECTION: . 3.0 TRANSFER ORBIT 
6. lEO CIRCUlARIZATlOl\1 HOURS 
Figure 3.2-1: Injection Mission Profile Schematic 
3.2.·2 OTV Reco~~.r:.yJh.?'tiQ..'2J:.~ades. Recovery of the injection stage following 
solar orbit insertion stage injection into heliocentric transfer orbit can be 
an important contributor to reducing the cost of the disposal mission. A re-
view of past references was unable to uncover definitive data on optimization 
of OTV recovery trajectories. The trajectories for recovery of a vehicle using 
aerobraking were also undefined for return from injection to hyperbolic escape 
orbits. 
Accordinqly a study was conducted to define optimum recovery modes for both all 
propulsive and aerobraked OTV recovery options. Several issues are involved in 
characterizing the l~eturn orbit. There is a discrete amount of time required 
to separate the OTV from the solar orbit insertion stage and reorient it for 
the retro maneuver. This time has an impact on the magnitude and the direction 
of the velocity change (delta-V). In addition the total delta-V required for 
the return to LEO is affected by the magnitude of retro delta-V. 
Two different methods of performing the braking maneuver on a hyperbolic orbit 
0180·26426·2 
65 
were analyzed: 
1. Tangential delta-V in which the braking velocity vector is applied tan-
gent to the orbital path. 
2. Co-apsidal delta-V in which the braking velocity vector is oriented 
such that there is no shift in orbit line of apsides. 
A comparison of total return delta-Vas a function of return orbit period for 
the two options resulted in selection of the tangential delta-V option as the 
most economical of delta-V. The comparison is treated in detail in Appendix F, 
Orbit Transfer Vehicle Return Trajectory Trades. 
With the optimum return trajectory option defined, studies were conducted to op-
timize the return orbit period for minimum mission cost. The key trade is 
between payload mass injected, which increases with longer return orbit periods 
due to low return delta-V, and launch costs which increase with longer return 
orbit periods due to orbiter on orbit stay time charges of $0.5 million per 
day. 
Results of the study are summarized in Figure 3.2-2. An estimate of total mis-
SlKI 
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NOMINAL MISSION 
MISSION DURATION 
F,gure 3.2-2: Return Orbit Period OptimlzlJtlon 
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sion cost per payload delivered to heliocentric orbit destination in dollars 
per kilogram is plotted on the vertical scale. The horizontal scale shows mis-
sion duration in hours. Minimum cost is shown at about 60 hours mission dura-
tlon. An inspection of the scale shows that this is not a stronq maximum and 
return mission period may be chosen any time between 40 and 100 hours with llt-
tle overall penalty. 
The duration chosen was 62 hours which is very close to optimum and which 
matches the capabillty of the baseline orbit transfer vehicle studied in the 
OTV Phase A Concept Definition Study, allowing use of a standard unmodified OTV 
for the injection mission. 
3.2.3 Placement Mission Profile. Figure 3.2-3 schematically illustrates the 
placement mission profile. The injection mission places the solar orbit inser-
tion stage and payload into a Hohmann transfer orbit to the 0.85 AU heliocen-
tric orbit placement location. Primary events following injection include an 
optional trajectory trim maneuver at about injection plus 10 days to correct 
for injection inaccuracies. An approximately 165 day coast to peri apsis of the 
transfer orbit is followed by orientation and the placement burn of 1.283 
km/sec at the 165 day point. This mission profile is common to both storable 
propellant and cryogenic propellant solar orbit insertion (placement) stages. 
DESTINATION ORBIT 
(085 AUI 
DA YI AFTER INJECTION 
TRAJECTORY 
TRIM (OPTIONAL) 
_____ L--~~--------~~JP_---------~-_+_-=EARTHATINJECTION 
1011 AT 
PLACEMENT 
IURN 
\.283 
Km/l 
~----------10AU------~~ 
Figure 3.2-3- Placement Mission Profile Schematic 
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3.2.4 Solar Electric Stage Mission Profile. The mlssion profile for the solar 
electric stages as illustrated ln Figure 3.2-4 differs significantly from the 
profile for chemical stages described in the previous section in terms of both 
duration, performance requirements and operation sequence. 
" • 
/ 
," , 
LEO ORBIT: 160NM 028.50 
TIME TO 0.85AU 545 DAYS 
flv TO ESCAPE 7.728 KmlSEC 
fl V ESCAPE - 0.85AU 2.621 Km/SEC 
10.249 Km/SEC 
...... fI ..... ~=---___ ---___ _____ 
\~ o 
........... 
Figure 3.2-4' Solar Electric Stage Mission Profl1e Schematic 
The baseline mission studied for the electric stage involves the followinq key 
events: 
1. A multiturn spiral from lower Earth orbit toward the escape injection 
involving a delta-V of approximately 7.7 km/sec over a period of about 
1 year. 
2. Approximately two-thirds turn splral in to the heliocentric orbit desti-
nation involving a delta-V of about 2.2 km/sec applied over a duration 
of 180 days. Total mission duration is about 545 days with a total 
delta-V of about 10.25 km/sec. Increased delta-V for this option ;s 
largely due to G losses suffered during the 1-year spiral to Earth es-
cape injection. 
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3.3 RESCUE MISSION ANALYSIS 
3.3.1 Introduction. Rescue mission analysis was accomplished for hlqh Earth 
orbit and deep space rescue missions to provide definition of: (1) abort 
modes, (2) trajectories for rescue, and (3) the performance requlrements in 
terms of delta-V and duration required to implement the rescue missions. An 
initial screening aimed at focusing the effort spent on rescue mission analysis 
dlvided rescue missions into two categories shown in Fiqure 3.3-1. 
NOMINAL: 99% 
• VEH I CLES ARE FAI L SAFE 
• OTV OR SOlS FAIL BUT NOT BOTH 
• TARGET VEHICLE IS ACTIVE FOR 
RENDEZVOUS AND PAYLOAD TRANSFER 
ACTIVE BEACON FOR RENDEZVOUS 
ATInUDE STABILIZED 
CONTI NGENCY 1% 
• VEHICLES FAIL CATASTROPHICALLY 
• BOTH FAIL 
• TARGET VEHICLE IS DEAD 
NO BEACON 
TUMBLING 
DAMAGED 
• VEHICLE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS DICTATED BY RESCUE 
.VEHICLES ARE FAIL SAFE 
.SOIS ACS 1 XPONDER GOOD FOR 2 X NOMINAL RESCUE MISSION DURATION 
Figure 3.3-1: Rescue Mission Functional Categories 
For reliabilities typical of existing space systems, approximately 99% of all 
failures will fall into the nominal failure categories shown. This requires 
small design penalties in that the staqes must be fail safe and transponder 
life must be equal to at least two times the duration of the maximum rescue 
mission. 
The remaining 1% of rescue mlSSlons pose a more formidable challenge, but it is 
safe to assume that baslc rescue systems will be the same in terms of perform-
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ance and most operations. Key operations which would differentiate contingency 
rescue operations from nominal rescue operations would include rendezvous with 
noncooperative targets and recovering of tumbling, massive vehicles. Further 
study of these subjects is required but is beyond the scope of the current ef-
fort and not directly related to differentiation of alternate space system 
concepts. Accordingly, in this study efforts were devoted to consideration of 
the nominal rescue mission only. Nominal rescue conditions cover 99% of the 
failures and the system evolved for dealing with the nominal rescue mission 
will serve as the foundation for coping with the remaining 1%. 
Resulting assumptions which govern the rescue study include: (1) treat nominal 
failures only, injections or placement staqe failure but not both; 
(2) placement stage is available for abort function if the injection staqe 
failures; (3) the NASA deep space network or equivalent is available to support 
the rescue mission task; and (4) use of delivery systems in the rescue mission 
is to be maximized. 
3.3.2 Definition of Abort Options. Abort mode definition was required for two 
reasons: first, to find the best way to assure waste payload placement in a 
safe orbit following injection stage failure; second, to find the characteris-
tics of the resulting orbits to provide initial conditions for rescue missions. 
Results of the abort option study are illustrated in Figure 3.3-2, which shows 
the abort options available for failures of the injection stage as a function 
of injection stage propellant consumption during the injection burn. Primary 
quantities plotted as a function of percent of propellant consumed include: (1) 
delta-V required to continue to transfer orbit insertion; (2) delta-V required 
for circular orbit insertion. Also plotted are failure orbit apoapsis altitude 
and the delta-V from the initial low Earth orbit and the placement stage 
delta-V capability. 
A logical abort strategy is suggested: (1) Up to about 55% propellant deple-
tion injection stage failure would result in the placement stage being used to 
place payload and placement stage in a circular abort orbit. Maximum altitude 
of this abort orbit would be about 40,000 km. (2) Beyond 55% propellant deple-
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tion failure of the injection stage would result in the placement stage being 
used to complete injection into the heliocentric transfer orbit, establishing 
initial conditions for subsequent deep-space rescue. 
Accordingly, for the nominal rescue cases studied, only two basic rescue mis-
sion profiles need be considered: (1) deep space rescue with the target vehi-
cle in a 0.85 x 1.0 AU transfer orbit ellipse, resulting either from contin-
gency injection using the placement stage following injection stage fallure or 
from a failure of the placement stage propulsion system during the 
circularization burn at the end of the initial transfer; and (2) high Earth 
orbit rescue, with the target vehicle in a circular or slightly elliptical 
holding orbit and an orbital altitude ranging between 500 and 40,000 km. 
3.3.3 Rescue Mission Tr~ec~ories. The study of abort mode options provided 
definitions of rescue mission initial conditions; either a circular Earth orbit 
at an altitude of 40,000 km or below, or an elliptical heliocentric transfer 
orbit with apoapsis between 1.0 and 0.85 AU and peri apsis at 0.85 AU. Rescue 
mission trajectories were defined for both Earth orbit and deep-space rescue lo-
cations (4). 
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Figure 3.3-3 illustrates the reference trajectory for rescue of vehicles 
stranded in earth orbit. Launch opportunities exist once a day. Figure 3.3-
4 illustrates the 3-burn deep space rescue mission trajectory. ThlS profile 
provldes for rendezvous with the malfunctioning vehicle at its second 
perhihelion and offers reduced delta-V when compared to 2-impulse transfers. 
This trajectory is applicable to a wlde range of solar orbit insertion stage 
(SOlS) failures and provides for maximum mission times of under 2 years. 
"'BORT HOLDI NG 
ORBIT 
DEPARTURE HYPERBOLA 
1: PHASING ORBIT INJECT 
2: TRANSFER ORBIT INJECT 
3: CIRCULARIZE IN HOLDING 
ORBIT: RENDEZVOUS AND 
TRANSFER OPERATIONS 
4: HELIOCENTRIC TRANSFER 
ORBIT INJECT 
Figure 3.3-3: High Earth Orbit Rescue Trajectory Schematic 
3.3.4 Res~ue_~ission Performance Requirements. Performance requirements are 
specified in terms of delta-V and for both Earth orbit and heliocentric rescue 
mission trajectories. The payload mass to be thrown is described in Task 6. 
Performance required for rendezvous in Earth orbit was established by an anal-
ysis of abort options for failures during the injection burn. Two primary 
options were identified; abort to Earth orbit and abort to heliocentric trans-
fer orbit. The first option encompasses using the SOlS to place the waste pay-
load in a circular storage orbit around the Earth. Maximum radius for circular 
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Figure 3.3-4: Deep Space Rescue Trajectory Schematic 
storage orbits is about 4 X 104 km; failures which would result in larger radii 
are more easily handled by abort to transfer orbit. Delta-Vis required for ren-
dezvous with the falled vehicle in the higher circular orbits are approximately 
3.2 to 3.5 km/sec; subsequent to waste payload transfer to the rescue vehicle, 
injection takes approximately 2.0 km/sec, followed by a standard placement. 
Performance requirements for deep-space rescue missions are bounded by the case 
of total SOlS failure. For a typical 3-impulse transfer (Figure 3.3-4), injec-
tion delta-V to a 0.85 AU perihelion is in the ranqe of 3.5 km/sec, with two in-
tercept delta-Vis of approximately 1.2 km/sec each used for rendezvous with the 
target at the tarqetls second perihelion, followed by a final 1.18 km/sec place-
ment burn. Total rescue mission duration from launch to placement is 0.8453 
years or about 308 days. This compares favorably with the 6 km/sec injection, 
1.46 km/sec rendezvous, 1.18 km/sec placement delta-Vis, and 1.292 year mlssion 
duratlon speclf1ed 1n Reference 4 (Case 3A). 
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-3.4 OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 
3.4.1 Introduct10n. The obJect1ve of the operat10ns analys1s task was to 
def1ne system operat10ns to the level requ1red for system deslgn support and to 
prov1de standards for qual1tat1ve d1fferent1at10n between alternat1ve concepts 
1n the areas of m1SS10n complex1ty and r1sk evaluation. 
Our approach was to def1ne a comprehens1ve top level operations flow encompass-
1ng (1) launch veh1cle opt10ns uS1ng one or two launch veh1cles per mission, 
(2) orb1t transfer system staging and reuse options, and (3) shield removal 
options. This top level flow was used as a basis for deflnition of key lower 
level operat10ns flows as required. An example would be definit10n of OTV and 
SOlS separation operations to prov1de an 1nput for the OTV return miss10n opti-
mizat10n. The flow as defined 1S generic; deta1l operational flows specific to 
total system opt10ns selected in Task 8 are presented 1n Task 8. This sect10n 
presents the details of the gener1c top level flow and documents the deta1l def-
1nition developed for 1nject10n and placement stage separation operat10ns. 
3.4.2 System Level Composite Operations Flow. Figure 3.4-1 illustrates the 
top level operat1onal flow for space d1sposal of nuclear waste which was 
evolved as a tool for compar1son of conf1gurat1ons and as a framework for loca-
t10n of areas need1ng further def1n1t1on. Operations are coded as follows: 
1.0 = Launch veh1cle ascent operat10ns 
2.0 = Low Earth orb1t operat10ns 
4.0 = Space transportation system land1ng operations 
5.0 = Solar electr1c stage operations 
6.0 = Orblt transfer veh1cle operat10ns (injection stage) 
7.0 = Long-l1fe OTV (LLOTV) operat10ns 
8.0 = SOlS (placement stage) operat10ns 
By correct ch01ce of d1rectlon at the "or" branch pOints on the d1agram any spe-
clfic m1SS10n scenarlO can be deflned in terms of the operatlons coded. 
Spec1f1c examples of complete operatlOn flows for selected total space systems 
are shown 1n Sectlon 8, System Integratlon and Evaluation. 
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Figure 3.4-1: Space System Composite Operations Flow 
-3.4.3 Ueta1l_ed J~_~f!..'!~t:~~r!_~( .QEe~at ~~r:!.~. Deta1l ed def1 n1 t IOn was prov1 ded for 
OTV/SOIS separat10n to allow evaluatlon of separat10n delays on orblt transfer 
vetllcle return traJectory delta-V requlrements (see Sectlon 3.2.2). Data was 
denved fran slmllar t1mel1nes def1ned for the Boe1ng/USAF IUS. 
The result1ng operat10ns flow lS lllustrated In Flgure 3.4-2. The 6.2 In the 
tltle of the flgure refers to the approprlate block In the canposlte operatlons 
flow (Flgure 3.4-1). Separatlon events for the OTV begln at maln englne cutoff 
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Figure 3.4-2. OTVISOIS Separation Operations 
(MECO). The vehlcle lS then slewed to the separation heading and separatlon 
nuts are flred, allowlng the SOlS to be separated under impetus of separation 
sprlngs. The same command which lnltiates separation acts to inhlblt the OTV 
reactlon control system. ThlS lS followed by a 100-sec coast by the OTV to a 
posltlon clear of the separated solar orblt insertlon stage. At the end of the 
coast perlod, the OTV reactlon control system lS enabled and a 20-sec slew to 
coast separatlon headlng lS accompllshed. ThlS maneuver lS followed byappllca-
tlon of a 3-m/sec delta-V uSlng the reactlon control system followed by a 330-
sec coast to obtaln clearance for maln englne start. A 20-sec reorientatlon to 
the flnal burn headlng IS followed by 1nltlatlon of the ma1n englne start se-
quence. Total tlme elap~ed durlng the separatlon operat10ns lS 660 sec or 11 
10111. 
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3.5 MISSIUN CONT~OL 
3.5.1 Introductlon. Mlsslon control lssues for the launch vehlcles, orblt 
transfer vehlcles, and solar electrlc stage have been well deflned 1n ongoing 
studles of the space transportation system, lnterim upper stage, and solar elec-
trlc propulslon systems. Control requirements to meet SOlS, however, rema1n 
largely undeflned. Earller stud1es (19) present the SOlS avionlcs as essen-
tlally ldentical to the OTV avionlcs in includlng prov1sions such as closed cir-
CUlt televlslon and high data rate communications links useful only ln the con-
tingency sltuatlon of a rescue mlssion. 
The available data base on vehicles such as Burner 2, IUS, and the Pioneer 
Venus Orbiter indicated the potential for a significant simplification of SOlS 
avionics when compared to the avionics carried by the OTV. The primary differ-
ences are in control requirements and reliability. 
SOlS control requirements differ significantly from OTV and IUS requirements. 
SOlS navigation is qround based. It has no requirement for autonomous state 
vector updates or real time processing. Its primary requirement is for orienta-
tion control only. 
SOlS reliability is not a primary risk issue. The stage operates only after 
solar system escape velocity is reached. Any conceivable failure mode after es-
cape is reached leaves the failed stage and payload in an orbit with a mean 
time to Earth reencounter measured in thousands of years. Accordingly, the res-
cue mission is the primary backup for malfunction of the SOlS. The primary ef-
fect of SOlS reliability is to dictate the number of rescue missions. 
Accordingly, SOlS rellability and complexity is primarily a mission cost 
drlver. Avionics cost impact due to increased reliability must be balanced 
against the decrease in cost resultinq from a lower number of rescue missions 
required. 
The thrust of this task became one of defining requirements for the SOlS con-
trol functions for use ln Task 6 vehicle definition efforts. 
3.5.2 SOlS Func~i~~~l_~~qui~~~en~~. SOlS functlonal requirements are illustra-
ted by mission phase 1n F1qure 3.5-1 for both spin stabilized and three axis 
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MISSION PHASE SPIN STABILIZED 5-AXIS STABILIZED 
6.2 OTV/SOIS SEPARATION • SPI N-UP ·VERIFY ATTITUDE 
• VERIFY CRUISE ORIENTATION REFERENCE ACQUISITION 
·INITIATE ATTITUDE HOLD 
IN CRUISE ORIENTATION 
8.1 SOlS CRUISE .MAINTAIN CRUISE ATTITUDE -MAINTAIN CRUISE ATTITUDE 
OPERATIONS 
• PROVIDE CONTINGENCY • PROVIDE CONTINGENCY 
TRAJECTORY TRIM TRAJECTORY TRIM 
8.2 SOl S PLACEMENT -PERFORM PITCHOVER - PERFORM YAW 
OPERATIONS TO BURN ORIENTATON TO BURN ORIENTATION 
-VERIFY ORIENTATION -VERIFY ORIENTATION 
• PERFORM BURN - PERFORM BURN 
-ALLOW ORBIT - ALLOW ORB IT 
ELEMENT VERIFICATION ELEMENT VERIFICATION 
Figure 3.5-1: SOlS Functional ReqUirements Summary 
stabilized SOlS vehicles. Separation requirements for the spin stabilized vehi-
cle include spin up to the cruise rlmin of about 15 r/min and verlfication of 
cruise orientation by downlink to the ground. Requirements differ for three 
axis stabilized vehicle during separation. Primary requirements for the three 
axis stage include preseparation verification of attitude reference acquisition 
after initial orientation by the injection stage by downlink to ground control, 
and initiation of attitude hold using reaction control system in cruise orienta-
tion following separation from the injection stage. 
Cruise and placement operation requirements are identical for spin stabilized 
and three axis stabilized stages. Cruise operations include maintenance of 
cruise attitude, and the ability to provide contingency trajectory trim to com-
pensate for injection errors. 
Placement operations include maneuvering to the correct burn orientation, veri-
fication of the correct orientatlon by ground control using the telemetry link, 
performance of the placement burn, and providing a continuous slgnal to allow 
post burn tracking verlflcatlon of the elements of the destination orbit. 
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3.5.3 SOlS Attitude Ex~~~na~~eferen~~~. Attitude control during all mission 
phases is a prime requirement ldentlfled for the SOlS. Characteristics of the 
heliocentric transfer orbit followed by the SOlS (F1qure 3.2-3) were examined 
to determine appropriate external references for SOlS attitude control. Fiqure 
3.5-2 illustrates the references chosen. The primary SOlS reference 1S the 
Sun. The Sun-SOlS line is established by Sun sensors on the vehlcle. Orienta-
t10n about the Sun-SOlS line is provided by star sensors locked on to a suit-
able star such as Canopus. 
DESTINATION ORBIT 
(0 86AU) 
-- -
/' 
/' 
: /~ " 
, e \ 
1'-1:'\ -- -l EARTH 
I \ "'" --- -0 SOlS 
EARTH ORBIT 
\ \ +X I 1./~~dltrl1 
\ \ 
I 
I 
I 
TRANSFER ORBIT 
\ 
LJ, 
't' STARS 
Figure 3.5-2: SOlS External Attitude References 
3.5.4 SOlS Attit~~~~~~!rol_~on~epts. Attitude control concepts were def1ned 
for both spin stab1lized and three axis stabilized SOlS stages to meet the re-
quirements defined 1n Section 3.5.2, using the external attitude references 
shown in Figure 3.5-2. The attitude control concepts defined were used as the 
basis for Task 6 SOlS vehicle mass estimates. 
Key features of the spin stabilized SOlS attitude control system are shown in 
F1gure 3.5-3. Attitude control about roll p1tch and yaw axes is provided by a 
combination of eight axial thrusters and four radial thrusters. Vehicle atti-
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-./ 
EARTH SENSOR 
+X 
RADIAL THRUSTER (4 EA) 
STAR SENSOR 
+Z 
... 
F,gure 3.5-3: Spin Stabilized SOlS AttItude Control Concept 
(8 PL) 
tude is determined by star and Sun sensors. Pulsing of axial thrusters at an 
angular reference determined by star and Sun sensors precesses the vehicle spin 
axis to accomplish pitch and yaw control. Roll control as well as spin up and 
spin down for stabilization are accomplished by four radial thrusters which can 
be pulsed to provide a torque about the vehicle's plus X axis. The Earth sen-
sor serves for placement burn attitude verification. 
Figure 3.5-4 illustrates features of the three axis stabilized SOlS attitude 
control concept. Vehicle attitude control is provided by four thruster clus-
ters which provide redundant thrusters for control of vehicle pitch, roll, and 
yaw. Vehicle attitude is determined by redundant Sun sensors and star sensors. 
One of the star sensors is used as an Earth sensor for placement burn orienta-
tion verlfication. Closed loop attitude control during the placement burn is 
provided by the rate gyro attitude reference package which is used to hold a 
constant heading during the placement burn only. 
3.5.5 Rescue Mission Control Req~ir~me~!~. Additional control requirements 
necessary for the rescue mission include establishing the tarqet vehicle loca-
tion after ground based navigatlon to within approximately 1000 km of the tar-
get, automated rendezvous and docklng with the tarqet vehicle, and waste pay-
--- load transfer from the faIled vehlcle to the rescue vehicle. Real time 
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FIgure 3.5-4: 3-Axis Stabilized SOlS AttItude Control Concept 
monitoring including video and contingency real time control have also been 
assumed as rescue mission requirements. These requirements were used as the 
basis for estimates of mass impact to vehicles used in Task 6 performance 
assessments. 
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-4.0 ORRIT TRANSFER SYSTEMS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of Task 4, Orbit Transfer Systems, was to trade a full range of 
orbit transfer system options (propulsion, staginq, reuse) in a systematic man-
ner to define the optimum orbit transfer system for the space disposal mission. 
The approach used was to use the extensive existing data base on IUS, SEPS, and 
OTV to provide the basis for estimates of mass cost and performance. Trades 
were conducted in four primary areas: (1) assessment of propulsion systems for 
application, (2) identification of candidate systems and options, (3) 
definition of candidate vehicles, and (4) comparison of total system 
performance. 
Key findings resulting from the study include: identification of eight primary 
candidate orbit transfer systems, including single stage systems using cryo-
genic chemical propellants and electric propulsion; two stage systems using all 
propulsive and aerobraked approaches to reuse of the injection staqe; and using 
storable liquid, cryogenic liquid, and electric second stages. Character-
ization of these candidate systems and trade studies performed to define the 
best performing systems resulted in selection of four for consideration in Task 
8. 
4.2 IDENTIFY ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM OPTIONS 
Options were identified in two steps. First a preliminary screening was used 
to identify the optimum applications for each propulsion system considered 
(Figure 4.2-1). Second, the remaining propulsion options were arrayed against 
staging and reuse options to define a matrix of all remaining orbit transfer 
system options (Figure 4.2-2). 
4.2.1 Assess Propulsion ~~~~~~_for ~!i~ation. An initial screening of pro-
pulsion system candidates resulted ln selection of cryogenic liquid, storable 
liquid, solid and solar electric propulsion for preliminary evaluation. Other 
concepts such as nuclear electric propulsion or laser propulsion were rejected 
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Figure 4.2-1: Propulsion Systems Assessment 
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Figure 4.2-2_ Identification of Candidate Orbit Transfer System for Space Disposal 
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as being difficult to characterize (particularly in cost) and of doubtful avail-
ability for 1995 IOC. 
Wlth candidate systems selected, a preliminary evaluation was conducted to 
assess propulsion systems for application to dlfferent mission phases. Results 
of the evaluation are illustrated in Figure 4.2-1. 
Solid propellant rockets were rejected for further consideration. Solid 
rockets showed no advantage in specific impulse over storable liquid systems, 
suffer from reliability problems characterized by occasional catastrophic deto-
nation on ignition, are not adaptable to redundancy, and are inflexible in 
terms of installation. 
Storable liquid propulsion systems were assigned to the placement roll only. 
The performance penalty relative to cryogenic propellants for the injection mis-
sion led to their rejection in this application. 
Cryogenic liquid propellants and electric propulsion are suitable for all mis-
sion phases. Cryogenic propellant systems are suitable for both injection and 
placement missions and for missions which combine the functions in a single 
stage expendable vehicle. Electric propulsion allows the additional option of 
vehicle return after the placement maneuver. 
4.2.2 Identiflcation of_QP-tions. A combination of the selected propulsion 
options by mission phase with the remaining options in the areas of staging and 
reuse provided a definition of the entire range of orbit transfer system 
options for space disposal of nuclear waste. 
The results of this combination are illustrated in matrix form in Figure 4.2-
2. Systems identified and their designations include: (1) a single stage reus-
able solar electric stage (SES-1), (2) a single stage expendable solar electric 
stage (SES-2), (3) a single stage expendable long life OTV (LLOTV-1), (4) a 
mu1tistaged system using a cryogenic propellant injection staqe and a reusable 
solar electric propulsion second stage (SES-3), (5) a multistaqed system using 
a cryogenic injectlon stage and an expendable solar electric propulsion second 
stage (SES-4), (6) a multistaged system using a cryogenic propellant injection 
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stage with an expendable, storable, liquid propellant second stage (SLP-1), and 
(7) a two staged system using a cryogen1c liquid propellant injection stage and 
a cryogenic liquid propellant second stage (LLOTV-2). 
Two stage options using storable liquid or cryogenic propellant upper stages 
were exercised with three injection stage reuse options: 
1) All propulsive return 
2) Aerobraked return 
3) Use of an expendable injection stage 
This provided a total of 13 options for characterization (option SES-3 was 
confined to use of an aerobraked injection stage for simplicity). 
4.3 DEFINE CANDIDATE ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEMS 
Definition of candidate orbit transfer systems identified in Section 4.2 was 
achieved in two steps. In the first, the vehicles used in the candidate sys-
tems were defined, using the extensive data bases generated in both studies of 
SEPS and OTV and 1n the IUS production contract. Characteristics of the vehi-
cles defined are described in Section 4.3.1; detailed mass statements for each 
vehicle are contained in Appendix G. 
The second step was to use the vehicle definition of Section 4.3.1 and the mis-
sion parameters from Section 3 as inputs to the Boeing OTV PSMC (Payload and Se-
quential Mass Calculation) code. The output of the code provided a parametric 
characterization of the performance of each candidate system option. 
4.3.1 Characterize Candidate Vehicles. The following types of vehicles are 
required for the different orbit transfer system options: 
l~jection Stages 
1. Single launch L02/LH2 OTV (SES 1,4, SLP-1) 
2. Dual launch L02/LH2 OTV (LLOTV-?) 
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Placement Stages 
3. Storable propellant SOlS (SLP-1) 
4. L02/LH2 SOlS (LLOTV-2) 
Combination Injection/~~~cemen~ Stages 
5. L02/LH2 lonq llfe OTV (LLOTV-l) 
6. Solar electric staqe (SES) (SES-l, SES-2) 
As the first step in determining the performance for the range of orbit trans-
fer system options, point desiqns and parametric mass relationshlps were devel-
oped for the candidate vehicles. Definition of vehicle point designs was accom-
plished in three areas: LOX/LH2 cryogenic propellant vehicles, storable liquid 
propellant vehicles, and solar electric propulsion vehicles. 
For the L02/LH2 stages the initial OTV defined in the Boeing/MSFC OTV concept 
definition study (Contract NAS8-33532) was used as a reference point design. It 
is very close to the optimum size for the single launch L02/LH2 injection 
stage. Point designs for all other L02/LH2 vehicles were developed as varia-
tions from this baseline. The emphasis was on analyzing and defining those 
areas of the L02/LH2 vehicles that were different from the Phase A baseline. 
The storable propellant placement stage was configured by combining existinq 
engines (from the STS reaction control system) and avionics (from the IUS third 
stage) with an in-house design for structure and electrical power. The extreme 
simplicity of the vehicle allowed a reasonable level of definition to be 
achieved within the constraints of the study. 
Definition of the solar electric stage drew heavily on the SEPS Phase B study 
effort and the previous Future Space Transportation Systems Analysis Study con-
ducted by BAC for NASA/JSC (Contract NAS9-14323). A vehicle configuration de-
veloped for the space disposal mission in the JSC study was updated by using 
SEPS derived estimates for the key propulsion areas of arrays, power processors 
and thrusters. Structure, thermal, and propellant storage masses were scaled. 
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Other subsystems such as avionics and ReS were synthesized using components 
der1ved from the IUS and OTV programs. 
The result1ng p01nt des1gn veh1cles are lllustrated along with some of their 
key character1st1cs in F1gure 4.3-1. 
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The storable propellant SOlS 1S the f1rst configuration shown in Figure 4.3-1. 
It 1S an MMH/N204 propellant stage that is spin stabilized during burns and 
three-aX1S stab1l1zed dur1ng coast. 
Structure. The structure 1S 7075 aluminum skin and stringer and cons1sts of a 
clrcular shell sect10n d1v1ded 1nto SlX bays by rad1al panels and a center C1r-
cular sectlon. Upper and lower surfaces are closed out by skin panels. Propel-
lant 15 stored 1n three N204 and three MMH 6 Al-4V tltanium tanks at a maX1mum 
operatlng pressure of 1450 kPa. A deslgn ultlmate factor of safety of 4 allows 
the tanks to be des1gned wlthout fracture mechanics valldat10n. 
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AV1onics. The storable SOlS uses a mod1f1ed NASA IUS th1rd stage avionics 
SU1t. A simp11f1ed block diagram of the system lS shown in Appendix G. 
Power Supply and Dlstrlbutlon. E1ectrlcal power lS provlded by a 14-m2 solar 
array. This lS a state of the art s111con array w1th 8 ml1 cells, 6 mil cover 
glass and 2 mll substrate. Batterles, power condltioning and sWltchlng 
equlpment and wlring harness complete the power supply and distribution 
-- subsystem. 
~aln Propu1s10n. Main propulsion consists of six 445N thrust Aerojet AJI0-160 
bl-propellant pressure feed englnes. Three kevlar overwrapped bottles store 
GHe at 24,130 kPa to malntaln pressure in the propellant tanks. 
Attltude Control. Twelve STS orblter 111N RCS vernier thrusters are used for 
attitude control. These are bi-propel1ant thrusters and use propellant from 
the mal n tanks. 
A summary mass statement for the point design storable SOlS lS shown in Appen-
dix G. 
L02/LH2 OTV - S~NGLE LAUNCH INSERTION STAGE 
The single launch insertion stage is an L02/LH2 propellant OTV that can employ 
the aerobraking option to accomplish the reduction in velocity to circularize 
upon return to LEO. The vehicle is the second configuration in Figure 4.3-1, 
and lS illustrated in more detail with its ASE in Figure 4.3-2. The following 
sections present a summary description of the vehicle and its systems. 
Because of the critical role of this vehicle as a standard from which configura-
tion and mass estimates of all cryogenic stages were derived, the system de-
scriptions are provided in detail, and can be applied to the derivative config-
urations. A complete summary mass statement for the vehicle is contained in 
Appendix F. 
Primary vehicle systems include structure, thermal control, avionics, power sup-
ply and dlstributlon, propuls10n, attltude control, and the airborne support 
equ i pment (ASE). 
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F,gure 4.3-2: Smgle Launch LOXILH 2 Inlectlon Stage Vehicle 
Structures. An exploded view of the OTV is shown in Fiqure 4.3-3. All of the 
vehicle and ASE external body shell except for the avionics ring are 
graphite/epoxy. The main propellant tanks are fabricated from 2219 aluminum 
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F,gure 4.3-3 Exploded View of LOXILH2 0TV 
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-and are designed for a 20 mission service life. Fiberglass struts are used to 
support the liquid hydrogen tanks, with graphite/epoxy struts used to support 
the liquid oxygen tank and the main engine. Trunnion fittings are made of tita-
nlum. Pneumatically actuated payload latch/release mechanisms are provided for 
payload separation. The vehicle side of the vehicle/ASE interface has a total 
of 36 receptacle fittings for the vehicle latch/release mechanisms mounted on 
the ASE. 
A major portion of the electrical power, avionics, and attitude control system 
are mounted on the avionics/equipment ring. The external shell for this sec-
tion is aluminum (for thermal control purposes) instead of the qraphite/epoxy 
used for the remaininq external body/shell. 
The aerobraking capability described previously is achieved by the modular 
installation of the ballute deceleration subsystem on the aft body shell. It 
consists of the ballute, ballute inflation system, installation provisions, and 
pyrotechnic devices for the deployment and release of ballute prior to and 
after re-entry. A global positioning system (GPS) receiver/processor subsystem 
is added to the vehicle avionics to provide the precise position determination 
required for the aerobraking maneuver. These additions increase the dry mass 
by 83 kg. 
Thermal Control. Thermal control of the OTV is accomplished by both active and 
passive techniques. The avionics are passively cooled. The avionics are 
mounted on an aluminum ring section with the components which operate during 
ascent in the orbiter located in the upper quadrant. The thicknesses of the 
mounting shelf and the external ring are tailored to accommodate component ther-
mal requirements. Flexible optical solar reflector (FOSR) covers the external 
rinq surface. 
Waste heat rejection from the fuel cell system is accomplished using an active 
cooling loop with a space radiator mounted on the L02 tank support body shell. 
Freon 11 is used for the working fluid. Heaters are used on the attitude con-
trol subsystem storage tanks, feedlines, and thrusters and also for batteries 
and the fuel cell product water dump line. 
The cryogenic tanks are covered wlth blankets composed of 23 layers of doubly 
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aluminized kapton. To prevent air liqu1fication and ice formation within the 
blanket, a ground purge is used during prelaunch activities and 1nitial 
portions of ascent to LEO. 
Avionics. A block diagram of the OTV avionics subystem is shown in Flgure 
4.3-4. This subsystem accomplishes all guidance, navigation, and control 
functions; handles communications to the orbiter and ground; and with the 
orbiter mounted ASE, interfaces with the orbiter avionics. The avionics fea-
tures redundant strings including two computers and 1S communications compati-
ble with both STON and TORS. It is compatible with addition of GPS receivers 
to provide precise navigation for the aerobraking return maneuver. Arranqement 
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of the aV10nlCS system components on the structure aV10n1CS r1ng 1S illustrated 
1n Flgure 4.3-3. 
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Power Supply and D1stribut10n. The electr1cal power supply and dlstr1bution 
subsystem, deslgned for 28V operat10n, 1S powered by redundant, low pressure, 
modlfled orblter H2/02 fuel cells, each rated at 2.0 kW nominal/3.5 kW peak. 
Dedlcated reactant storage tanks are used with reactant expulsion simllar to 
the orblter deslgn. A 25 A/hr n1ckel/hydrogen utility battery 1S also 
provlded. The dlstr1bution and control subsystem is based on IUS design. The 
system des1gn prov1des for redundant power distribution un1ts. The load demand 
on the power supply 1S approximately 2 kW during coast and 3 kW during maln 
eng1ne operat10n. 
~ropulslon. The schematic for the main propuls10n subsystem 1S shown 1n Figure 
4.3-5 w1th the general arrangement of propulslon system components lllustrated 
1n F1gure 4.3-3. Main propulsion is provided by a single Pratt & Whitney 
GROUND 
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Figure 4.3-5. LOXILH2 OTV Mam PropulSion System Schematic 
HL10-IIB eng1ne WhlCh has a stowed length of 1.778m and provides 66,720N of 
ma1nstage thrust. The maln propellant tanks have usable capaclties of 3130 and 
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17,970 kg of llqUld hydrogen and oxygen respect1vely. The propellant del1very 
system features 0.057m delivery llnes, tank sump-mounted prevalves, and 0.102m 
f1ll, dra1n, and dump llnes wlth redundant parallel dump valves. Tank 
pressur1zatl0n 1S accompl1shed using autogenous pressurlzat10n dur1ng eng1ne 
mai nstage. Separate space and ground (orb1 ter) vent systems are prov1 ded. 
Att1tude Control. The attitude control subsystem (ACS) uses hydraz1ne mono-
propellant wlth pressure blowdown pos1tlve expuls1on. The ACS uses 12 IUS 
react10n eng1ne modules (REM) and propellant storage tank assembl1es. Each of 
the three 0.533m d1ameter titanlum tanks prov1des a usable propellant capacity 
of 54 kg. Propellant expuls10n 1S accompl1shed uS1ng a flexible d1aphragm and 
N2 pressure blowdown from 2620 kPa to 690 kPa. Propellant isolat1on whlle in 
the orb1ter 1S accompl1shed by uS1ng pyrotechn1c valves Wh1Ch are opened after 
OTV deployment at LEO. The thrusters provide 133N of thrust w1th 2620 kPa 
1nlet pressure and 36N at 690 kPa inlet pressure. Spec1f1c 1mpulse 1S 235 and 
230 at the 133N and 36N thrust levels respectively. Propellant tanks, REMis 
and all plumbing are mounted on the aV10n1CS ring sect10n (Figure 4.5-3). 
Airborne Support Equipment. The ASE provides for all electrical and flu1d 
interfaces between the OTV and the orbiter. The ASE provldes structural 
support as well as tilt and vehicle release mechanisms. The configuration and 
major features of the ASE are shown in Figures 4.5-2 and 4.5.3. 
DUAL LAUNCH LOX/LH2 OTV INJECTION STAGE 
The dual launch injection stage is a stretched version of the baseline OTV 
(Flgure 4.3-6). It shares many subsystems with the single launch injection 
staqe. Avionics and electrical power subsystems are unchanged except for 
increased length 1n the wirinq harnesses. The vehicle has a larqer version of 
the structure and thermal control systems used on the smaller stage. The ACS 
has three additional propellant tanks but is otherwise unchanged. Two RL 10 
lIB engines are used to prov1de the necessary thrust for the increased gross 
mass. The propellant system schematic is the same except that the final feed 
line splits to the two engines and the line and valve sizes upstream of the 
split have been 1ncreased to match the flow rate of the two engines. A point 
design summary mass statement for the stage is contained in Appendlx F. 
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Ul2 TANK 
FORWARD 001"[ 
'--- ACS THRUSTER CLUSTERS 
• PROPELLANT WEI GHT • 60,135 KG 
• !"lASS AT STARTBURN • 66,820 KG 
• DRY MASS a 5,529 KG 
Figure 4.3-6: Dual Launch LOXILH 2 Inlectlon Stage Point Design 
LOX/LH2 LONG LIFE OTV {LLOTVt 
The LLOTV combines the injection and placement functions in one stage. As such 
it must carryall subsystems peculiar to each type of stage. The stage general 
arrangement and features are illustrated in Figure 4.3-7. The structure, atti-
tude control and main propulsion are those of the baseline OTV except for 
OTV AVIONIC SUITE -----.. 
-SHORT LIFE 
- CONTROL THRU INJECTION 
_ SOME SHARED 
FUNCTIONS 
WASTE PAYLOAD 
SUPPORT STRUCTURE 
(ONE PAYLOADI 
-INCREASED MLI 
- METEROID SHIELD 
MAIN ENGINES (z RL 10-11 B) 
- DUAL FAILURE TOLERANT 
PLUMBING 
- SELECTED RAD HARDENING 
- CONTINGENCY RAD SHIELDING 
- LOCATE FOR LOZ TANK 
SELF SHIELDING 
ACS THRUSTER CLUSTER 
FORWARD SUN SHADE • PROPELLANT MASS - 21,122 K, 
+ SOLAR ARRAY 
- MASS AT STARTBURN • 32.736 Kg 
- DRY MASS • 3,11111 Kg 
F,gure 4.3-7: Long Life OrbIt Transfer VehIcle (LLOTV) LOXILH2 
Injection Plus Placement Stage Configuration 
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increased size for tankage and structure. Thermal control consists of the 
baseline OTV subsystem with MLI increased to 40 layers for the lonq duration 
mission and a forward sunshield added. The avionics subsystem includes both 
the baseline OTV avionics suit and the SOlS avionics suit. This is necessary 
because the baseline OTV avionics are not capable of lonq duratlon operatlon. 
The electrical power subsystem consists of the baseline OTV subsystem plus the 
solar array and other components of the SOlS subsystem. Electrical power dur-
ing geocentric operations is provided by the OTV subsystem and during coast by 
the solar array. Primary batteries are switched in to provide additional power 
during the placement maneuver at 0.85 AU. 
A summary mass statement for the LLOTV stage 1 s contal ned 1 n Appendl x F. 
LOX/LH2 PLACEME~T STAGE (CRYO SOlS) 
The CRYO SOlS 1S an expendable cryogenic propellant stage deslgned to support 
the waste payload dur1ng the 165 day post lnject10n coast in transfer orbit and 
to perform the clrcularizat10n or placement maneuver when the dest1natlon orbit 
radius of 0.85 AU lS ach1eved. The general arrangement and key features of the 
stage are lllustrated in Flgure 4.3-8. 
+x 
P ITCH THRUSTERS 
+z 
C RL 10-118 MAIN ENGINE 
PROPELLANT 
MASS = 27,300 kg 
MASS AT 
ST ART BURN " 31,883 kg 
DRY MASS = 1823 kg 
'----yAW, ROLL AND 
'----WASTE PAYLOAD TRANSLATI ON THRUSTERS 
SUPPORT STRUCTURE 
(ELEMENT OF FLIGHT 
SUPPORT SYSTEM) 
FIgure 4.3-8: LOXILH2 Placement Stage (Cryo SOlS) ConfIguration and Features 
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-The CRYO SOlS lS essentially a smaller verSlon of the baslc injection OTV with 
changes ln the thermal control, aVlonlCS and electrlcal power subsystems to 
handle SOlS functlons. 
Thermal Control. Changes in the thermal control subsystem are required because 
of the 162 day coast period from 1 AU to 0.85 AU. The stage remains orlented 
durlng coast in a head on attltude to the Sun. A sun shield mounted on the 
front end of the vehlcle reduces the lncldent heat flux. The number of layers 
of ML1 has been lncreased from 23 to 40 to prevent excessive bOlloff. 
No actlve thermal control lS requlred because electrical power lS provided by 
solar array and batterles lnstead of fuel cells. 
~~onics. The L02/LH2 SOlS has the same aVlonlCS suit as the storable SOlS 
except for the addltlon of two thrust vector controllers (TVC) and the maln 
engine control unit requlred for control of the main engine. These units are 
from the basellne OTV. 
Electrlcal Power. ThlS subsystem is slmllar to the storable SOlS except for 
addltional batterles WhlCh are used at the end of misslon only to provlde the 
higher power needed to drlve the TVC actuators durlng the circularization burn 
into 0.85 AU orblt. 
A summary mass statement for the CRYO SOlS is contained in Appendix F. 
SOLAR ELECTRIC STAGE (SES) 
Definition of the solar electric stage options shown in Fiqure 4.3-1 required 
more effort than that devoted to the chemical propellant stages because of the 
relative difficulty of analyzing the performance requirements imposed by the 
low acceleration, continuous burn trajectories used by the SESe The task was 
accordingly divided into three subtasks: trajectory and performance analysis 
(performed by a Boeing proprietary code and described in Section 3.2.3), ini-
tial SES technology characterization and option sizing, and SES point design 
defi nit ion. 
Iechn~ Ch~a~~erizatlon and Optlon_Sizing. The objective of this task was 
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to characterize solar electric propulsion (SEP) vehicles for transporting nu-
clear waste. The four mission scenarios considered are: 
1. One-way LEO to 0.85 AU 
2. Round-trip LEO to 0.85 AU and return 
3. One-way high Earth orbit (HEO: 7000 nmi) to 0.85 AU 
4. Round-trip HEO to 0.85 AU and return 
Returned solar electric stages are recovered and refurbished for reuse. Ion 
propulsion using 50-cm argon thrusters is used. The technology 1S second 
generation with respect to the contemporary NASA SEPS stage. 
Technology Characterization. The basic technology assumptions are shown in Fiq-
ure 4.3-9. All have been demonstrated at the component level. The 50 cm 
thrusters chosen are similar to those presently under design by NASA/LeRC; the 
five power supply power processing unit (PPU) was first demonstrated in 1977; 
the capacitor-diode voltage multiplier (CDVM) screen supply has been 
demonstrated at BAC, Hughes Aircraft, and at NASA/LeRC. Space qualified 2 mil 
cells are in production. 
THRUSTERS 
DIAMETER TBD 
(50·em REF I 
Ar. Xe. Hg. Cs 
MULTIPLE 
LIFE - MISSION 
NT ~ 0 71 @ 5000 SEC 
POWER PROCESSING UNIT (PPUI 
5 POWER SUPPLIES 
CDVM SCREEN SUPPLY 
SEPS THERMAL CONTROL 
NO ISP CONTROL 
Np = 0 93 @ 11 KW 
FIgure 4.3-9: SES Technology ProjectIons 
SOLAR ARRAY 
2 MIL SI CELLS 
EFFICIENCY: 15% 
BLANKET: 190 W/M2 
DEGRADATION' 50%/1 YR. 
BLANKET: 2.166 KG/KW 
6 KG/KW: BOL 
Argon was selected as the propellant used in vehicle characterization because 
of the wealth of existing data, and because of its benign plume characteristics 
(minimum magnetic-atmosphere impact). If this proves to be less of a problem, 
alternate propellants such as Xe, Hg, or Cs offer the potential of higher 
performance. 
PPU performance (welqht and efflclency) benefits greatly from combination of 
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power supply function, higher power rating, and an unregulated beam voltage. 
Thermal control for the PPU is accounted at 8.0 kg/kW radiated. The principle 
improvement in solar array technoloqy is the adoption of 2 mil silicon cells at 
15% (BOL) efficiency. Most of the array mass is attributable to launch 
packaging. 
Option Sizing. Definition of mission profiles and technology allowed SES vehi-
cles to be sized for the required mission options. Option 4 was dropped due to 
operational complexity, leaving one way and round trip missions to 0.85 AU from 
LEO, and an expendable mission from a 7000 nmi HEO to 0.85 AU as the remaining 
choices. 
Sizing of vehicles for the four options used a proprietary code to select the 
specific impulse yieldinq the maximum payload for a 3-year trip time (chosen as 
representative of achievable system lifetimes for SES systems). An inital mass 
including payload of 34,000 kg was assumed as a constraint. The code used pro-
vided estimates of the initial power, number of thrusters, and propellant mass 
used. 
Results of the slzlng study for the three mission options are illustrated in 
Figure 4.3-10, which for each of the three options shows initial mass, initial 
CD ® ® ® 
MISSION LEO 116 LEO 1161 LEO HEO/. HEOI iii I HEO 
INITIAL MASS ~ 34000 34000 13200 • (LBM) (75000 ) (76000) (21106.) TBD 
INITIAL POWER Kw 100, 860 80 TBD 
SPECIFIC IMPULSE 9000 8000 7000 TBD (SEC) 
TRIP TIME - DAYS 1100 10n 10lI0 TBD (PROPULSION) 
PROPELLANT MASS (Kel 42012. Ii830 14&0 TBO 
NUMBER OF THRUSTERS 8 12 3 TBD 
DELIVERED PAYLOAD ~ 23600 ..nulL 10480 (62000) (47000) (23060 I TBD LBM 
• DELIVERED TO 11,288 km CIRCULAR. 21..&0 
Figure 4.3-10: SES Performance Summary 
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power, specific impulse, number of thrusters, propellant mass, and deliverd 
payload for identical init1al masses and trip times. A review of these results 
led to selection of the single stage expendable mission for development as a 
point design due to the following factors. 
1. Highest delivered payload for single launch option. 
2. Reusability for solar electric stages is questionable due to the difficulty 
of restowing the solar array; the long component life required; dependance 
on array annealing; and the operational complexity is also a negative 
factor. 
3. The cost savings of reusability may not exist. Array costs are such a 
strong function of quantity that the smaller number of vehicles required 
for a reusable fleet might cost as much as the expendable fleet, which 
being more numerous benefits from economies of scale in solar array 
production. 
In addition, the expendable mission, 1f attractive in comparison to chemical 
stages, would automatically establish the viability of a reusable SES if such 
a vehicle were to prove technically feasible. 
Solar Electric Stage Point Design Defini~ion. A further review of the SES per-
formance led to selection of a stage sized to carry the maximum size fully 
shielded waste payload still capable of passive thermal dissipation. This 
allowed reduction in the array size to 270 kW and provided a substantial margin 
for mass growth. 
The point design vehicle general arrangement and features are illustrated in 
F1gure 4.3-11. 
4.3.2 Candidate Systems Jarametric Characterization. The candidate vehicles 
described 1n the previous section were assembled into candidate orbit transfer 
systems. Performance parametrics were developed for these candidate orbit 
transfer systems. These parametrics were combined with cost estimates in 
task 8 so that candidate systems could be compared on cost per kilogram of 
delivered waste. 
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Figure 4.3-11. Solar Electric Stage (SES) Point Design Configuration and Key Characteristics 
Ca~didate_Orbit Transfer Systems. The following types of orbit transfer sys-
tems were identifled in Section 4.2.2 for the nuclear waste disposal mission. 
o Aerobraked recoverable OTV/Storable SOlS 
o Aerobraked recoverable OTV/LOX/LH2 SOlS 
o Expendable OTV/Storable SOlS 
o Expendable OTV/L02/LH2 SOlS 
o Long life L02/LH2 OTV 
o Aerobraked OTV/SEPS 
o Solar Electric Stage 
o All propulsive recoverable OTV/Storable SOlS 
o All propulsive re~overable OTV/LOX/LH2 SOlS 
Parametric Characteriza~io~. Parametric payload versus weight relationships 
were developed to determine the maximum payload capabilities of the different 
orbit transfer systems for each of the launch options. 
Trending curves for mass at burnout were generated from the point design mass 
statements described in the previous section. The burnout mass versus propel-
lant mass relationships are shown for the OTVIS and SOlS in Figures 4.3-12 and 
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Figure 4.3-12: Inlection Stage (OTV) Mass Trending Curves 
4.3-13, respectively. A series of points were selected from these curves and 
used for the performance analysis. 
The PSMC program was used to determine payload capabilities of the candidate 
orbit transfer systems. Given a stage burnout mass and propellant capacity, 
PSMC calculates propellant consumption, losses and stage mass for each event in 
the mission profile. Payload and start mission mass are iterated until 
calculated propellant consumption and burnout mass match the specified values. 
The program incorporates a complete mission profile of time and delta-V, for 
each event. The type of burn, either RCS or main engine, and corresponding 
start-stop losses can be specified. Boiloff and EPS losses are calculated from 
the timeline and specified loss rates. The loss rate is specified as a 
function of propellant capacity to handle different stage sizes. A detailed 
mission sequential mass statement listing event, delta-V, propellant usage, 
losses, and mass is printed along with a summary mass statement. 
In addition to basic stage masses from the mass trendinq curves, a 254 kQ inter-
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Figure 4.3-13: Placement Stage (SOlS) Mass Trending Curves 
stage is carried by the OTV/L02/LH2 SOlS combinations. This is jettisoned by 
the OTV after injection into heliocentric transfer. A payload adapter mass of 
227 kg for single waste ball and 454 kg for double waste ball payloads was 
added to the SOlS burnout masses. 
Figure 4.3-14 presents the mass required as a function of payload for the 
aerobraked OTV/storable SOlS. The mass lines plotted are start mission, OTV 
and SOlS, SOlS and payload, SOlS, and SOlS propellant from top to bottom, re-
spectively. Also shown are the same lines for an aerobraked OTV/storable SOlS 
system 1n Wh1Ch the payload radiation shield is jettisoned at injection into 
the heliocentr1c transfer orb1t. 
The same data for the aerobraked OTV/L02/LH2 SOlS and the LLOTV are shown in 
F1gures 4.3-15 and 4.3-16, respectively. In all cases where the payload 
radiation sh1eld 1S Jettlsoned, an add1tional mass of 770 kg is added to the 
SUlS burnout mass for a radlatlon shield to protect it from the payload. 
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Figure 4.3-14: Parame'tric Performance Characterization for Aerobraked OTVlStorable SOlS 
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The pOlnts of lnterest on these flgures are the net payload llmlts for the 
growth STS and the class 2 SDV launch vehlcles. Slngle launch orbit transfer 
systems are constralned to a start-mission mass correspondlng to the growth STS 
llmlt and the dual launch orblt transfer systems are constrained to an OTV and 
SOlS mass matching the class 2 SDV limit. 
Data for the expendable OTV/SOIS systems are not shown. Prellminary investiga-
tlon showed this type of system to have essentially the same performance as the 
aerobraked OTV/SOIS systems but with slgnificantly higher cost per flight due 
to the OTV being expended. For this reason lt was not consldered further. The 
solar electric stage, belng a slngle point deslgn, was not characterized 
parametrically. 
4.4 SELECT CANDIDATE ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEMS 
A parametrlc performance characterlzation of orbit transfer systems contained 
In Sectlon 4.4 provlded the basis for performance comparisons leading to selec-
tlon of four orblt transfer system options for consideration in Task 8. Compar-
lsons were carrled out in two steps for chemical orbit transfer systems. In 
the flrst, SlX candldate two stage orbit transfer systems were compared to se-
lect the best two stage system. In the second step, the best two stage systems 
were compared to slngle stage systems. No performance trades were carried out 
for electrlc vehlcles as only one option was selected. 
4.4.1 Parametrlc Performance Comparisons. Figure 4.4-1 illustrates the 
parametrlc performance comparisons for six two stage orbit transfer systems. 
Orblt transfer system mass is plotted on the ordinate as a functlon of 
delivered payload mass plotted on the abscissa. Variables include both 
cryogenlc and storable propellant SOlS propulslon and three lnJection stage 
optlons: all propulslve return for recovery, aerobrake return for recovery, 
and the optlon of extendlng the lnJectlon stage without recovery. 
Comparlsons were made for orblt transfer system masses of about 82,000 kg, typi-
cal of dual launch optlons where the waste payload lS carried up in one launch 
and the orbit transfer systen ln a separate launch, and for orbit transfer sys-
tems of about 23,000 kg, tYPlcal of SIngle launch options wlth waste payload 
and orblt transfer system carrled to low orbit in the same launch vehicle. The 
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Figure 4.4-1: Parametric Performance Comparison for 2-Stage System, 
comparisons illustrated resulted 1n two selections: for the large system the se-
lect10n of the cryogen1c SOlS results in a payload gain of over 8200 kg. Use 
of the aerobrake return opt10n in comparison to all propulsive return is worth 
a further 2000 to 3000 kg. Expending the injection stage will gain only 1000 
to 2000 kg (about 4%) but the added cost associated with the expended 1njection 
stage led to 1ts reJect10n 1n favor of the aerobrake option. 
The choice for the single launch compatible system was not dominated by perform-
ance; even though the cryogenic upper stage still showed superior performance, 
STS cargo bay length constra1nts el1m1nated it from consideration. Evaluation 
of 1nject10n stage opt10ns for the small system lead once more to selection of 
the aerobraked 1nJect10n stage for super10r performance. 
In summary the selected two stage opt10ns are: 
1. For systems uS1ng dual launch, an aerobraked cryogen1c propellant 1njectlon 
stage te~ned with a crygen1c propellant SOlS. 
2. For smaller systems carring the orb1t transfer system and payload in a sin-
gle launch, an aerobraked cryogen1c propellant injection stage using a stor-
able propellant SOlS. 
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A comparison of the perfonmance of the best two stage systems agalnst single 
stage systems 1S lllustrated in Flgure 4.4-2. The performance of two stage sys-
tems using both storable and cryogenic propellant SOlS optlons is shown with 
the performance of single stage LLOTV options plotted on the same chart. 
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For the dual launch option for orbit transfer systems weighing about 82,000 kg, 
the performance of the single stage option is increased over the two stage 
option by about 4%. This was judged insufficient to warrant the increased cost 
per launch of the LLOTV option resulting in selection of the two-stage option 
for dual launch applications. 
Evaluation for the single launch option traded the performance of the single 
stage LLOTV against the two stage system using the storable propellant SOlS. 
This comparison showed the single stage option as a clear winner, with a pay-
load increase compared to the two-stage option of 44%. 
Primary conclusions of the parametric performance comparison include: 
0180-26426-2 
108 
1. The maximum performance dual launch option is the aerobraked injection 
stage used with a cryogenic propellant SOlS. 
2. A maximum performance single launch option is a single stage cryogenic pro-
pellant LLOTV. 
4.4.2 Selected Option Definition. Final orbit transfer systems selection for 
consideration in task 8 was based on performance and additional factors. 
Three options compatible with Single launch missions were chosen and are illus-
trated in Figure 4.4-3. 
liNGLE STAGE EXPENDABLE 
IOLAR ELECTRIC STAGE 
2-STAGE 
AEROBRAKED INJECTION 
STAGE + CRYO SOlS 
SINGLE STAGE 
CRYO EXPENDABLE ILLOTVI 
INJECTION 
STAGE 2-STAGE \ 
AEROBRAKED INJECTION LsoIS 
ITAGE + STORABLE SOlS 
Figure 4.4-3: Selected Orbit Transfer Systems 
1. The single stage cryogenic expendable LLOTV is the highest performance sin-
gle launch chemical propellant opti9n. 
2. The two stage system using a storable propellant SOlS and an aerobraked in-
jection stage is inferior in performance to the cryogenic propellant LLOTV 
but is closest to the reference system and was carried as a standard for 
evaluation of alternate systems. 
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3. The solar electric expendable stage has performance superior to the best 
chemical stage fQr the single launch option but is sufficiently different 
in cost to require cost comparisons at the total system level 1n Task 8. 
4. The sole dual lauch option considered is also illustrated in Figure 4.4-3. 
It uses a large aerobraked recoverable injection stage and a expendable cry-
ogenic propellant SOlS. 
This combination offers the best overall performance in this size range. Elec-
trlc systems were not considered for dual launch as efficient manifesting of 
multiple payloads and deployment of 81 metric ton electric stages would require 
extensive space based operations, which were considered beyond a scope of this 
study. 
4.5 RESCUE SYSTEM DEFINITION 
Definition of the rescue system was required to allow calculation of rescue mis-
sion capabilities of the basic orbit transfer system delivery vehicles. 
Study of the MSFC reference system indicated potential mission cost savings in 
deletion of rescue peculiar hardware from the standard SOlS. Our study of res-
cue mission requirement in Task 3 indicated that the only SOlS rescue peculiar 
component required on every vehicle was a rendezvous radar transponder. Addi-
tional rescue provisions basically consisted of providing for a 3-year minimum 
life for beacon transponder and attitude control system. This provided minimum 
cost for most missions but left the basic SOlS capablities short of rescue mis-
sion requirements. 
The approach evolved was to kit the basic SOlS to provide a rescue vehicle with 
required capabilities. This section describes the rescue kit installed on the 
SOlS to provide rescue vehicle capabilities. Integration of the rescue vehicle 
with the basic orbit transfer system is also described. The rescue system de-
scribed is applicable to the dual launch large orbit transfer system but the 
basic kit approach is applicable to all orbit transfer systems considered. 
4.5.1 Rescue~~~emJi~~irements. Rescue mission requirements for the nominal 
rescue mission, derived from task 3 analysis of rescue mission profiles, are 
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shown in Figure 4.5-1. Navigation to within terminal acquisition range of the 
target vehicle is accomplished by using the deep space network to track the 
onboard beacon transponder. Target vehicle and rescue vehicle relative 
o NAVIGATE TO wlTum TERt1INAL ACQUISlTlOrl RANGE OF TARGET VEHICLE 
• ACCot~LlSH TERMINAL RENDEZVOUS Arm DOCKHIG 
• COrlPUTER 
• IV.u 
• RENDEZVOUS RADAR 
• NOUITOR/CoritlAND CAPP.BILlTIES 
• TRANSFER PAYLOPD TO RESCUE VEHICLE 
• EFFECTORS FOR PAYLOAD TRAflSFER 
• ORIENT SOlS FOR PLACEt1ENT ~lANEUVER 
Figure 4.5-1: Rescue System Requirements 
positions are monitored and the maneuvers required for closing are calculated 
on the ground and up linked to the rescue vehicle. The initial navigation 
phase is completed when the rescue vehicle arrives within 1000 km of the 
vehicle to be rescued. 
The next requirement is accomplishment of terminal rendezvous and docking. The 
basic sequence of operation involves: (1) power up of the rescue kit, (2) a 
rescue radar scan to acquire the target vehicle transponder, (3) a range and 
bearing link to the ground where the closing trajectory for the rescue vehicle 
is calculated and uplinked back, (4) a closing maneuver from the initial 
acquisition range to 10 km range involving a total delta-V of approximately 40 
m/sec and requiring about 10 hours, (5) initation of terminal rendezvous opera-
tions with an initial closing to 300m ranqe followed by station-keeping and 
visual inspection by ground control using the on board television camera and the 
high data rate downlink, (6) initation of the automatic rendezvous and docking 
sequence followed by completion of docking and waste payload transfer to the 
rescue vehicle, (7) undocking and a 5 m/sec clearance burn followed by 
orienting of the rescue vehicle to the final SOlS burn heading and loading of 
the SOlS coast tlmer, and (8) inltation of the SOlS autonomous operations 
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followed by the jettison of the rescue kit and sunshield. The SOlS then 
performs a normal placement to complete the deployment mission. Total duration 
for operations is approximately 18 hours. 
This sequence dicates requirements for computer capability, an inertial measure-
ment unit, rendezvous radar, and monitor/command capabilities including closed 
circuit television and a high data rate downlink to allow ground monitoring of 
terminal rendezvous operations. Payload transfer to the rescue vehicle in-
volves requirements for docking provisions on both rescue vehicle and the vehi-
cle to be rescued and effectors to accomplish payload transfer. The final re-
quirement is to orient the SOlS for the placement maneuver and initiate the 
SOlS autonomous operations. 
4.5.2 Chemical Propellant Rescue System. The rescue system evolved to meet 
these requirements consists 
sion orbit transfer system. 
SOlS and a rescue kit. 
of a rescue vehicle plus a standard delivery mis-
The rescue vehicle is assembled from a standard 
Rescue Kit Configuration. The rescue kit is illustrated in Figure 4.5-2. Pri-
mary components include the reaction control system, propellant tankage, commu-
• EQUIPMENT COMPLEMENT 
1 N2 He TANK 
2 TRANSPONDER 
3. 20 WATT POWER AMP 
e COMPUTER 
5 DATA BUSISIGNAL CONDITIONER 
6. SIGNAL INTERFACE UNIT 
7 REOUNDANT INERTIAL 
MEASUREMENT UNIT (RIMUI 
8. RENDEZVOUS RADAR ELECTRONICS 
9 CCTV ELECTRONICS 
10 POWER DISTRIBUTION UNIT 
• GROSS WEIGHT (Kg) 1582 
DRY WEIGHT 1153 
RESIDUALS 15 
RESERVE PROP 38 
NOMINAL PROP 376 
FIgure 4.5-2: Rescue Kit Configuration 
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nication subsystem, a redundant inertial measurement unit, rendezvous radar 
electronics, computers and closed circuit television electronics unit which 
includes a high data rate RF subsystem and a deployable high gain antenna. Com-
ponents are mounted in an equipment support ring which provides structural sup-
port and thermal control; the general arrangement is similar to the avionics 
equipment ring described in Section 4.3 for the standard injection stage. A 
3.1m diameter hole in the center of the equipment section provides for transfer 
of the waste payload. Outboard mounting provides the widest possible field of 
view for the rendezvous TV camera, the gimbal mounted rendezvous radar antennas 
and a boom mounted high gain antenna. Additional structure consists of the 
struts used to interface the rescue kit with the SOlS mounted waste payload 
support structure. 
Gross weight of the rescue kit is about 15,082 kg. The kit dry mass is about 
11,053 kg. Consumables, primarily propellants for the reaction control system, 
amount to 426 kg. This propellant loading is adequate for all SOlS rendezvous 
and docking operations involved in rescue. 
Rescue Vehicle Configuration. Assembly of the rescue kit and SOlS into a res-
cue vehicle is illustrated in Figure 4.5-3. The rescue kit is strut mounted to 
the SOlS payload support structure. Additional components include an aft sun-
STANDARD SOlS 
+X 
KITTED RESCUE VEHICLE 
Figure 4.5-3: Rescue Velllcle IS Modified from Standard SOlS 
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shade which mounts a solar array and Sun sensor used for vehicle attitude con-
trol and power during cruise and coast in the pursuit mode. At the conclusion 
of rescue operations the rescue kit and sunshade are jettisoned, converting the 
rescue vehicle back to a standard SOlS. 
Key features including a summary mass statement for the complete rescue vehicle 
are shown in Figure 4.5-4. 
STANDARD SOlS 
-MAIN PROPULSION 
-ACS THRUSTERS 
-STAR SENSORS 
-PLUS-
MASS. kll 
14461 kll 
RESCUE KIT 1682 
-TARGET ACQUSITION 
-RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING 
-NAVIGATION 
-GROUND MONITORING 
-ADDED RCS PROPELLANT 
-ADDED ELECTRICAL POWER 
-JETTISONABLE 
ACTIVE DOCKING RING 
-IMPACT ATTENUATION 
PAYLOAD TRANSFER MECH. 
AFT SUNSHADE 
-THERMAL CONTROL 
-SUPPLEMENTARY POWER 
-SUN SENSORS 
86 
23 
78 
RESCUE VEHICLE GROSS 18239 
AFT SUNSHADE 
SOLAR ARRAY 
SUN SENSORS 
~ STEERABLE HIGH GAIN 
ANTENNA (DEPLOYED) 
RESCUE KIT 
(JETTISONABLE) 
Figure 4.5-4: Rescue Vehicle Configuration and Summary MBa Statement 
The aft sunshade provides thermal control for the vehicle cryogenic propellant 
during the Sun oriented coast portion of the pursuit mission when the X-axis of 
the rescue vehicle is pointed at the Sun. The sunshade also mounts a solar 
array and redundant Sun sensors used for vehicle power and pointing during the 
cruise portion of the mission. A steerable high gain antenna, shown in the 
deployed position, is used for the high data rate downlink required for closed 
circuit television monitoring of the rescue operations. 
An active docking ring with shock absorbers to mitigate docking loads on the 
system is carried. The standard SOlS carries a passive docking ring hard 
mounted to the waste payload support structure. The docking ring is surrounded 
by the jettisonable rescue kit. 
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The mass of the standard SOlS is increased from approximately 14,400 kq to 
about 16,200 kg by the addition of rescue provisions. The largest increment is 
provided by the 1582 kg rescue kit. The active docking ring weighs 95 kg, 
mechanization for payload transfer an additional 23 kg, and the aft sunshade 
with its thermal control, supplementary power, and Sun sensors weighs 78 kg. 
Rescue Orbit Transfer System. The rescue orbit transfer system consists of a 
pursuit configuration which carries the rescue vehicle to the tarqet after 
injection and an injection configuration which injects the pursuit 
configuration to its initial transfer orbit. 
The basic mission profile for rendezvous of the failed SOlS in heliocentric 
orbit is described 1n detail 1n Section 3.3.3 and illustrated in Figure 3.3-4. 
The initial injection inpulse injects the pursuit configuration into a transfer 
orbit (leg 3 to 4). A phasing maneuver by the standard SOlS component of the 
pursuit configuration applied at point 4 phases the pursuit vehicle for target 
interception at point 5. A second velocity inpulse provided by the standard 
SOlS matches the velocity of pursuit and target vehicle leaving the rescue vehi-
cle within terminal acquistion ranqe of the target. The expended standard SOlS 
is separated and the rescue vehicle (now in the configuration illustrated in 
Figure 4.5-4) completes the mission. 
The pursuit configuration described is illustrated in Figure 4.5-5 and conslsts 
SUNSHIELD 
SUNSHIELD SOLAR ARRAY 
ST ANDARD SOlS 
+ Y IN ECLIPTIC PLANE 
STANDARD SOlS PROPULSION FOR 
• RENDEZ TRANSFER INSERTION 1.19 Km/SEC 
• RENDEZ PLACEMENT 1.19 Km/SEC 
RESCUE VEHICLE 
• CONTROL FOR ALL MISSION PHASES 
• TERMINAL RENDEZVOUS AND 
PAYLOAD TRANSFER OPERATIONS 
• FINAL PLACEMENT 1.28 Km/SEC 
Figure 4.5-5: Rescue Orbit Transfer System Pursuit Configuration 
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of the rescue vehicle docked to the waste payload support structure of a stand-
ard SOlS. After injection and between maneuvers, the pursuit configuration 
flies with the rescue vehicle sunshade pointed at the Sun, allowing the rescue 
vehicle to shade the standard SOlS. All the control functions are provided by 
the rescue vehicle; the standard SOlS serves as a propulsion module only. Its 
propulsive capab1litity is adequate for the two 1.19-km/sec maneuvers required 
for the pursuit phase of the misslon with the rescue vehicle itself perfonming 
the final 1.28-km/sec placement maneuver. 
The same system is used with a slightly different delta-V Spllt for the Earth 
orblt rescue misslon illustrated in F1gure 3.3-3. 
The 1nject1on configuration of the rescue orbit transfer system is illustrated 
1n Flgure 4.5-6. The inJection configuration is assembled on orbit from a 
RESCUE VEHICLE 
STANDARD DELIVERY ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM 
RESCUE MSSION ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM 
INJECTION CONFIGURATION 
Figure 4.5-6: Rescue Orbit Transfer System: Inlection Configuration 
standard dell very orbit transfer system delivered to LEO by a shuttle derived 
cargo launch vehicle and a rescue vehlcle WhlCh is carried up in the uprated 
shuttle orbiter. After orbiter rendezvous with the previously deployed stand-
ard dellvery orbit transfer system, the rescue vehicle is deployed from the 
orb1ter and in the first exerC1se of 1tS functions, which serves as a final 
0180-26426-2 
116 
checkout, rendezvouses with and docks with the standard delivery orbit transfer 
system. Injection of the pursuit configuration to its lnitial transfer orbit 
is then accomplished by the large cryogenic lnjectlon stage WhlCh uses an 
aerobraking maneuver to return to low orbit for recovery by the orbiter. 
4.5.3 Electric Propulsion Rescue Systems. Due to the relative lack of maneu-
verablllty of the electric orbit transfer system, the rescue klt for the elec-
trlc vehlcle is fitted with thrusters and used as a free flier capable of 
leavlng the rescue electric vehicle and rendezvousing with the failed vehlcle. 
The waste payload is then transfered from the failed vehlcle to the free flier 
rescue klt which undocks from the failed vehicle and returns and docks with the 
rescue vehlcle. Following a hard dock WhlCh attaches the waste payload to the 
rescue vehlcle, the free flier rescue klt is Jettlsoned. 
4.5.4 Contlngency Rescue Study Areas. For reasonable system rellability, con-
tingency rescues will comprlse less than 1% of the total number of rescue mis-
sions carrled out (see Section 3.3). Evolution of concepts for dealing with 
contingency rescue mission requirements is still required. Primary study areas 
include: 
1. Tracking, acquisition and rendezvous with noncooperative failed vehicles. 
2. Despin, docking and waste payload transfer from failed and randomly tum-
bling vehicles. 
Various methods for dealing with these contengencies have been studied (Ref. 
14) but a definite resolution of these issues requires further study. 
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5.0 LAUNCH VEHICLE SYSTEMS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The primary objective of the launch vehicle systems task was to trade a full 
range of launch vehicle options in a systematic manner to define the optimum 
launch system for the space disposal option. Secondary objectives included def-
inition of unique requirements imposed on launch vehicle systems by the space 
disposal mission. 
The task began with a preliminary screening of launch vehicle options which 
resulted in selection of solid and liquid rocket boosted versions of the space 
shuttle orbiter and shuttle derived cargo launch vehicles as candidate configu-
rations. Applicable references were reviewed to define key characteristics of 
the candidate vehicles in the areas of performance and cost. The candidate con-
cepts were then traded in the areas of risk and cost to select the best candi-
date for the space disposal mission. These trades resulted in selection of two 
candldate systems. 
1. For single launch missions, the liquid rocket booster uprated space 
shuttle. 
2. For dual launch missions, the liquid rocket booster uprated space shuttle 
was teamed with a liquid rocket booster version of the shuttle derived 
cargo launch vehicle. This system showed significant life cycle cost sav-
ing over the reference launch mode for a wide range of assumptions on DDT&E 
and recurring costs, while preserving the low risk characeristics inherent 
in the winged orbiter. 
5.2 CANDIDATE SYSTEM SELECTION 
5.2.1 Launc~~t~~_~ur~~. A survey of the available data on launch vehicles 
and past studies of space disposal of nuclear waste identified six categories 
of launch system candidates illustrated in Figure 5.2-1. Four major categories 
are represented. 
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(1) REFERENCE (29,500 KG PAYLOAD) SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM (STS) 
(2) UP RATED (45,000 KG PAYLOAD) STS 
(3) SHUTTLE DERIVATIVE CARGO LAUNCH VEHICLE USING SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERSISDV(SRB)} 
(Lf) SHUTTLE DERIVATIVE CARGO LAUNCH VEHICLE USING LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTERS ISDV(LRB)j 
(5) HEAVY LIFT LAUNCH VEHICLE (HLLV) CONCEPTS 
(6) SINGLE STAGE TO ORBIT (SSTO) LAUNCH VEHICLE CONCEPTS 
Figure 5.2·1: Candidate Launch Systems 
1. Reference and uprated versions of the present winged orblter. These sys-
tems team the orblter with an external tank and boosters, either SOlld 
rocket boosters as used on the present shuttle configuration or uprated llq-
uid rocket boosters. 
2. Shuttle derlvative cargo launch vehicles which replace the wlnged orbiter 
with a recoverable propulsion pod and an expendable cargo shroud. The 
external tank and booster configurations used with the shuttle derived 
cargo launch vehicles are identlcal to those used with the wlnged orbiter, 
out deletlon of the orblter inert welght leads to signlficantly increased 
payload capabllltles. 
3. A varlety of heavy lift launch vehicle (HLLV) concepts have been deflned 
primarily in support of studies of the solar power satellite. The latest 
HLLV concepts defined lnvolved winged fully reusable orbiters and boosters 
used in two stage configurations with gross lift off weights in the region 
of 5000 tons. These vehlcles are capable of orbitlng payloads on the order 
of 250 tons per launch. 
4. Slngle stage to orbit (SSTO) concepts have also been investigated for the 
space dlsposal of nuclear waste. These concepts typically orbit relatlvely 
small payloads and depend on a high degree of reusability and greatly 
slmplllfled mission operations to lower launch costs. 
5.2.2 PrellmlnaCt_La~nch ~tem Scre~ning. A prelimlnary screening of the 
selected concepts rapldly ellmlnated the HLLV and SSTO concepts from further 
consideratlon. 
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Whlle the HLLV offers attractlvely low launch costs per kilogram of payload, 
the scale of the vehicle and ltS development costs (estlmated on the order of 
$10 blllion) are sufflclent to make lt nonvlable except in the context of sup-
port of an actlve solar power satelllte program. Further study of a concept de-
pendent for viablllty on the eXlstance of a solar power satellite program was 
not consldered to be consistent with the ground rules and assumptions governing 
the present study. A prellminary assessment of the utllity of the HLLV for 
support of the space disposal mission was conducted by the Marshal Space Fllght 
Center in Reference 20. 
5.2.3 Candidate Launch System Descriptio~. The candidate launch vehicles 
resulting from the preliminary screening are illustrated along with key charac-
teristics in the areas of risk, cost, and performance in Figure 5.2-2. Major 
elements of each candidate are listed. 
~~~C~ STANDARD SHUTTLE UPRATED SHUTTLE SHUTTLE DERIVATIVE SHUTTLE DERIVATIVE CIOLiD ROCKET BOOSTER) (LiaUID ROCKET BOOSTER) 
11\ 1n 11\ I , 1 f\ (\ /~ CONFIGURATION le- I 
I I I 
I ~ q~ ~~ I I~ ~ tt: '; 
• ORBITER • ORBITER 
• E>CI'ENDA8lE CAROO SHRtU • E>CI'ENDA8lE CAROO SHROlJ[l 
MAJOR • EXTERNAL TANK • EXTERNAL TANK • RECOVERABLE I'ROP\.JUION • RECOVERABLE I'ROf'U.SION 
ELEMENTS • SOLID ROCKET • LlaUID ROCKET AND AVIONICS r.t:lDlU AND AVIONlr .. M1IlUlE 
BOOSTER (2) BOOSTER 121 • SCUD ROCKET BOOSTER CZ) • l.JQlm ROCKET IIOOISTeR CZ) 
APPLICATION CREW AND CARGO CREW AND CARGO CARGO CARGO 
CARGO BAY 1M) 457x18.3 4.57 x 111.3 7x24 7x24 DlA x LENGTH 
PAYLOAD TO LEO 29.500 ® 47.000 87.700 14.000 K.0370Km 
DDT&E -Go 208B 1.2B 10B CD 
PRODCOaT H< 0 460 M 335 M 780M 
COST/FLT <D 286M 270M 220M 187M 
ALL COST IN 1880 DOLLARS <D ORBITERS NOT INCLUDED 
<D FOR FLIGHT RATE 23/YR <D WHERE APPROI' INCLUDES ET AND PIA MOD CD WHEN DEVELOPED IN ASSOCIATION WITH DEVELOPMENT 
OF UPRATED SHUTTLE. 
@ TO 270Km 
F,gure 5.2-2: Key Characteristics Candidate Launch VehIcle System 
Risk is expressed in terms of whether or not the vehicle possesses an intact 
abort capability. Winqed orblters in the event of a malfunction are able in 
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most cases to jettison the external tank and glide back for a landing at the 
launch site or at an alternate field. Shuttle derivative vehicles do not pos-
sess this capability. 
Performance is expressed in terms of payload bay size and the payload that the 
candidate vehicle can lift to a 28.5 deg inclination orbit at an altitude of 
260 km. 
Cost is expressed in terms of the design, development, test, and engineering 
required to implement the candidate, the production cost per unit, and the cost 
per flight. 
Immediately apparent is the increased payload to low orbit capability of the 
shuttle derived cargo launch vehicles and the decreased unit cost due to dele-
tion of the winged orbiter. 
5.3 LAUNCH SYSTEMS SELECTION 
Launch systems selection was accomplished in two steps: in the first, candi-
date launch systems were ranked for risk; the second step compared launch sys-
tem concepts on the basis of life cycle cost. The risk evaluation led to the 
selection of the shuttle derived cargo launch vehicle as a supplement to the 
winged orbiter for dual launch mission scenarios. Cost trades led to the selec-
tion of two launch systems for further evaluation in Task 8. 
5.3.1 Risk Assessment. Risk characteristics of the candidate launch systems 
are illustrated in Figure 5.3-1. Immediately apparent is the lack of abort 
capability for the shuttle derived cargo launch vehicles. The logical conclu-
sion is that the orbiter will always provide lower risk for the waste payload. 
The significantly lower cost per pound of the shuttle-derived cargo launch vehi-
cle can still be used as part of a dual launch scenario with the waste payload 
carried in the winged orbiter and the orbit transfer system carried to low 
earth orbit by the shuttle-derived vehicle. This concept preserves the risk 
benefits of the winged orbiter but uses the increased cost efficiency of the 
shuttle-derived vehicle to lift the heavier part of the space system. 
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LAUNCH VEHICLE IHT8CI ABQRI MODES CO~ftfNlS. 
REFERENCE STS RTLS, AOA, ATO + CONTINfENCY ABOR1S 
UPRATED STS RTLS, AOA, ATO + AUG~ENTED CONTINfENCY 
ABORT (LRB SHUTDOWN) 
SDV (SRB) NONE NO IDENTIFIED ABORT 
CAPABILITY 
SDV (LRB) NONE NO IDENTIFIED ABORT 
CAPABI LITY 
• A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF ESCAPE SYSTEM RELIA~ILITY INDICATES THAT 
AN ESCAPE SYSTEM RELIABILITY OF 0.9 IS OPTIMISTIC 
( F-lll ESCAPE CAPSULE DATA) 
• SDV IS TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON ESCAPE SYSTEM FOR WASTE PAYLOAD RECOVERY AFTEr. 
ABNORMAL MISSION TERMINATION 
FIgure 5.3-1: Launch System Risk Characteristics 
5.3.2 Cost Asses~~ent. As a result of the risk assessment, four space systems 
were carried into the cost assesment. Two single launch options include the 
reference space shuttle and the uprated space shuttle using liquid rocket 
boosters. Two dual launch options team the reference space shuttle with the 
solid rocket booster version shuttle derived cargo launch vehicle and team the 
uprated space shuttle with the liquid rocket booster version of the shuttle 
derived vehicle. 
Candidate system life cycle launch system costs for the 10 year reference mis-
sion were compared by calculating the number of flights required for each candi-
date system to 11ft the full mission cumulative mass to low Earth orbit. Cumu-
lative mass requirements for transport to low orbit calculated for the Marshal 
Space Flight Center reference system are illustrated in Figure 5.3-2. The life 
cycle cost was calculated by multiplying the launch cost from Fiqure 5.2-2 by 
the total number of flights. This total was added to the OOT&E cost estimate 
to derive an estimate of each system's life cycle cost for the mission. 
Figure 5.3-3 compares launch system llfe cycle costs and shows some of the key 
0180-26426-2 
122 
YEAR AFTER PROGRAM START 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
NUIeER OF G---:.. 
UPRATED SHUITLE 10 20 50 50 50 50 50 60 60 60 60 
FLIGHTS 
EQUI VALENT l!.-J 470 940 2350 2350 2350 2350 2350 2820 2820 2820 2820 MASS TO f.!.::-
LEO (MT ) 
CUrULATIVE 470 1410 3760 6110 8460 0810 13160 15980 12800 21620 24440 MASS TO LEO (MT. ) 
rr~ BASED ON MSFC REF. SYSTEM (200 GWE INSTALLED, PW-4b WASTE MIX) 
~ BASED ON RE-USABLE CRYO OTV FOR INJECTION, STORABLE PROPELLANT SOlS. 
MSFC WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM 
f!~ UPRATED SHUTTLE CAPACITY 47 MT/LAUNCH 
Figure 5.3-2: Space DISposal of Nuclear Waste Launch Requirements 
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25 
20 
REF MISSION MASS REOMT - STS 1_2 FLIGHTSI 
/0 
/: 
,/ : 
• 1+ Tc IN ELEMENTAL FORM 
• (10 YEARSI 
/ : , 
, 
.-
· 
, 
, 
: UPRATED STS '680 FLIGHTS) 
12 
60 
2820 
27260 
: STS + SOV (SRa) C&II FLIGHTSII1I 
1&1 
..J 
U 
~ 
1&1 
11 
10 
, 
, 
. 
• ,
.-
UPRATED STS + lOY ILRBII432 FLiGHTII 1Z1 
~ 1 
CUMULATIVE 
MASS DEPLOYED 
15 TO LEo131141 10 15 20 25 30 
MY X 103 I. ., , , , , , , , , , , 
YEAR FROM 1 2 3 4 15 • 1 • 
9 10 11 12 
PROGRAM 
START 
111 INCLUOES 291 ORBITER AND 298 SOY FLIGHTS TO SUPPORT 298 MISSIONS 
121 INCLUDES 21. ORBITER AND 218 SOY FLIGHTS TO SUPPORT 216 MISSIONS 
131 BASED ON MSFC REF SPACE SYSTEM CONCEPT 
141 INCLUDES WASTE PAYLOAD AND PROTECTIVE SYSTEM, FLIGHT SUPPORT 
SYSTEM, ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM 
F,gure 5.3-3: Lde Cycle Cost Comparison for Candidate Launch Vehicles 
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assumptions used 1n their calculation. The ord1nate shows life cycle cost in 
b1llions of dollars. Cumulative mass in thousands of metric tons is plotted on 
the abcissa along with years from program start for the reference mission 
scenario. 
Launch costs for the four cand1date systems are represented by the four lines 
running from left to right. The slope intercept representes DDT&E for initial 
deployment of the launch system; values range from 0 for the reference shuttle 
to about 3.2 blllion for the uprated shuttle teamed with the liqU1d rocket 
booster version of the shuttle der1ved cargo launch vehicle. The slope of each 
line 1S proport1onal to the cost per fl1ght. 
Desp1te the highest 1n1tial DDT&E costs, the uprated shuttle/shuttle-derived 
veh1cle team shows the lowest llfe cycle cost by a significant amount. This 
f1nd1ng was tested by a ser1es of sens1tivity stud1es which (1) varied the mis-
Slon model by adding non-waste d1sposal space m1ssions; (2) let the shuttle 
derived cargo launch veh1cle cost per fl1ght equal cost per flight for the 
w1nged orblter; (3) 1ncreased development cost for the shuttle derived vehicle 
and the llqu1d rocket booster by a factor of 2; and (4) imposed various combina-
t10ns of these assumptions llsted in Figure 5.3-4. 
CASES EXAMINED 
1) ADDED LARC FOTV NOMINAL MISSION ~ODEL TO SDNW MODEL 
2) SDV COST/FLT = ORBITER COST/FLT 
3) SDV DEV COST = 2 X NOMINAL 
4) LRB DEV COST = 2 X NOMINAL 
5) 1 + 2 + 3 
6) 1 + 2 + 4 
7) 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 
CONe LUS I ON : 
• UPRATED SHUTTLE & SDV (LRB) SHOWS LOWEST LCC FOR ALL CASES 
• LARGER PAYLOAD MODEL INCREASED ADVANTAGE 
• PAYLOAD MODEL MAY BE VERY CONSERVATIVE (IT IS NOT VERY LIKELY 
THAT THE SPACE DISPOSAL MISSIONS WOULD BE TERMINATED AFTER 10 YEARS) 
Figure 5.3-4. Launch System Lde Cycle Cost SenSitivity Studies 
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Conclusions of the cost study are also summarized in F1gure 5.3-4. The uprated 
shuttle teamed w1th the shuttle derlved cargo launch vehlcle uS1ng liqU1d 
rocket boosters shows the lowest life cycle cost for all cases stud1ed. This 
advantage increases w1th increas1ng payload models and is maintained with 
smaller payload models down to about 20% of the reference miss10n studled. 
Th1S concept was selected as the reference dual launch/launch system configura-
tion for evaluation in Task 8. 
The uprated shuttle uSlng liquid rocket boosters was selected as the cand1date 
for single launch veh1cle m1ssion scenarios 1n Task 8. Th1S system shows a 
llfe cycle cost about two-thirds that of the reference space shuttle Wh1Ch uses 
solid rocket boosters and 1S 1dentical to the launch system used in the refer-
ence space system. 
5.4 LAUNCH VEHICLE UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS 
Launch veh1cle un1que requirements identif1ed for launch vehicles carrying 
waste payload ejection systems are llsted in Figure 5.4-1. No specific unique 
requirements beyond strengthening for full payload weight landing were 
1dentified for orb1ters carrying waste payload systems not requ1r1ng ejection. 
• JETTISONABLE/QUICK CYCLE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS 
-FOR WASTE PAYLOAD JETTISON 
-MAY OCCUpy ONLY PART OF DOOR LENGTH 
• ORBITER DESTRUCT SYSTEM (PREVENT HIGH SPEED IMPACT) 
• BLAST CHANNEL/FIREWALL TO CONTAIN PLUME FROM WASTE PAYLOAD EJECTION 
SYSTEM MOTOR (MAINTAIN ORBITER STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AFTER EJECTION) 
• CREW ESCAPE PROVISIONS 
• STRUCTURE AND LANDING GEAR STRENGTHENING FOR MAXIMUM PAYLOAD 
WEIGHT LANDING. 
Figure 5.4-1: Unique ReqUirements for Launch Vehicles 
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6.0 WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEMS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The waste payload system consists of those systems providing payload protection 
functions that provlde the necessary level of safety. Protection system con-
cepts must provide protection against accident possibilities during all mission 
phases; launch site, ascent, low Earth orbit, and heliocentric transfer to the 
final destination. Primary systems involved include: 
o Containment 
o Thermal control 
o Radiation protection (gamma and neutron) 
o Thermal protection (reentry) 
o Impact protection (land and water) 
o Other auxiliary systems 
Accordingly, the primary objective of the waste payload system study effort was 
to trade a full range of waste payload protection system options in these areas 
in a systematlc manner to define the optimal waste payload protection system 
for the space dlsposal mission. Both removable and integral (non-removable) 
radiation shield containment systems were studied. 
Key elements of the approach used lncluded use of the containment/accident re-
qUlrements from the 1979/80 Marshall/Battelle study. These requirements are 
documented for reference in Appendix E. Requirements were reviewed and mod-
ifications recommended. The results formed the basis for the remainder of the 
study effort. Trade studies were run to evaluate protection options in the 
area of radiation shielding and containment, waste payload ejection, and 
radiation shield removal. Results of these trade studies provided the basis 
for definition of reference waste payload systems for use ;R Task 8, total 
system integration effort. 
Key results include: 
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1. Recommendation of additional requirements in the areas of rad1ation 
shielding and impact protection. 
2. Adoption of a composite steel and graphite rad1ation shield used 1n both 
f1xed and removable shield configurations. 
3. Characterization of waste payload configurations and parametric weight 
estimating relationships for both integral and removable shields. 
Two primary risk issues were identified: 
1. Ground impact at terminal velocity. This problem can be assessed in future 
studies aimed at verification of the ability of the waste payload system 
concept to withstand ground impact. 
2. Post-burial meltdown following ground 1mpact. This problem appears unavoid-
able with waste payloads possessing thermal loadings comparable to the PW-
48 waste m1X used in this study. The only solution may be a waste mix with 
reduced thermal loadinq. 
6.2 DERIVATION OF PROTECTION SYSTEM REOUIREMENTS 
Protectlon system requirements were derived in three steps. The first was es-
tablishment of a classiflcation system for accident events. Accident end condi-
tions were then identlfied and the results used in reviewing the safety require-
ments defined for the reference system. Recommended changes included reduction 
in the waste payload radiation specification from 2 rem/hr at 1m to 1 rem/hr 
and the addition of orbiter crash conditions to the waste payload design condi-
tions. These additions, plus the recommendations of the previous study, pro-
vided the basis for design of the waste payload protection system. 
6.2.1 Accident Effect Classification. Acc1dent classifications used in the 
study along with their defining criteria are illustrated in Figure 6.2-1. The 
classiflcation and criteria were derived in modified form from Reference 21. 
Four classes of accidents were established. Class 1, the catastrophic 
accident, is defined as an accident producing an immediate radiological hazard 
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CLASS DEFINING CRITERIA NECESSARY CONDITIONS PRODUCED BY 
1 C.lTAS- IMMEDIATE RADIOLOGICAL BREACH OF CONTAINMENT MECHANICAL {BLAST OVERPRESSURE TROPHIC HAZARD TO POPULATION FOLLOWED BY ATMOSPHERIC RUPTURE HI-SPEED GROUND tCC IfEHT AND ENVIRONME~; PO- RELEASE OF >10 KG OF WASTE IMPACT CTA TENT I AL FOR 10 - 103 FORM FRAGMENT IMPACT 
WORLDWIDE EFFECTS OR {'<-EN'" HEATING SEVERE LOCAL DAMAGE. THERMAL RADIATION POTENTIAL LONG TERM MELTING FIRE 
EFFECTS MELTDOWN FOLLOWING 
BURIAL 
2 CRITICAL POTENTIAL RADIOLOGICAL BREACH OF CONTAINMENT OCEAN IMPACT, SINKING 
ACC I~ENT HAZARD TO MARINE EN- IN DEEP OCEAN FOLLOWED BY SLOW CORROSION (CRA VI RONMENT OF CONTAINER 
SHORT TERM LOCAL NON- GROUND IMPACT IN POPU- ATTAINABLE GROUNDTRACK NOT 
RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD LATED OR FLAMMABLE AREA; OVER OCEANS 
TO POPULATION, ENVI- NO LOSS OF CONTAINMENT 
RONMENT , 
3 NON-CRITICAL NO DANGER TO POPU- OCEAN IMPACT WITH SUCCESS- SHUTTLE CATASTROPHIC FAILURE 
ACCI~ENT LATI ON, EN IV RONMENT FUL FLOTATION AND RE- FOLLOWED BY GROUND IMPACT IN (NCA COVERY OR LAND IMPACT SAFE AREA OR OCEAN IMPACT IN UNPOPULATED, NON- WITH SUCCESSFUL FLOTATION, FLAMMABLE AREA. NO LOSS RECOVERY OF CONTAINMENT 
4 ABNORMAL MISSION NOT SUCCESS- • ORBITER EXECUTES STS OR WASTE PAYLOAD 
I1ISSION FUL INTACT ABORT SYSTEM FAILURE 
TERMINATION (,1MT) 
Figure 6.2-1: Space Disposal Accident Classification 
to population or the environment with the potential for hundreds or thousands 
of world-wide effects or severe local damage. Class 2, the critical accident, 
may pose a potential long-term radiological hazard to the marine environment 
caused by a breach of containment in deep ocean or a short-term local 
nonradiological hazard to population and environment caused by ground impact or 
by the setting of fires. Class 3, the noncritical accident, represents no 
danger to either population or environment. Class 4, the abnormal mission ter-
mination, is a classification applied to an unsuccessful mission fo~lowed by an 
intact abort. Necessary conditions and agents producing accidents in these 
classes are summarlzed in the figure. 
6.2.2 Protection System Objectives. The primary objective identified for the 
waste payload system lS that of restricting the worst accident consequences to 
the Class 2 or crltical accident category, or phrased differently, the elimina-
tion of the Class 1 or catastrophic accident. In Class 2 accidents the marine 
hazard can be eliminated by correct design of the waste payload system or by 
making provision for waste payload system recovery. The nonradiological 
hazards, crash and flre, in this category of accident are similar to those 
posed by the operatlon of commercial aircraft and cannot be completely 
eliminated from any launch system. Pnmary implications of this category of 
accident limitatlon include planning for land and ocean recovery. 
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6.2.3 Accident End Conditions. Accident end cond1tions identified for the 
launch vehicles considered 1n this study are illustrated in F1qure 6.2-2 for 
systems having the capabil1ty for ejection of the waste payload 1n the event of 
an accldent and for systems lack1ng ejection capability or the case where the 
ejection system fa1led. Possible accident environments and the primary environ-
EJECTION POSSIBLE ACCIDENT PRIMARY ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS 
OPTIONS ENVIRONMENTS RESUL TI NG 
EJECT RETARDATION SYSTEM WORKS LOW SPEED IMPACT; CONNECTION COOLING ASSURED 
RETARDATION SYSTEM FAILS HIGH SPEED DIRECTIONAL GROUND IMPACT 
LAUNCH PAD ACCIDENT BLAST, FRAGMENT, RADIATION HEATING, FIRE 
NO EJECTION GRalTER INFLIGHT BREAKUP BLAST, FRAGMENT, RADIATION HEATING, RE-ENTRY, HI-SPEED GROUND IMcACT 
OR HI-SPEED IMPACT, CRUSHING, POST-CRASH FIRE, ORBITER CRASH 
C-OLlNG? 
EJECTION 
POST LAND COOLING? SYSTEM ORBITER LAND ORBITER CRASH LOAD CONDITION. 
FAILS 
- I NT ACT, RUNWAY 
- DITCH OCEAN, LAKE 
- BELLY NO RUNWAY 
Figure 6.2-2: ACCIdent End Conditions 
mental stress on the waste payload resulting are tabulated as a function of the 
type of accident. The environmental stresses identified were compared with 
those tabulated ln Appendix E for the reference system accident requirements. 
As a result of this comparison we are recommendinq an addition to paraqraph 
2.5.1.3.3, On- or Near-Pad or Ascent Booster Accident. We would recommend 
addlnQ to this a provision for shuttle crash resultinq in an impact velocity 
distribution as shown in the impact speed and angle diagram illustrated in 
Figure 6.2-3, followed by a TBD crushing load imposed by the orbiter structure. 
Th1S add1tion wlll provide for withstanding all orbiter crash environments and 
will contribute to making the accident environment list comprehenslve. 
The second recommendation was that the radiation limits imposed by 49CFR173.393 
(surface radiation limit: 1000 mrem/hr, 1m from external surface of container) 
be applied for all mission phases when the possibility of personnel coming into 
contact with the payload during contingency situations exists. This would 
require a mod1flcation to paragraph ?5.2.4, Flight Radlat10n Shielding, of the 
existing spec1flcation by chanqlnQ the first paragraph to read "from 2 rem/hr 
at 1m" to "l rem/hr at Jm. II 
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122 M/sEC. (400 FT. ISEC. ) 
X,Y,Z ARE IN ORBITER 
COORDINATE SYSTEM 
I ENVELOPE OF POSSIBLE CRASH CONDITION VELOCITY VECTORS 
(DIRECTION OF 
FORWARD FLIGHT) 
L __ 305 M/sEC. (1000 FT. I SEC. t 10°) 
Figure 6.2-3: Recommended Design Criteria for Impact Angle 
6.3 WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION TRADE STUDIES 
Waste payload protection trade studies were conducted to determine the best ap-
proach to meeting the protection system requirements defined in Section 6.2. 
The effort began with definition of protection system options in key areas and 
proceeded with analyses conducted in the areas of radiation shielding, ejection 
from the launch vehicle, and shield removal, backed up by waste payload thermal 
analyses. 
6.3.1 Protection Options. Basic options for protection of the waste payload 
are illustrated in Figure 6.3-1. Options exist in the area of radiation 
shielding material with the prime choice beinq between the use of uranium or 
steel for radiation protection. A second primary option is the ability to 
remove the radiation sh,eld at some point in the mission to reduce the require-
ments for payload carried all the way to the destination. A final primary 
option is providing the capability to eject the waste payload in the event of 
a launch vehicle malfunction. Studies were conducted in each of these areas to 
determine which of these options would be carried to the total system trades in 
Task 8. 
6.3.2 Containment/Ra~iat~~n Shi~l~inq Tr~~~~. Primary objective of the 
shielding and contalnment study was to determine whether shielding and contain-
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REMQVEABLE 
rT'1 
RENUAL :z: C-o rT'1 (""") OPTIONS rT'1 --l 
C-
rT'1 
(""") 
--l 
INTEGRAL 
Figure 6.3-1: Waste Payload Protection Options 
ment could be integrated 1n a synergistic manner to maximize protection of the 
waste payload wh1le minimizing total system mass. A series of trades were con-
ducted early in the study to evaluate the characteristics of candidate 
shielding/containment configurations. 
The first step was the evaluation of concepts used in past studies. A survey 
of packaging arrangements used in past studies led to the selection of a single 
shape, or one piece waste payload. Considerations involved in the trade are il-
lustrated schematically in Figure 6.3-2. The sinqle shape arrangement offers 
the highest packaqinq density, fair coolinq, and the simplicity of passive 
de p 10 .'ffflent . 
A brief consideration of the full range of shapes considered in past studies 
led to selection of a spherical shape. Primary considerations in the trade 11-
lustrated in Figure 6.3-3 1nclude rat10 of packaging volume to surface area 
which is highest in the spherical configuration and the nondirectional nature 
of the spherical configuration in terms of sensitivity to ground impact or reen-
try heating. 
A survey of past stud1es also led to the selection of the candidate sh1eld mate-
rials illustrated in Figure 6.3-4 along with the1r key properties. Properties 
of the cermet waste form lllustrated were derived by contacting Oak Ridge 
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I 
I 
Passive 
PackagIng System Systenl 
DensIty CoolIng Deployment 
Hexagonally packed cylInders low Goad Active 
TelescopIng CylInders Hed Good Active 
Sphere wIth multlsphere Low Poor PassIve 
SIngle Shope HIgh FaIr Passive 
F,gure 6.3-2: Waste Payload Packaging Arrangement Trade 
Impact PaSSive Reentry 
Sens I ttvl ty Coaling Sens I tI v Ity 
lOllg cylinder Dlrectlullal Goad DlrtCtlollal 
Short cylinder DIrect lonal Goad DirectIonal 
Disc Directional Good DI rectlanal 
Hemispherical DIrectional Good Dlrtct lanaI 
Spherical Nandi rect lonal Good Nandi rectlonal 
SQuare Directional Good Directional 
Rectangular DIrect lanai Good DIrectIonal 
Cone Directional Good DIrectional 
Figure 6.3-3: Waste Payload Shape Trade 
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J 
J 
CEIU1£T 304 ss stee\ UranllJll TantahJll Graphite (Hastellot G) (4130 (Depleted) 
Density (g/cc) 6,7 7,98 (8,3) 7,8 18,7 16.6 2,25 
lIeltlng temperature (CO) 1200 1399 (1260) 1482 1133 2996 -
Thenool conductivity 14 16,4 (w/m-e) (13,0) 29,7 30,0 55,0 -200 
CoeffJelent ther~l - 18,7 11,0 14,0 6,5 
-1.3 
exPOns Ion (xlO- em/crn/CO) (16.5) 
Yield stre~th - 29 41 24 33 2.7 (xlO-6 nlc ) (32) 
I elongation (In 5 cm) - 55 25 5 -30 <2 (61) 
Corrosion resistance Exeell ent Excellent Poor Poor Good Excellent 
Figure 6.3-4: Candidate Shield Materials and Properties 
National Laboratories (ORNL). ORNL indicated that the cermet properties were 
approximated by the material properties of the superalloy, hastelloy G. 
The candidate materials chosen were evaluated for sh1elding effectiveness in 
homogeneous and compound (gamma plus neutron shield) configurations. The evalua-
tion was conducted in three steps. 
1. Characterization of source terms for the baseline PW-4B waste mix incorpo-
rated in the cermet waste form. 
2. A criticality estimate to verify the safety of the reference PW-4B/cermet 
waste form in the size range considered. 
3. Shielding transport analyses used 1n the sizinq and selection of candidate 
radiation shields. 
Basel1ne Waste Mix Parameters. The basel1ne cermet parameters for this study 
were: 
1. Total cermet mass, ~.075 kq 
2. Cermet mass dens1ty of 6.7 q/cm3 
3. Cermet diameter of 113.1 cm 
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4. 58.7% waste loading with waste composition PW-4B (Table 1, Appendix H) 
5. 41.3% metal phase composition as follows: 22.49% Fe, 6.13% Ni, 7.36% Cu 
5.32% Mo 
Characterization of Source Terms (Neutron, Gamma, and Thermal). The ORIGEN-79 
computer code was used to calculate the radiation and thermal source terms for 
the baseline cermet. The radio-isotopic composition of the cermet (Table 2, 
Appendix H) was input to ORIGEN as a waste mass and a lOO-day decay calculation 
was performed. Output was obtained for 10 intervals within the 100-day period. 
It was found that some decay time was required to reach the secular equilibrium 
that would be characteristic of some of the isotopes in a 10-year-old waste 
mix. This was siqnificant to the source calculations since one of these 
isotopes, Ba 137 metastable, is a primary contributor to the gamma source term 
but is not explicitly included in Table 2 (Appendix H). Other isotopes that 
were observed to reach secular equilibrium in the lOO-day period were Pu 240, 
Np 239, and Pa 233. These made a slight contribution to the gamma spectrum. 
Gamma spectrum from ORIGEN are output in three tables for three classes of 
nuclides: (1) light elements, (2) fission products, and (3) actinides. The 
total spectrum was obtained by summin~ over all three classes. Due to the 
equilibrium buildup of the isotopes noted above, there were some slight 
variations in the spectra over the 100-day decay time. To remain conservative 
in the calculations, the worst case spectrum from each nuclide class was used 
in adding up the total spectrum listed in Table 3 of Appendix H. This spectrum 
is regrouped for input to ANISN in Table 4 of Appendix H. The amount of 
overestimate possible by adding worst case spectrum is less than 2%. 
The neutron spectrum could not be obtained directly from ORIGEN since ORIGEN 
only calculates the total neutron production rate and the contribution from 
each isotope. However, it was possible to approximate a neutron spectrum by 
noting that 98% of the neutron production calculated by ORIGEN is from spontane-
ous fission of Cm 244. Information on the Cm 244 fission spectrum from 0.3 to 
12.8 MeV was obtained from Reference 22 and is listed in Table 5 of Appendix H. 
For energies above and below 0.3 to 12.8 MeV, the spectrum was estimated by fit-
D 180-26426-2 
134 
ting an equation of the form, 
2 n 
N(E) = ( 1/2 T3/2) kEI/2 e-E/T MeV 
where T = 1.265 MeV and k is a normalization constant. The above spectral in-
formation was normalized to the total rate given by ORIGEN of 3.05 x 10n n/sec 
and restructured into a histogram spectrum for input to ANISN as listed in 
Table 6 of Appendix H. 
The decay power calculated by ORIGEN is calculated for each of the three nu-
clide classes in terms of: 
1. Total power (thermal plus gamma) for the nuclide class 
2. Contribution from each nuclide to the total power of the class 
3. Gamma power for the class 
4. Contribution from each nuclide to the gamma power of the class 
Summing the total power over the three material classes yielded a total cermet 
• output of 97.9 kW. The gamma power contribution to this was 36.7 kW; the re-
mainder was thermal. ANISN calculations indicate that up to 14% of the gamma 
power can escape the cermet but that this comes from the outer 5 cm of the cer-
met and is absorbed in the first 5 cm of any shielding material used. The 
result is that all the gamma rays are converted to heat in or near the cermet 
and the entire 97.9 kW represents a thermal source. 
Criticality Estimate. A criticality estimate was performed for the 5075 kg 
cermet configuration using the XSDRN computer code. XSDRN is a discrete ordi-
nates spectral code which uses a 123 group neutron cross section set to solve 
several types of neutron production transport problems one of which is the cal-
culation of k effective. 
Inputs to XSDRN which are important to the k effective calculation are (1) mate-
rial compositions, (2) fission spectrum, and (3) medium surroundinq the fissile 
materi al. 
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The material composition of the cermet is given in Table 13 of Appendix H. The 
composition as input to XSORN ;s given ;n Table 14 of the same appendix. Some 
of the elements present in the cermet could not be included in the input to 
XSDRN because they were not contained in the XSDRN cross section set. The ex-
clusion of these elements, which are predominantly fission products, was a con-
servative assumption that would result in a slightly higher estimate of k effec-
t1ve. 
The neutron spectrum used for this calculation was the U 235 fission spectrum 
stored in the XSDRN cross section set. This spectrum was specified by 
utilizing the mixing table fission spectrum option. While the cermet spectrum 
is more closely a Cm 244 fission spectrum, the differences between the Cm 244 
and U 235 fission spectra are not significant to the calculation. 
The medium surrounding the cermet was assumed to be water since this would in-
crease the moderated neutrons in the outer regions of the cermet and increase 
k effective. 
The result of this XSDRN calculation was a criticality estimate of keff = 
0.025. 
Shielding Calculations. Shieldinq calculations for this study were performed 
using ANISN. 
Cross sections used in ANISN were the CASK 40 group coupled neutron and gamma-
ray cross section set (DLC-23E) obtained from the Radiation Shielding Informa-
tion Center of Oak Ridge. To reduce the storage and run time requirements of 
ANISN, the CASK element cross sections were blended into material cross sec-
t10ns and stored on tape using the TAPEMAKER routine. The element cross sec-
tions ava1lable 1n CASK are shown in Table 7 of Appendix H. The element compo-
sitions of the materials to be used in ANISN are given in Tables 8 and 9 of 
Appendix H. As is evident in the tables, not all the elements present in the 
cermet are available in CASK. To account for some of the "missinq" elements, 
other elements of comparable (or conservative) neutron and gamma cross sections 
were substituted. The substitutions were as follows: 
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Si substituted for P 
Zr substituted for Rb, Sr, and Y 
Mo substituted for Tc, Ru, Rh, and Pd 
Sn substituted for Ag, Cd, and Te 
No substitutions were made for Cs, Ba, La, Ce, Pr, Nd, Pm, Sm, Eu, Gd, Np, Am, 
U 236, Pu 241, or Cm. They constitute 21% of the total cermet we1ght. It was 
believed to be more practical within this study to accept a conservative calcu-
lation by excluding these elements than it would be to attempt to approximate 
their cross sections by elements or mixture of elements in the CASK set. 
The flux to dose conversion factors used in ANISN were the Snyder-Neufeld fac-
tors for neutrons and the Henderson factors for gammas. These are listed 1n 
Table 10 of Appendix H. 
When performing ANISN calculations, the following proqram conditions were used: 
Spherical geometry IGE = 3 
Reflection at left boundary IBL = 1 
Vacuum at ri ght boundar y IBR = 0 
Fixed source eigenvalue IEVT = 0 
Distributed source 10M = 1 
Zero flux guess 3* all = 0 
For the bare ball cases, an S4 quadrature was used. For the shielding calcula-
tions, an S8 quadrature was used. These are listed in Table 11 of Appendix H. 
Baseline conflgurat1ons for a compound (neutron and gamma) cermet shield were 
also developed using ANISN. Various shield materials and cermet payloads were 
input to ANISN to determine the shield mass required to achieve a 1 rem/hr dose 
rate at 1m from the surface. While an attempt was made to choose the gamma and 
neutron shield thicknesses that would minimize the shield mass, a complete mass 
optimization calculation was not performed. Informal estimates by the BAC 
physiCS staff indicate that such an optimization could conceivably reduce the 
shield mass by as much as 5%. 
Results of the analysis of isotropic and compound sh1e1ds are presented in Fiq-
ure 6.3-5. The results are all based on the reference 5075 kg cermet waste 
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Figure 6.3-5: Candidate RadIation Shield Comparison 
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form. A preliminary optimization of each shield configuration has mlnimlzed 
the shield mass to the specifled 1 rem/hr at 1m dose rate. Several conclus10ns 
are apparent: 
1. Compound shields are lighter than the isotropic sh1eld due to their 
increased efficiency in reducing the neutron dose rate. 
2. Water is the most effective moderator considered. 
3. The lightest configuration by a narrow margin is the uranium water compos-
ite shield at 11,520 kg. The next lightest 1S the uranium graphite compos-
ite shield at 12,251 kg. The heaviest shield at 16,806 kq is the steel 
graphite composite shield, which is also judged as the safest. 
The final shield evaluation considered survivability, mass, and availability of 
shield material. Survivability considerations ruled out water as a moderator. 
Any accident condition which breached the outer shell containing the water 
would lead to loss of moderation and immediate increase in neutron dose rate. 
Tantalum was ruled out as a serious competitor by availability. The mass 
required to fabricate a tantulum shield for the reference 5075 kg waste form is 
worth about $5 million. 
A comparison of the remaining steel graphite and uranium graphite candidates 
shows that manifesting constraints and impact tolerance both tend to favor the 
steel shield. 
In the case of a dual payload launch where a single launch vehicle carries two 
payloads, sizing of the waste payload for passive thermal dissipation at the 
reference destination keeps the payload under the uprated shuttle payload 
constraints for both steel and uranium shield concepts. 
Crash survivability considerations are an even more important influence. Past 
studies indicate orbiter crash load attenuation requirements for the uranium 
shield are undefined and the pyrophoric nature of uranium is an unresolved prob-
lem. Similarly, the abllity of uranium to tolerate fragment penetration is 
undefined. In contrast high strength steel provides maximum resistance to 
impact requirements, is not flammable, and possesses an extensive literature on 
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fragment tolerance for a variety of steel formulations and heat treats. 
In conclusion, survivability considerations must dominate, result1ng 1n adapta-
t10n of the steel graphite composite shield as the sole candidate for further 
consideration in the study. 
6.3.3 Ejection From Launch Vehicle. The ejection option effects on launch con-
ditions are immediately apparent. Staying with the orbiter requires surviving 
the most rigorous possible environments. EJection enormously simplifies the 
survival problem but is not 100% reliable. 
The effect of ejection system reliability was examined using a review of data 
on USAF's experience with escape capsules used for aircraft crew escape. The 
study illustrates that ejection systems on the whole are very reliable, but 
problems cannot be totally eliminated. 
Systems can be damaged through blast overpressure or through fragment impact. 
These possibilities are unavoidable. An alternative possibility is the failure 
of components such as squibs and parachutes, or human error, for instance the 
misrouting of shielded mild detonating cord (SMOC) lines. These factors can be 
minimized but not eliminated. The conclusion is clear: a system which depends 
on ejection to eliminate Class 1 or catastrophic accident events cannot guaran-
tee that no catastrophic event will occur. 
Even though not 100% effective, the effect of an ejection system can still be 
substanti al . 
Risk to the waste payload is a function both of accident magnitude and the fre-
quency of occurrence. An ejection system which is not 100% reliable cannot be 
relied on to decrease the magnitude of insults delivered to the waste payload, 
but can be a valid means of reducing the frequency of occurrence of insults, 
and thus the probability of a catastrophic accident event. The need for such 
a reduction cannot be established until the reliability of launch systems is 
more firmly establ1shed. 
In conclusion, the waste payload system must survive all accident environments 
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without ejection to ensure against catastrophic accident events; but ejection 
can still contribute to overall risk reduction. Evaluat10ns 1n Task 8 have 
shown that the cost of the ejection option for selected options ranqes between 
zero and 20%. A final evaluation or balancing of this cost against reduction 
in r1sk can be accomplished only after the launch vehicle operation rel1abil1ty 
is firmly established. Until that time the waste payload protect10n system pro-
viding for ejection should be carried as an alternate in all systems 
considered. 
6.3.4 Shield Removal Trades. Pr1mary issues in shield removal are illustrated 
in Figure 6.3-6. The integral or nonremovable shield is clearly superior in 
every area except performance. 
REMOVEABLE INTEGRAL 
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY MASS PENALTY FOR IMPACT HIGHEST; BEST TOLERANCE 
CONDITION NEEDS ASSESSMENT TO IMPACT 
RADIATION EFFECTS ON ADD 770 KG OF SHADOW SHIELDING NO RADIATION EFFECTS 
AVIONICS FOR RESCUE CRITICAL AVIONICS 
PROTyCTION (PLACEMENT STAGE 
ONLY 
THERMAL EFFECTS CORE MELTING IN CONTINGENCY NO CORE MELTING ONCE ON 
SITUATIONS, NO MELT THRU ORBIT FOR ANY CONTINGENCY 
ONCE CARGO BAY DOORS OPEN 
EVA ACCESS TERMINATES WITH SHIELD AT ANY TIME IN EARTH 
REMOVAL ORBIT 
MECHANIZATION SHIELD REMOVAL MECHANIZA- NO CRITICAL MECHANIZA-
TION RELIABILITY IS CRITICAL- TION. EVA BACKUP AVAIL-
NO EVA ACCESS FOR CONTINGENCY ABLE AT ALL TIMES IN LEO 
REPAIR 
SIZING LIMITED TO 5075 KG OF REF. ALLOWS 10% INCREASE IN 
CERMET WASTE FORM WASTE FORM MASS WITH 
PASSIVE HEAT DISSIPATION 
PAYLOAD DEPLOYED PER HI GHEST 44-50'/. OF REMOVEABLE SHI ELD 
MISSION PAYLOAD (DEPENDS ON SYSTEM 
OPTIONs,) 
Figure 6.3-6: Shield Removal Factors 
The total performance penalty may not be as great as 1t first appears. An ini-
tial look would indicate the penalty appears to be on the order of 250%, but 
when quant1fied at the system level for the dual launch reference system 
considered here, the results, as shown in Figure 6.3-7, show a less drastic 
decrease in performance. The figure, for both integral and separable shields, 
shows the number of orbiter launches, shuttle derived cargo launch vehicle 
launches, orbit transfer vehicle flights and expended stages for deploying six 
payloads to the destination. When all factors are taken into account the 
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Figure 6.3-7: Manifesting Mismatch Decreases the Cost Advantage of Shield Removal 
actual penalty ranges from about 30% to 50% rather than 250%. These costs must 
be balanced against the decreased risk involved in the non-separable shield. 
In conclusion, shield removal deserves consideration at the total system level. 
At the total system level the removable shield will be used only with the 
ejectable waste payload protection system in view of its decreased survivabil-
ity. The intregal shield will be evaluated both with and without the ejectable 
waste payload protection system. 
6.3.5 Protection System Option Evaluation Conclusions. In conclusion, 
the following ground rules have been adapted for the remainder of the study 
as a result of the protection system option trade studies. 
1. Steel graphlte composite radiation shields have been adapted for all 
opti ons. 
2. Both integral and removable shields will be evaluated for total system 
lmpact in Task 8. 
3. Integral shleld options will be evaluated both with and without ejectable 
waste payload protection systems to determine total system impact in Task 
8; removable shleld optlons will be evaluated only in conjunction with use 
of the eject~hle waste payload protection system. 
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6.3.6 Thermal Analysis. It was decided very early in the study that the waste 
package should be spherical to facilitate fabrication, shielding, deslgn, and 
thermal analysis. One of the first questions to be answered was how large can 
the waste sphere be? Due to the high density, the limitation was not shuttle 
cargo bay volume so the maximum allowable from the thermal standpoint was deter-
mined. It was assumed that active cooling required would be available during 
ground and in-shuttle operations. Therefore, the first sizing was done based 
on deployment of the waste sphere at 0.85 AU with no shielding. Surface prop-
erties, especially emissivity, are very important since, in space, all heat 
rejected is by radiation. Various coatings were investigated for sUltability 
of application to the hot (up to 9820 C) cermet surface. The surface treatment 
selected was flame sprayed aluminum oxide (A1203) which melts at 20370C and 
has absorptivity/emissivity values of 0.21/0.8 which deqrade to 0.26/0.8 after 
7-1/2 months based on Telstar I experience. Another criterion which affected 
the allowable waste sphere size was that the sphere center temperature must not 
exceed the cermet melting temperature of 12000C. The surface temperature of a 
sphere in space far removed from any other body is given by: 
( qi 111 a) ~ Ts =155.4 2+-:2- -460 4nr N £ (1) 
The internal dissipation (ql) is a function of waste volume and hence increases 
by the cube of the radius. From Carslaw and Jaeqger (Reference 23) the tempera-
ture rise from surface to center of a sphere with internal heat generation is 
given by: 
where Q = 0.13 W/cm 3, k = cermet conductivity, and the allowable surface temperature 
is 
Ts = 1200 0C - ~ r2 
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( 2) 
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The intersection of equations (1) and (2) for Ts defines the maximum radius as 
shown in Figure 6.3-8 and is about 600 mm. 
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Figure 6.3-8: Unshielded Waste Sphere Radius LImit Determination at 0.85 A. U. 
The next step in the thermal analysis was to determine how shielding would 
affect the temperatures at the center and of the other materials involved. A 
large number of shielding schemes were examined. Various combinations of such 
materials as uranium, steel, tantalum, qraphite, and water were evaluated. Two 
concepts were selected: one an integral or nonremovable shield and another 
which features a removable shield. In the interests of conservatism a waste 
sphere radius of 560 mm was selected for the shielding studies. 
The integral shield concept remains with the waste package. It features 
cooling tubes in the steel just outboard of the cermet/steel interface which 
will provlde cooling until the waste payload separates from the shuttle. The 
cermet/steel interface will be fused together during fabrication to enhance 
thermal conductance. The graphite will be mechanically fastened to the steel 
to maximize contact conductance. Based on data available, a contact conduct-
ance of 88 W/m2_oC was selected. 
The removable shleld lncorporates cooling tubes ln the shleld portion near the 
cermet interface. Contact conductance can be maintained hlgh (88 W/m2_oC) 
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except at the steel/cermet interface. In this area it was assumed a gap wlll 
exist with emissivity equal to 0.8 on the cermet side and 0.9 on the shield 
side. At the temperatures involved, the equivalent conductance was 63 W/m2_oC. 
Steady state temperature profiles for both the removable and integral shield 
approaches are shown in Figure 6.3-9. The solar heating rate at 0.85 AU and 
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Figure 6.3-9: Removable & Integral Shield Temperature Profiles for Leo & aS5 A.u. 
the average of the solar, albedo, and Earth radiation heating rate at LEO for 
spherical shapes with absorbtivity/emissivity = 0.26/0.8 are sufficiently simi-
lar (3.15 and 3.2 MJ/hr, respectively for this case) to result in nearly identi-
cal temperatures; thus, the temperature profiles shown in Figure 6.3-9 are 
applicable for both. The LEO case would represent a contingency situation 
where the waste sphere was stranded in LEO: e.g., following a failure of the 
orbit transfer vehicle. Therefore, with either shielding approach, there is 
sufficient heat loss from the waste through the shield in LEO or at 0.85 AU to 
assure containment even though there is some cermet melting for the case of the 
removable shield. 
A final evaluation was conducted of the effect of increasing cermet radius for 
the integral shield. If no cermet melting is to be permitted, the cermet ra-
dius cannot exceed 500 mm. 
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-Reentry. Various shuttle mishaps could result in reentry of the waste sphere 
into the atmoshere. Two approaches to cope with reentry were examined. 
The Aero-Shell (Waste Payload Protection System). One reentry approach studied 
was to enclose the waste sphere in an aero-shell which would be ejected under 
certain conditions of shuttle failure. The aero-shell protects the waste 
sphere from the heat of re-entry and, at a predetermined altitude, would be 
separated from the waste payload by a parachute which would then carry the 
waste to a soft landing. This scenario is similar to that used by the Viking 
lander when entering the Martian atmosphere. Two aero-shell designs were devel-
oped; one having a 45 deg conical section half-angle and the other 60 deg. The 
aero-shell and afterbody configurations selected were determined based on the 
requirement that they be stable in only one orientation; i.e., conical section 
leading regardless of initial entry orientation. 
Re-entry temperature histories and temperature profiles were calculated for 
these shapes using the Boeing CHAP computer code. Profiles w~'e based on use 
of phenolic silica ablator, chosen for its combination of toughness and low 
thenmal conductivity. The two aero-shells perform similarly from the thenmal 
standpoint but, for a dlameter-limited configuration (imposed by the shuttle), 
the 45 deg aero-shell provides greater volume. A number of locations on the 
aero-shells were evaluated to determine required ablator thickness. The varia-
tions from the selected thickness were minor and, since a constant ablator 
thickness of 18 mm does not pose a significant weight penalty and slmplifles 
the design, that thickness was chosen. 
Integrally Shielded Waste Sphere. An alternate re-entry approach studied takes 
advantage of the high temperature capabilities of the integrally shielded waste 
sphere concept. A re-entry profile was determined for the waste sphere using 
the drag coefficient curve from Figure 6.5-1. During the re-entry process 0.53 
inches of graph,te are lost due to ablation. Note that the thermal capacitance 
of the 8.84 inches of steel under the graphite is such that, at the steel/cer-
met interface, there is almost no increase in temperature. Therefore, it is ap-
parent that the integrally shielded waste sphere can survive the reentry 
heating environment. 
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Post Entry 
Parachute Landing Case. When the waste package is soft landing via parachute, 
the waste payload will be held up above the ground, regardless of orientation, 
by a framework to maximize heat loss by convection and radiation. The frame-
work will offer minimum blockage to air movement and radiation interchange with 
the surroundings. 
The heat lost from a large hot sphere in air, assuming free convection and aver-
age sink temperature for radiation equal to air temperature, can be expressed 
as: 
In the steady state condition, the heat given up to the surroundings must equal 
the heat dissipated by the waste; in this case 100 kW. If an air temperature 
is ass umed, the surf ace temperature can be determi ned for a ~ 'en radl us sphere. 
Figure 6.3-10 presents the temperature profiles for the integral and removable 
waste spheres for these conditions. It is apparent that the steady state tem-
peratures do not impose a containment concern. 
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Hlgh Speed Impact. The reentry case where the waste sphere 1S allowed to 
lmpact the Earth's surface at high speed (454 m/sec) presents a critical ther-
mal design problem. The problem results from impact on and subsequent burial 
ln soft, dry soil. Using the conduction shape factor, S, approach to determine 
allowable sphere burial depth for steady state where qi = kS (Ts - To) 
and S = 4 iT r 
1 - r 
2P 
lt was immed1ately evident that, lf the sphere is buried beneath the surface at 
all, the disslpatlon rate must be less than or equal to 5 kW, far below the 
actual 100 kW. An analysis of the transient response was then undertaken to rle-
termine the rescue time available before loss of containment. Figure 6.3-11 
l"<::tr,,tp.., thp ,nhpr"p temperature response after a bud al of from 4 to 8 hr. 
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FIgure 6.3-11 Integral Sh,eld Temperature History after Post-Entry Serial 
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Extrapolating the linear portions of the curve leads to the conc1uslon that ap-
proximately 27.5 hr are available for rescue before containment is lost. 
Thermal Analysis Conc1uslons. Conclusions reached include: 
1. Leavlng the radiation shield on the waste sphere indefinitely has very lit-
tle thermal impact on the cermet. 
? The integrally shielded waste sphere can survive reentry. 
3. Removable or lntegrally shlelded waste spheres can surVlve indeflnltely In 
the ground, cooled by free convection and radiation. 
4. The integrally shielded waste sphere will remain intact for 27.5 hr 
after burial in dry soil following reentry. 
6.4 WASTE PAYLOAD CONFIGURATION DESCRIPTION 
Using the results of the waste payload system trades in the areas of radiation 
shielding, shield removal and the results of the thermal analysis task, inte-
gral and removable shield configurations were characterized by drawings and 
parametric weight estimating relationships. A dual waste payload system was 
also defined for use ln dual launch concepts. 
5.4.1 Integral Shield Configuration. The lntegrally shielded waste payload 
general arrangement is illustrated in Fiqure 6.4-1 for the reference 5075 kg 
cermet waste form. A primary feature is the high strength steel gamma ra-
diation shield and primary contalner. The shield is welded into a one piece in-
tegral shell around the cermet waste form. The fit is tight enough to assure 
lntimate thermal contact between waste form and shield; integral cooling tubes 
for active cooling are incorporated in the shield. The shield is 225 mm 
thick and weighs 10,436 kg. 
The graphite neutron shield is fabricated as over 100 individual tiles which 
are fastened to the steel shield wlth 1.3 cm high strenqth steel bolts. The 
tiles are overlapped to prevent leak paths for neutron emission. The steel 
bolts provide sufficient tensior to oreload the graphite against the shield ~ 
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FIgure 6.4-1: CandIdate Waste Payload ConfIgurations 
a level ddelludLe tor 111yh tnermal condut..tlvlty between -,Letl alllJ yraf.lnlt~. 
Graphite plugs over the steel bolts are used to prevent the bolts from becoming 
conduits for neutron emission. In addition to its neutron shielding function 
the graphite serves as contingency entry protection to protect against inadver-
tent entry. Total graphite thickness is 50 mm and the graphite shield weighs 
939 kg. 
The outer sheath is 5 mm of corrosion resistant steel which is bonded to the 
outside of the graph1te tlles. The sheet 1S divided into lndlvidual plates for 
each tlle. A fl~ne sprayed alumlnum oxide thermal control coating is applled 
to the outside of the shield to provide corrosion resistance and the correct 
ratio of absorb1tivity to emisslvity for thermal control during long term space 
storage. 
SlX 50-mm diameter handllng trunnions fabricated from high strength steel 
provide for mechanical interfaces with the flight support systems and the waste 
payload transfer mechanlsms. The trunnions are interfaced with the steel 
shield for structural integrity, and pass through the carbon neutron shield, 
posing a neutron leakage problem WhlCh requlres further investigation. 
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The total 1ndiv1dually sh1elded waste payload system 1S approx1mately 1500 mm 
in diameter and weighs 16,806 kg. 
6.4.2 Removable Shield Configurat1on. The removable shield configurat1on is 
also illustrated in Figure 6.4-1. The composite rad1ation shield 1S similar 1n 
thickness to the integral shield. The cermet waste form is enclosed in a sepa-
rate 64 mm thick reinforced stainless steel conta1ner; trunnions are set in the 
cermet and protrude through the radiation shield for 1ndependent support of the 
waste form during shield removal. Shield removal is mechanized by offset 
hinges which allow the two articulated segments to swinq open, providing 
suff1cient clearance for waste form removal. The shield 1S overlapped at the 
joints to contain radiation leakage. Overall Slze and shape of the removable 
shield are similar to the integral shield. The d1ameter of the waste form 
without the shield is approximately 1140 mm. 
6.4.3 Dual Waste Payload. The dual waste payload conf1guration is illustrated 
along with key dimensions in FiQure 6.4-2. Two of th~ inteqrally ~~i~lrlerl 
1740.0 
..... 
--ts---
1 
11111 
11.00 
, . 2514 _I (III 001 -------. 
Figure 6.4-2 Dual Waste Payload Configuration 
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waste payloads described in Sectlon 6.4.1 are connected by a tltanlum lnter-
payload support structure. 
The lnterpayload support structure provides pickups for the trunnions of the in-
dividual waste payloads and accomplishes three primary functions: (1) it sup-
ports the waste payload in association with the dual waste payload flight sup-
port system during launch in the cargo bay, (2) it carries guide rails and 
)ther provlslon~ for waste payload transfer from the fllqht support system to 
the orblt transfer system and between a falled solar orblt lnsertlon ~tdge anu 
a rescue vehicle, and (3) the space frame structure provides a free fleld of 
view for passive waste form thermal dissipation. The titanium struts are sized 
to carryall loads at the full waste form equilibrium temperature. 
Addltlonal support trunnions mounted on the inter payload support structure in 
combination with the outboard trunnions on each of the lndividual waste pay-
loads provide the structural interface between the support structure and the 
flight support system. Total mass of the inter payload support structure, 
including guide rails and associated hardware is calculated at ]36 kg. 
6.4.4 Waste Payload Weight Estimating Relationships. Weight estimating rela-
tionshlps for the waste payloads lncluding waste form containment and shielding 
were prepared by optimizing shields for three waste form masses and using the 
resulting data points to prepare a curve showing the weight estlmating relation-
ship between waste form mass and total waste payload mass. 
Waste payload point designs were established for waste form masses of 2500 and 
10,000 kg by usinq the ANISN code to optimize the selected steel graphite 
composlte shield configuration. 
Results of the optlmlzation are illustrated in Figure 6.4-3. Total masses 
range from 10,126 kg for the 2500 kq waste form to 27,853 kg for the 10,000 kg 
waste form. The penalty in shielding efficiency involved in smaller waste 
forms is evident. As a percent of total waste payload system mass, the waste 
form represents only 25% for the 2,500 kg waste form as compared to 30% for the 
reference 5075 "U ~d~~e for~ 11~ 36~ f"r the 10,000 kq mass waste form. 
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SHIELD STEEL/GRAPHITE 
MATERIAL (7.98/2.25 Glee) 
DOSE RATE ~:~~ 11 + Y C9~ @/HR,1MTR 
t d w (em) (em) ( kg) 
d1 (em) - 89.32 2500 
t1 (em) - - -
t2 (em) 
- - -
,I S 21.5 132.32 6703 
t3 (em)IGr 5.0 142.32 667 
t4 .5 143.32 256 
TOTAL 
WT(kg) - - 10.126 
22.324 
df • WASTE BALL (PW - 4b) 
tl (304 SS) 
t2 (30955) 
t3 (VARIOUS SHIELD MATERIALS) 
t4 (304 SS ) 
STEEL/GRAPHITE 
(7.98/2.25 Glee) 
11.55 
11+ Y (9~ Y.43 
t d w (em) (em) (kg) 
-
141.8 10.000 
- - -
- - -
23.0 187.8 15.762 
6.0 199.8 1.593 
.5 200.8 
- - 27.858 
Figure 6.4-3: Waste Payload Characteristics for Alternate Waste Form Sizes 
lnese pOlnt deSlqnS were the basl~ f)r the welght estlmatlng re'atlon~hlp 
curves plotted 1n Figure 6.4-4. The ordinate shows the mass of the composite 
waste payload including conta1nment and radiation shield. The mass of the 
waste form is plotted on the abscissa. Individual curves are shown for the re-
movable shield and the integral shield. Waste payload mass is slightly hiqher 
for the removable shield due to mass included to account for hinges and struc-
tural closure. 
,~lng these curve~ the tO~31 waste payload mass can be derived for any glven 
waste form mass. These curves were the basis for the payoff estimates in 
Task 8 where the waste form mass per m1ssion was derived qiven the initial 
waste payload mass delivered to the destination. 
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FIgure 6.4-4: Waste Payload WeIght EstImating RelationshIps for Selected Shield Options 
6.5 WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION SYSTEM DEFINITION 
The objective of the waste payload protection system is: (1) to provide intact 
recovery of the waste payload, restricting the consequences of any space trans-
portation system accident to be non-critical action category, (2) to minimize 
the expense of waste payload reflight by preventing damage to the waste payload 
due to transportation system accidents; and (3) to decrease the probability 
(however low) of a Class 1 or critical accident. 
The basic waste payload protection system has been well characterized in previ-
ous studies by the Marshall Space Flight Center, in particular Reference lQ, 
and our objectives in this study were limlted to: (1) characterization of the 
system for use in Task 8 total system trades and (2) evaluation of an alternate 
aerodynamic confiquration offering better characterization of reentry proper-
ties as a result of extensive use on proqrams such as Galileo and Pioneer 
Venus. Additional benefits of the alternate confiquration included: more 
internal volume, provisions for entry wake clearance, compatibility with the 
Boeing CHAP reentry heating analysls code, and perspective on the sensltivity 
to shape of the waste payload protection system in general. 
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6.5.1 Aerodynamlc Conflguration Trades. In order to provide a comparison of 
the alternate shape with the shape used in the reference system, the following 
constraints were applied to the alternate configuration: 
1) Length to be less than or equal to the Marshall Space Flight Center refer-
ence system length. 
2) Diameter less than or equal to 4.S7m for compatablity wlth the diame-
ter of the STS cargo bay. 
J) Center of gravlty dlstance from the extreme nose of the vehl~:e Lu be 
greater than or equal to that of the Marshall reference system. 
4) Demonstrated static stability through hypersonlc, supersonic, and subsonic 
fl i ght regimes. 
5) Wake clearance on the entry wake of 30 deg minimum. 
Two candidate shapes were considered. The first, a blunt cone with a half 
angle of 60 deg and a ratio of nose radlus to base radius of 0.68; the second, 
a blunt cone with a half angle of 45 deg and a ratio of nose radius to base 
radius of 0.68. Concepts were evaluated to determine whether alternate shapes 
would provide reduced terminal velocity or reduced ablator mass and were 
investigated for the possibility of providing increased stabillty margln. 
Curves illustratlng the drag coefficient for both shapes as a function of mach 
number are illustrated in Figure 6.5-1. At low mach numbers, the drag coeffi-
cient is almost identical. Computer trajectory runs lndlcated that the termi-
nal veloclty was not a strong function of shape for the blunt nose conlcal 
entry bodl es. 
Ablator mass was calculated using the CHAP reentry thermal analysis program. 
Ablator thickness of 18 mm was determlned as adequate for both systems uSlng 
the selected phenolic silica ablator. Comparison of the ablator mass for the 
two configurations indicated no significant dlfference 1n total system mass 
between the two concepts, w1th a maximum dlfference of approximately 147 kq for 
total system masses on the order of 20,000 to 30,000 kg. 
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comparison of the stablllty marg1n of the two cand1dates 1S illustrated 1n 
-,qure 6.5-2 which shows the aft CG llmit for static stability measured in 
(mml (ml 
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Figure 6.5-2. HypersOnic Aft C.G. Limit/Body Length Trade 
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600 
hnl 
(mml 
millimeters from the extreme nose of the entry body as a function of total body 
length. With total body length limited to the Marshall reference system value. 
the 45 deg half angle blunt cone shows a clear superiority in the distance aft 
of the nose for the CG when compared with the 60 deg half angle cone. 
As a result of the equ1valence in term1nal velocity, the minor dlfferences in 
ablator mass, and the superior stability margin, the 45 deg half angle blunt 
cone was selected as a reference for further evaluation. 
Results of the evaluation conducted to verify the minimum aft body angle for 
wake clearance are shown in Figure 6.5-3 which plots the hypersonic pitching mo-
ment coefficient against the angle of attack for selected aft body angles. The 
30 deg aft body angle established for reentry wake clearance shows a positive 
stability margin for angles of attack ranging from 0 to 180 deq, allowing the 
option of some ~ft movement of the system fG if required. 
o 
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Figure 6.5-3: Hypersonic Pitching Moment/Aft Body mg/e Trade 
The conf1gurat1on of the ~~sult'ng waste payload protection system 1S lllustra 
ted 1n Flgure 6.5-4 as 1t would be installed 1n the orblter cargo bay. ThlS 
shape offers advantages over the reference concept in the areas of internal vol-
ume for accommodatlon of subsystems and in terms of the data base available for 
reentry analysis; further development is strongly recommp.nderl. 
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Figure 6.5-4: Waste Payload Protection System Configuration and Envelope Dimensions 
6.5.2 Waste Payload Protectlve System Welght Estlmating Relationships. A re-
view of past studies of space dlsposal, in particular Reference 19, and of the 
space disposal reference system has indicated the complexity of the waste pay-
load protection system. An indication of this complexity is indicated by the 
list of key elements illustrated in Figure 6.5-5. A preliminary investigation 
in several of these areas indicated no reason to differentiate from the con-
cepts shown in the Marshall Space Flight Center Study. In accordance with the 
ground rules specifYlng maximum use of past studies, the MSFC generated data 
for the waste payload protective system from Reference 19 was used to estimate 
parametric weight relationships for the waste payload protective system. 
Results are shown in Flgure 6.5-6 which plots the total mass of the waste pay-
load protective system against the mass of the waste payload carried from 
ground to low Earth orbit. Two curves are shown, the bottom one being the mas~ 
of the waste payload protective system by itself and the top curve being the 
mass of the waste payload protective system plus its associated flight support 
system. The mass of the reference system when plotted falls exactly on the 
bottom line. These curves were used for characterization of waste payload pro-
tectlVe system rnass 1n the total sy~tern studles in Task 8. 
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Figure 6.5-5: Waste Payload Protection System Elements 
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Figure 6.5-6: Waste Payload Protection System Parametric Mass Characterization 
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7.0 FLIGHT SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Primary objectives of the flight support system task were to identify system re-
qUlrements for support of waste payloads in the launch vehicle cargo bay; to 
define and evaluate flight support systems concepts; and to characterize the 
resulting flight support systems. Because of the earlier work documented in 
Reference 19 on flight support systems applicable to waste payloads protected 
by a waste payload protection system during launch, the effort in this study 
was concentrated on defining flight support systems for waste payload systems 
not requiring an ejectable waste payload protection system. 
The task began with a review of fliqht support system requirements from past 
studies, aimed at identifing the peculiar requirements imposed by alternate 
waste payload concepts and launch vehicles. Consideration of these factors 
lead to identification of concepts for and characterization of flight support 
systems for (1) the hardened waste oayload not using ejection, (2) the dual pay-
load cargo manifest required by dual launch options, and (3) the area of payload 
support and contingency payload transfer for orbit transfer systems. The 
resultinq concepts were characterized by drawings and preliminary mass state-
ments for use in the total system evaluations conducted in Task 8. 
7.2 FLIGHT SUPPORT SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
Primary functional requirements are summarized in Figure 7.2-1. With the excep-
tion of support of waste payload protection system ejection functions and sup-
port of radiation shield recovery after remote shield removal, these require-
ments are shared by the full range of flight support system concepts. Particu-
lar emphasis in this study was placed on mediation of payload transfer func-
tions, which were accomplished on the reference system by the waste payload pro-
tection system, and on support of orbit transfer system docking with the 
orbiter required for the multlple launch scenarios considered in this study. 
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ePROVIDEMECHANICAL INTERFACE FOR WASTE PAYLOAD/WASTE PAYLOAD 
PROTECTIVE SYSTEM IN ORBITER CARGO BAY 
eMEDIATE ALL PAYLOAD TRANSFER FUNCTIONS 
e SUPPORT ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM DOCKING WITH ORBITER (MULTI PLE 
LAUNCH SCENARIOS) 
e PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (TRANSFER AND RESCUE) 
.. PROVI DE COOLANT STORAGE FOR ONCE-THROUGH ACTI VE COOLI NG 
e PROVI DE REMOTE 01 SCONNECT ELECTRICAL AND FLUID 01 SCONNECTS WITH 
PAYLOAD 
e PROVI DE ELECTR I CAL AND FLU I 0 I NTERFACES WITH OR B ITER SYSTEMS 
• PROVIDE FOR FLIGHT CREW MONITORING OF WASTE PAYLOAD STATUS (AFDI· 
- . 
• PROVI DE FOR FLI GHT CREW CONTROL OF TRANSFER AND SHI ELD (AFDI 
RECOVERY OPERATIONS 
e SUPPORT WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION SYSTEM EJECTION FUNCTIONS 
• CONTINGENCY SEPARATION OF WPPS 
• BLAST SHIELD FOR ORBITER 
e SUPPORT RADIATION SHIELD RECOVERY AFTER REMOTE SHIELD REMOVAL 
• AFT FLI GHT DECK 
Figure 7.2-1: Flight Support System Functional Requirements 
7.3 LAUNCH VE~ICLE FLIGHT SUPPORT CONFIGURATIONS 
Figure 7.3-1 illustrates the waste payload system options requiring flight sup-
port. The most common configuration, used on the largest number of options, 
uses the waste payload protection system to support the waste payload. This 
option has been studled in detail in previous studies (19) and these studies 
were used to provide the mass estimates used in Task 8. The length of this 
option is 3510 mm for all waste payload options considered. 
The next most common configuration is the single waste payload supported in the 
cargo bay, used on total system options SL2, SL6 and SL10. The mass of this 
flight support system configuration ranged from about 2000 kg to about 4000 kg 
depending on the mass of the waste payload supported. Length in the shuttle 
bay ranged from 1.4m to 1.7m. 
The last configuration studled was required to support a dual waste payload sys-
tem mounted in the cargo bay. The mass of this system lncluding coolant 
required for waste payload heat dissipation is 53,017 kg and it occupies a 
length of 2700 mm In the orbiter cargo bay. Orbiter cargo bay stations for the 
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Figure 7.3-1: W.te Pay/o«1 System Optiom RfKlUiring Flight Support 
lnstallation are tabulated for the single waste payload and dual waste payload 
system. Locations were determined as a function of the orbiter longeron flt-
ting load capabilities. 
7.3.1 Flight Support System for Single Waste Payload. Key features of the sin-
gle waste payload flight support system are illustrated in Figure 7.3-2. The 
waste payload serves as an integral part of the structure. It is attached by 
four motor driven latches to a titanium space frame and two built-up frames 
which distribute the load from the waste payload to four longeron fittinqs and 
one keel fitting. The structure has been sized for orbiter flight and crash 
load as specified in the STS Payload Accommodation Documents (JSC 07700). 
A built-up titanium sheet keel fitting reacts keel fitting kick loads and pro-
vides a mounting location for the STS interface avionics and the waste payload 
cooling and electrical umbllical. Four aluminum alloy coolant tanks carry 
sufficient water coolant for once through cooling on both nominal and contin-
qency launch vehlcle mlSSlon profIles. 
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Figure 7.3-2: Flight Support System Configuration for Single Waste Payloacil 
Total mass including coolant ranges from 1927 kg to 4400 kg dependlng on the 
waste payload mass. A detailed group weight statement for the configuration is 
contained in Appendix I. 
The single waste payload flight support system is designed to eliminate the re-
quirement for separate waste payload transfer provisions. In operation the 
waste payload is attached to both the OTV waste payload support structure and 
the shuttle mounted flight support system. The three crosses flanking the 
waste payload in the illustration represent the position of the orbit transfer 
system mounted waste payload support system struts. Strut compliance is 
adjusted to assure primary load transfer through the flight support system 
rather than the orbit transfer vehicle. Prior to orbit transfer vehicle tilt 
up the four motor driven latches are opened allowing the orbit transfer system 
waste payload support system to lift the waste payload clear of the flight sup-
port system during OTV tilt up. For contingency recovery the procedure can be 
reversed. 
7.3.2 Flight Support System for Dual Waste Payload. The dual waste payload 
system serves three primary functions in association with the interpayload sup-
port structure described in the preceeding section. It supports the dual waste 
payload in the STS cargo bay; incorporates an external docking rinq which 
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allows orbit transfer system docklng prlor to waste payload transfer from the 
orbiter to the orbit transfer system; and provldes a tilt table and guide rails 
which interface with the waste payload guide ralls to guide the waste payload 
during transfer to the orbit transfer system. 
Key features are illustrated in Figure 7.3-3. Two built-up titanium tee frames 
braced by tubular titanium struts transfer loads from the dual waste payload to 
four longeron fittings and two keel fittinqs which interface with the space 
transportation system. 
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Figure 7.3-3: Flight Support System Configuration for Dual Waste Payloads 
An extendable docklng collar 1S stowed durIng launch and asce~t and ext~nded 
prior to orbit transfer system docking by support struts incorporating linear 
actuators. Support struts also incorporate impact attenuators to reduce the 
docking loads. 
A tilt table drlven by two llnear actuators is incorporated to rotate the waste 
payload 90 deg prior to waste payload transfer. STS interface avionics and a 
TV camera to aid docking are mounted on the forward tee frame. Coolant is 
carried in tanks mounted beneath the cargo bay liner in the orbiter winq carry 
through structure. 
Operation of the dual payload fllqht support system is illustrated schematl-
cally in Flgure 7.3-4. In operdtlon, the orbit transfer system docks to the 
D180-26426-2 
164 
RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING 
(ORBITER ACTIVEI 
WASTE PAYLOAD TRANSFER ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM W SEPARATION  lOR."," W,VEI 
:1p& 
TRANS 
LATION 
Figure 7.3-4: DUM W.,., P.yIOMi Flight Support System Operation Sequence 
extended docking collar. The STS orblter performs the actlve role 1n thlS 
docklnq sequence. Waste payload transfer is accomplished by rotatlng the trans-
fer cradle 90 deg using the linear actuators, allowing the waste payload to be 
translated through the center of the joined ring shaped docking collars to its 
final location in the orbit transfer system waste payload support structure. 
The orbiter then undocks and backs off and the orbit transfer system is powered 
up to initiate the transfer to the destination. 
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8.0 SYSTEMS INTEGRATION AND EVALUATION 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Primary objectives of the systems integration and evaluation task were to inte-
grate the systems resulting from Tasks 2, 3, 5 and 6 into alternative total sys-
tem concepts, to define these candidate concepts in terms of performance and 
risk, and to trade the total systems in the areas of risk and performance to se-
lect alternative systems of high merit for further definition. 
Primary issues in systems integration included technical feasibility, total sys-
tem performance and relative risk levels of different alternatives concepts. 
Technical feasibility and long term risk issues were settled in previous tasks 
(2, 3, 5, 6, 7) and were not treated in Task 8. Total system performance was 
defined as 1980 dollars per kilogram of waste form delivered to destination and 
was calculated for each alternative concept. Risk was evaluated on a relative 
basis only, with the risk of each alternative system compared on a qualitative 
basis with the risk level of the reference system. 
Primary evaluation criteria for selection of systems with high merit were (1) 
relative risk to be less than the Marshall Space Flight Center reference con-
cept and (2) relative cost less than or equal to the Marshall Space Flight 
Center reference concept. 
The results of these studies were the selection of four systems as alternative 
systems possessing high merit. Two single launch solar electric options 
utilize high specific impulse to deliver 5405 kg of waste payload fully 
shielded to the 0.85 AU destination (Options SL-9, SL-10). 
Two dual launch concepts use efficiencies of scale in launch vehicles and the 
increased specific impulse offered by long life cryogenic placement stages to 
delivery 10,150 kg of waste form fully shielded to the 0.85 AU destination. 
No concept Significantly less costly than the reference concept has been 
identified. All of the results obtained in this study indicate that increased 
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performance of space systems translates to risk reductions far more readily 
than cost reductlon for the space disposal mission. 
8.2 SYSTEM INTEGRATION 
The systems integration effort was accomplished in two steps. In the first, 
past studies were surveyed to ensure identification of all space system 
concepts. In the second phase, the "winners" of trades on launch vehicles and 
orbit transfer systems were arrayed against shield removal options and waste 
payload protection options identified in Task 2 to define a matrix showing rea-
sonable alternative space system options for further analysls. 
8.2.1 Identification of Options. Option identificatlon began with a catalogue 
of space system concepts obtained from a survey of 57 references on space dis-
posal of nuclear waste. Thirty-six distinct space system concepts were 
identifled. From the inltial screening, concepts using electromaqnetic mass 
drivers and particle accelerators for disposal of waste products were rejected 
as out of the scope of the study. The remaining systems were characterized in 
the areas of (1) waste mixes, (2) waste payload system configuration, 
(3) space disposal destination, (4) launch vehicle usage in terms of the 
numbers of launch vehicles per mission and how they were manifested, (5) 
payload protection removal location, (6) number and reusability options used 
for upper stages, and (7) quantity of waste payload emplaced per mission. 
Results of this characterization are tabulated for each study investigated in 
Appendlx C. 
A second level of screening was then applied using the criteria of avallabil-
ity, risk and cost. System availability considerations led to rejection of sys-
tems using expendable launch systems due to be phased out before the 1995 IOC 
used in the study. System availability also caused rejection of SSTO concepts 
on the basis of initial operational capability past the period of interest and 
on insufficient configuration data to provide reliable costing. Systems 
eVldencing risks greater than the qualitative risk level of the Marshal 
reference system were rejected. The primary rescue criterion evaluated was the 
availability of a rescue option. Systems with costs clearly greater than the 
Dla)-26426-2 
167 
cost of the Marshall reference were also rejected uSlnq vehicle reusabllity and 
the payload transported to destination for launch as the primary criterion. 
Characterlstics of the remaining systems were arranged in matrix form to define 
the entire range of reasonable total system options. The resulting matrix is 
lllustrated in Flgure 8.2-1. Primary option areas are identical with study 
tasks treating orbit transfer systems in Section 4, launch vehicles in Section 
5, and payload protection in Section 6. These optlons represented the starting 
point for studies in the launch vehicle, orbit transfer system, and waste pay-
load protection areas. 
Figure &2-1: ldentifk.rlon of OptiotM 
8.2.2 Selection of Options for Evaluation. Results of studies in the areas 
noted were used to reduce the comprehensive matrix shown to a speciflc defini-
tion of options for evaluation. Specific options included were (1) the two 
launch vehicle options identifled in Section 5, (2) orbit transfer system candi-
dates defined for dual and single launch scenarios in Section 4, and (3) waste 
payload protection options including shield removal, shield removal location, 
and incorporation of an ejectable waste payload protection system defined in 
Section 6. Combining these options, using the appropriate constraints, allowed 
preparation of the matrlx illustrated in Figure 8.2-2. Options are designated 
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Figure 8.2-2: SIIIection of Optionl for EvMu.tion 
by number on the bottom row. The descrlption of each optlon can be obtained by 
following one branch of the trade tree reading from the top down. As an exam-
ple, Option DL-1 is a dual launch optlon using a two stage orbit transfer sys-
tem composed of an aerobraked reusable injection stage and a cryogenic SOlS. 
This option has an integral shield waste payload system and makes use of an 
ejectable waste payload protection system. 
These options represent the complete range of reasonable alternative systems 
for space dlsposal, resulting from combining the highest performance orbit 
transfer options, the most cost effective launch vehicle options, and all via-
ble waste payload protectlon options. 
8.3 SYSTEM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
8.3.1 Performance Evaluation Criteria. The alternative space systems defined 
1n Sectlon 8.2 were evaluated for performance in terms of payload delivered per 
mlssion and cost. Performance was determined from the performance parametrics 
defined in Tasks 4, 5 and 6 and BAC performance and mass estimating codes. 
Cost was calculated on the basis of average cost per fllght based on launch 
vehicle production and operatlons cost from past studles, orbit transfer system 
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operat10ns based on estimates obtained 1n the Phase A OTV study, and production 
cost for orbit transfer systems based on Phase A derived unit cost for orbit 
transfer system hardware. The output of the system performance evaluation was 
a figure of merit expressed in recurring dollars per kilogram of waste form 
delivered to destination. 
8.3.2 Option Throw Weight Evaluation. For each option, the fl1ght support sys-
tem mass (from Task 3) and the waste payload parametrics (from Task 2), includ-
ing the waste payload protective system, where applicable, were combined with 
the orblt transfer system airborne support equipment mass (from Task 6) and 
subtracted from the launch vehicle throw weight (from Task 5) to determine the 
initial orbit transfer system mass delivered to low orblt. This mass which 
includes lnterstaqes, orbit transfer vehicle flight support equipment, and 
avionics radiation shieldlng, if required, was then iterated usinq the orblt 
transfer system performance parametrics from Task 6 to determine the waste form 
mass delivered to the destination per flight. 
8.3.3 Option Cost Evaluation. Costs for each option were estimated using FY 
80 dollars on the basis of recurring cost per mission. A preliminary survey 
indicated that DDT&E costs were not a significant differentiator. Launch vehi-
cle operations and procurement costs were obtained from Task 5; procurement 
costs were amortized over 100 missions. Development cost was not counted. 
Orbit transfer system average costs were calculated from data obtained during 
studies of the Phase A OTV and the solar electric propulsion system. OTV total 
first unit costs were estimated from the Phase A study results. Solar electric 
stage costs were scaled to the increased mass of the 270 kW solar electric 
stage. Operations costs for both ground and flight control operations were 
obtained from Phase A OTV study estimates. The cost per flight estimates gener-
ated exclude costs associated with the waste payload protective system, ground 
support equipment, facilities, program operation costs, and contingency. 
8.3.4 Option Performance Evaluations. This section presents a summary perform-
ance assessment for each of the 12 options identified. Each assessment con-
sists of a space system summary mass statement and a space system summary cost 
estimate. The waste form delivered per mission in kilograms, cost per mission 
in 1980 dollars, and the unit cost in 1980 dollars per kilogram for deployment 
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are also tabulated. Mass values shown are estimated uSlng the parametr1c 
weight est1mat1ng relationships derived in Tasks 4 and 6 and the airborne sup-
port equipment and waste payload flight support system masses generated in Task 
3. 
Production costs for orbit transfer systems were calculated by uS1ng the theo-
retical first unit costs and the appropriate amortization for the number of 
flights and production runs required. Launch veh1cle costs were amortized over 
100 flights. 
The following sections present details of space system performance assessment 
and a summary description of each option. 
~tion DL-l. Th1S is a dual launch option using the uprated space transpor-
tation system teamed w1th a liquid rocket booster version of the shuttle 
derived cargo launch vehicle. A two stage orbit transfer system uses an 
aerobraked inject10n stage and a cryogenic propellant solar orbit insertion 
stage. The waste payload is protected by a nonremovable integral shield and an 
ejectable waste payload projection system. The performance assessment for 
option DL-l is presented in Figure 8.3-1. This option delivers two 4250 kg 
waste forms per mission for a total waste form delivered per mission of 8500 
kg. Cost per mission is $85.25 million with operations, primarily launch 
costs, accounting for $51.65 million and production costs accounting for $33.6 
million, dominated by the $23 million devoted to amortization of launch 
vehicles. This option delivers the waste mix to the destination for approxi-
mately $10,000 per kilogram. It shares with option SL-9 the distinction of 
be1ng the lowest risk option considered and is the second lowest in unit 
delivery cost. 
Option DL-2. Option DL-2 is similar to DL-1 except that no ejectable waste pay-
load protection system 1S incorporated, with the hardened integral shield pro-
v1d1ng pr1mary protection for the waste payload. The resulting decrease in 
tare weight allows the waste form delivered per mission to be increased to 
10,150 kg, resulting in a decrease in unit cost from $10,000 to about $8,000 
per kilogram. The performance assessment of option DL-2 is illustrated in 
F1gure 8.3-2. 
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SPACE SYSTEM SUMMARY MASS STATEMENT (KG) 
TOTAL LAUNCH MASS 45,361 (LV-I) 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM 43,628 
WASTE PAYLOAD 2 a 15,559 
WASTE FORM 2 Ii 4,250 
SHIELDING 2 a 11,309 
WPPS 2 a 6,255 
TOTAL LAUNCH MASS 83,915 (LV-2) 
ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM 81,647 
INJECTION STAGE 67,177 
PLACEMENT STAGE 13,762 
PAYLOAD ADAPTER 454 
INTERSTAGE 254 
AIRBORNE SUPPORT EQUIP. 
STAGE ASE(l) 2,268 
WASTE PAYLOAD (2) 1,733 
FLI GHT SUPPORT 
(2) LV-l ONLY 
(l) LV·2 ONLY 
WASTE FORM DELIVERED 
COST PER MISSION 
UNIT COST. $/KG 
SPArE SYSTEM SIJMMARY COST ESTIMATE (M S) 
TOTAL COST (PER MISSION) 85.24 
OPERATIONS 51.65 
LAUNCH OPS 
LV-l 
LV-2 
OTS OPS 
FLT OPS 
GROUND OPS 
PRODUCTION 
INJ. STAGE 
PLACEMENT STAGE 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYST. 
FLI GHT SUPPORT 
LV-l 
LV-2 
8,500 KC 
85.24 M 
10,028 
46.20 
27.50 
18.70 
5.45 
1. 25 
4.20 
33.59 
1. 08 
6.43 
1. 00 
1. 78 
15.10 
8.20 
Figure 8.3·1 Space System Performance Assessment: Option DL-1 
SPACE SYSTEM SU~~ARY MASS STATEMENT (KG) SPACE SYSTEM SUMMARY COST ESTIMATE (M S) 
TOTAL LAurICH MASS 39,101 (LV-ll TOTAL COST (PER MISSION) 85.24 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM 33,784 
WASTE PAYLOAD 
WASTE FORM 
SHIELDING 
2 () 16,892 
2 @ 5,075 
2 @ 11,817 
TOTAL LAUNCH MASS 83,91~ (LV-2) 
ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM 81,647 
I NJECTI ON STAGE 
PLACEMENT STAGE 
PAYLOAD ADAPTER 
INTERSTAGE 
67,177 
13,762 
454 
254 
AIRBORNE SUPPORT EQUIP. 
STAGE ASE (l) 
WASTE PAYLOAD (2) 
FLI GHT SJPPORT 
(l) LV-2 ONLY 
m LV-l DriLY 
2,268 
5,317 
WASTE FORM DELIVERED 
COST PER MISSION 
UN IT COST. $/KG 
OPERATIONS 51. 65 
LAUNCH OPS 46.20 
LV-l 27.50 
LV-2 18.70 
OTS OPS 5.45 
FLT OPS 1.25 
GROUND OPS 4.20 
PRODUCTION 33.59 
INJ. STAGE 1.08 
PLACEMENT STAGE 6.43 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYST. 1.00 
FLI GHT SUPPORT 1. 78 
LV-l 15.10 
LV-2 8.20 
10,150 KG 
85.24 n 
8,398 
F,gure 8.3·2' Space System Performance Assessment, Option DL-2 
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Q£tion SL-1. This is the f1rst of the s1ngle launch opt1ons. It uses a two 
stage orbit transfer system consist1ng of an aerobraked injection stage and a 
storable propellant 5015. The waste payload is protected by an integral shield 
and this option incorporates an ejectable waste payload protection system. The 
summary performance assessment for option SL-1 is illustrated in Figure 8.3-3. 
This system is capable of delivering approximately 1600 kg of waste form per 
launch at a cost per mission of approximately $54 m1llion. This 1S divided 
1nto a $34 million operations cost dominated by launch operations and 
approximately $20 million in production costs dominated by the amortizat1on 
cost of the launch vehicle. This option is the lowest performance option 
E'''aluated with a unit cost for deployment of $33,000 per kilogram. 
SP~rE SYSTEM SU~~ARY MASS STATEMENT (KG) 
TOTAL LAUNCH MASS 45,3'J4 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM 11,097 
WASTE PAYLOAD 7510 
WASTE FORM 1,599 
SHIELDING 5,911 
WPPS 3,587 
ORB IT TRANSFER SYSTEM 29,722 
INJECTION STAGE 22,634 
PLACEMENT STAGE 
PAYLOAD ADAPTER 
INTERSTAGE 
6,862 
226 
AIRBORNE SUPPORT EQUIP. 4,535 
STAGE ASE 
WASTE PAYLOAD 
2,494 
2,041 
WASTE FORM DELIVERED 
COST PER MISSION 
UN IT COST: $/KG 
SPACF SYSTEM SUMMARY COST ESTIMATE (M S) 
TOTAL COST (PER MISSION) 53.77 
OPERATIONS 33.95 
LAUNCH OPS 28.00 
LV-1 28 00 
LV-2 
OTS OPS 5.95 
FLT OPS 1.25 
GROUND OPS 4.70 
PRODUCTION 
INJ. STAGE 
19.82 
0.61 
PLACEMENT STAGE 3.79 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYST. 0.61 
FLIGHT SUPPORT 0.52 
LV-1 
LV-2 
1,599 KG 
53.77 M 
33,627 
14.29 
F,gure 8.3-3: Space System Performance Assessment: Option SL-1 
Option SL-2. Th1S opt1on 1S slm11ar to SL-1 except that the ejectable wa~te 
payload protection system is not used. This allows an increase in the waste 
form delivered per miss10n to 1800 kg, decreasing the unit cost in dollars per 
kilogram for del1very to $30,133. The performance assessment for SL-2 is 
illustrated in F1gure 8.3-4. 
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SPACE SYSTEM SUMMARY MASS STATE~NT (KG) sear~ ~YSTEM SUMMARY COST EST! MATE (M I ~ 
TOTAL LAUNCH MAss 45,176 TOTAL COST (PER MISSION) 54.24 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM 8,391 OPERATIONS 33.85 
WASTE PAYLOAD 8,391 LAUNCH OPS 28.1)0 
WASTE FORM L800 LV-l 28.00 
SHIELDING 6,591 LV-2 
OTS OPS 5.85 
ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM 32,250 FLT OPS 1.25 
INJECTION STAGE 24,812 GROUND OPS 4.60 
PLACEMENT STAGE 7,212 PRODUCTION 20.39 
PAYLOAD ADAPTER 226 INJ. STAGE 0.62 
INTERSTAGE PLACEMENT STAGE 3.5E 
AIRBORNE SUPPORT EQUIP. 4,535 WASTE PAYLOAD SYST. 0.50 
STAGE ASE 2,494 FU GHT s{)PPORT 0.61 
WASTE PAYLOAD 2,041 LV-l 15.10 
LV-2 
WASTE FORM DELIVERED L800 KG 
COST PER MISSION 54.2LI M 
UNIT COST: $/KG 30,133 
Figure 8.3-4: Space System Performance Assessment: Option SL·2 
Option SL-3. This option shares the two stage orbit transfer system used for 
Option SL-1 and SL-2 but removes the radiation shield in low Earth orbit prior 
to deployment of the waste payload from low orbit to the destination. Protec-
tion for the waste payload is provided by an ejectable waste payload protection 
system. This option is similar to the MSFC reference system except for the use 
of an aerobraked return for the injection stage and use of the steel/graphite 
composite radiation shield. A summary performance assessment for Option SL-3 
is presented in Figure 8.3-5. Removal of the shield in low orbit increases the 
waste payload delivered per mission to over 4000 kg at approximately the same 
cost per flight. This allows a reduction in the unit cost for deployment to 
$13,400 per kilogram making this the fourth highest performance option evalu-
ated. This unit cost was used as a standard for comparison of other concepts. 
Option SL-4. This option is similar to option SL-3 except that the radiation 
shield used for protection is removed from the waste payload at Earth escape 
rather than at low Earth orbit. This results in a decrease in the waste pay-
load deployed per mission from 4000 kg to approximately 2000 kg, just about 
doubling the unit cost for deployment, which rises to $23,400 per kilogram. 
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SPACE SYSTEM SUMMARY MASS STATEMENT (KG) 
TOTAL LAUNCH MASS 47,625 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM 20,729 
WASTE PAYLOAD 14,700 
WASTE FORM 4,082 
SHIELDING 10,618 
WPPS 6,029 
ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM 22,361 
I NJECTI ON STAGE 17,826 
PLACEMENT STAGE 4,309 
PAYLOAD ADAPTER 226 
INTERSTAGE 
AIRBORNE SUPPORT EQUIP. 4,535 
STAGE ASE 2,494 
WASTE PAYLOAD 2,041 
Ft IGHT SlIPPOR 
WASTE FORM DELIVERED 
COST PER MISSION 
wm COST: S/KG 
SPArE SYSTEM SUMMARY COST ESTIMATE (M S) 
TOTAL COSTCPER MISSION) S4,60M 
OPERATIONS 33,85 
LAUNCH OPS 28,0 
LV-1 28,0 
LV-2 
OTS OPS 5,85 
FLT OPS 1.25 
GROUND OPS 4,60 
PRODUCTION 20,75 
INJ. STAGE O,C8 
PLACEMENT STAGE 4,32 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYST. 0,13 
FU GHT SUPPORT 0,52 
LV-1 15,10 
LV-2 
4,082 
54,7 M 
13.376 
FIgure 8.3-5: Sp«e Syrtwm PerformMlce A".,.",.nt: OptIon SL-3 
,he summary performance assessment for option SL-4 is presented ln Figure 
8.3-6. 
SPACE SYSTEM SU~~ARY MASS STATEM~NT (KG) SeAC~ SYSTEM SUMMARY COST ESTI MATE (M i l 
TOTAL LAUNCH MASS 45,357 TOTAL COST(PER MISSION) 54.14 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM 14,066 OPERATIONS 33,95 
WASTE PAYLOAD 9,943 LAUNCH OPS 28,0 
WASTE FORM 1,978 LV-1 28.0 
SHIELDING 7,965 LV-2 
WPPS 4,123 OTS OPS 5.95 
ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM 26,756 FLT OPS 1.25 
INJECTION STAGE 22,557 GROUND OPS 4.70 
PLACEMENT STAGE 3,973 PRODUCTION 20.19 
PAYLOAD ADAPTER 226 INJ. STAGE 0.65 
INTERSTAGE PLACEMENT STAGE 3.60 
AIRBORNE SUPPORT EQUIP. 4,535 WASTE PAYLOAD SYST. 0.70 
STAGE ASE 2,494 FU GHT SUPPORT 0.52 
WASTE PAYLOAD 2,041 LV-1 14.72 
LV-2 
WASTE FORM DELIVERED 1,978 KG 
COST PER MISSION 54,14 M 
UN IT COST: S/KG 27,371 
Figure 8.3-6. Space System Performance Assessment: Option SL-4 
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Option SL-5. This option takes advantage of the most effective orbit transfer 
system identified for single launch options. The orbit transfer system is a 
slngle stage cryogenic vehicle which is used in an expendable mode. It carries 
the waste payload all the way to the destination orbit at 0.85 AU. 
Option SL-5 uses an integral shield for waste payload protection and also incor-
porates an ejectable waste payload projection system. Figure 8.3-7 presents 
r~e summary performance assessment for option SL-5. The increased performance 
SPACE SYSTEM SUMMARY MASS STATE~NT (KG) SeerE ~YSTEM SUMMARY COST ESTI MATF (M! l 
TOTAL LAUNCH MASS 47,818 TOTAL COST(PER MISSION) ':>7.81 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM 13,060 OPERATIONS 29.96 
WASTE PAYLOAD 9,118 LAUNCH OPS 27.5 
WASTE FORM 2,100 LV-1 27.5 
SHIELDING 7,018 LV-2 
WPPS 3,942 OTS OPS 2.l16 
ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM 27,764 FLT OPS 1.25 
INJECTION STAGE 27,538 GROUND OPS 1.21 
PLACEMENT STAGE PRODUCTION 27.85 
PAYLOAD ADAPTER 226 INJ. STAGE 12.21 
INTERSTAGE PLACEMENT STAGE 0.60 
AI RBORNE SUPPORT EQU IP. 6,994 WASTE PAYLOAD SYST. 
STAGE ASE 2,494 FLI GHT SUPPORT 0.52 
WASTE PAYLOAD 11,500 LV-1 14.52 
LV-2 
WASTE FORM DELIVERED 2,100 KG 
COST PER MISSION 57.91 M 
UNIT COST: S/KG 27,529 
FitJure 8.~7: ~ s".a.m ~ AIf.Di'MlJt: Option SL-5 
of the cryogenic expendable stage increases waste form delivered to 2100 kg 
compared to 1600 kg for the most closely equivalent two stage single launch 
system. The cost per mission is only slightly increased at $58 million 
with the increased cost of the LLOTV stage at $12.2 million partially 
compensated for by the deletion of the orbit transfer vehicle ground 
refurbishment cost. Unit cost for this option is $27,580 per kilogram. 
Option SL-6. This is the most efficient single launch option which preserves 
the low risk feature of carrying the shield all the way to the destination. 
Increased payload is provided by the deletion of the ejectable waste payload 
protection system with the hardened integral shield now providing primary waste 
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payload protection. The resulting performance increase is shown in Flgure 
8.3-8. Waste form delivered per mission is increased to 2500 kq and the cost 
per mission remains approximately the same, decreasing the unit cost to ap-
proximately $22,700 per kilogram. 
SPACE SYSTEM SUMMARY MASS STATEMENT (KG) 
TOTAL LAUNCH ~.ASS q5, 353 
SPAfF SYC;TFM SUMMARY COST EST! MATF (M $ ) 
TOTAL COST(PER MISSION) 5b.73 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM 10,lq7 OPERATIONS 29.96 
WASTE PAYLOAD 10,lQ7 LAUNCH OPS 27.5 
WASTE FORM 2,500 LV-l 27.5 
SHIELPING 7,6Q7 LV-2 
OTS OPS 2.LlE 
ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM 30,671 FLT OPS 1. 25 
INJECTION STAGE 30,QQ5 GROUND OPS 1. 21 
PLACEMENT STAGE PRODUCTION 2E.77 
PAYLOAD ADAPTER 226 INJ, STAGE 11. 06 
INTERSTAGE PLACEMENT STAGE 
AIRBORNE SUPPORT EQUIP, Q,535 WASTE PAYLOAD SYST, 0.50 
STAGE ASE 2,Q9Q FU GHT SUPPORT 0.61 
WASTE PAYLOAD 2,OQl LV-l lQ.60 
FI I GHT SUPP R LV-2 
WASTE FORM DELIVERED 2,500 KG 
COST PER MISSION 56.73 M 
UN IT COST: $/KG 22,692 
Figure 8.3-8: Sp#Jce Sy,,.,,, PerformMIce Aa.ament: Option SL-6 
Option SL-7. This option combines the cryogenic expendable orbit transfer sys-
tem with shield removal at low Earth orbit to achieve the best performance of 
any single launch option. The waste payload shield is removed in low Earth 
orblt. Protection during ascent is provided by an ejectable waste payload pro-
tection system. The performance assessment illustrated in Figure 8.3-9 shows 
the efficiency of this concept which delivers almost 5000 kg of waste form per 
mission at a cost of just over $58 million. Unit cost for this option is 
approximately $11,600 per kilogram delivered. 
Option SL-8. This option is similar to SL-7 but the shield is removed at Earth 
escape instead of in low Earth orbit. The severe penalty this exacts is illus-
trated in Figure 8.3-10 which shows the waste form delivered per mission 
reduced to 2100 kg with the cost per mission essentially unchanged at $58 
million. This more than doubles the unit cost per deployment to $27,600 per 
0180-26426-2 
177 
SPACE SYSTEM SUMMARY MASS STATFMENT (KG) 
TOTAL LAUNCH MASS 4b,946 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM 23,133 
WASTE PAYLOAD 17,500 
WASTE FORM 4,990 
SHIELDING 12,510 
WPPS 5,633 
ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM 19,278 
INJECTION STAGE 19,052 
PLACEMENT STAGE 
PAYLOAD ADAPTER 226 
INTERSTAGE 
AIRBORNE SUPPORT EQUIP. 4,535 
STAGE ASE 
WASTE PAYLOAD 
2,494 
2,041 
WASTE FORM DELIVERED 
COST PER MISSION 
UNIT COST: S/KG 
SPAfF ~Y~TFM SUMr~ARY COST EST! MATF (M S) 
TOTAL COST(PER MISSION) 58.24 
OPERATIONS 30.0b 
LAUNCH OPS 27.50 
LV-1 27.S0 
LV-2 
OTS OPS 2.5b 
FLT OPS 1.25 
GROUND OPS 1. 31 
PRODUCTION 28.18 
INJ. STAGE 13.40 
PLACEMENT STAGE 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYST. 0.13 
FU GHT SUPPORT 0.52 
LV-l 14.13 
LV-2 
4,990 KG 
58.24 ~1 
11,671 
Figure 8.3-9: Space System Performance Assewnent: Option SL-7 
SPACE SYSTEM SUMMARY MASS STATFMENT (KG) ~PArF <;YSTFM SlJMMARY COST EST I r,ATE (M, ~ 
TOTAL LAUNCH MASS 45,358 TOTAL COST (PER MISSION) 58 01 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM 14,447 OPERATIONS 30.06 
WASTE PAYLOAD 10,256 LAUNCH OPS 27.50 
WASTE FORM 2,105 LV-I 27.50 
SHIELDING 8,151 LV-2 
WPPS 4,191 OTS OPS 2.~6 
ORB IT TRANSFER SYSTEM 26,376 FLT OPS 1.25 
I NJECTI ON STAGE 26,150 GROUND OPS 1. 31 
PLACEMENT STAGE PRODUCTION 27.95 
PAYLOAD ADAPTER 226 INJ. STAGE 12.21 
INTERSTAGE PLACEMENT STAGE 
AIRBORNE SUPPORT EQUIP. 4,535 WASTE PAYLOAD SYST. 0.70 
STAGE ASE 2,494 FU GHT SUPPORT 0.52 
WASTE PAYLOAD 2,041 LV-l 14.52 
LV-2 
WASTE FORI1 DELIVERED 2,105 KG 
COST PER MISSION 58.01 M 
UNIT COST. $/KG 27,S':.8 
Figure 8.3-10: Space System Performance Assessment: Option SL-B 
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kilogram, illustrating the significant penalty of carrying the massive 
radiation shield through the delta-V required to reach Earth escape. 
Option SL-9. This option is the first considered that uses an electric propul-
sion orbit transfer system. A waste payload protection system is also incorpo-
rated to provide a second level of protection beyond the integral shield. Fig-
ure 8.3-11 illustrates the performance assessment for this option dnd points 
SPACE SYSTEM SU~,"'ARY MASS STATF~',fNT (KG) 
TOTAL LAUNCH MASS 45,132 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM 24,267 
WASTE PAYLOAD 17,500 
WASTE FORM 5,449 
SHIELDING 12,051 
WPPS 6,767 
ORB IT TRANSFER SYSTEM 16,556 
INJECTION STAGE 16,330 
PLACEMENT STAGE 
PAYLOAD ADAPTER 226 
INTERSTAGE 
AIRBORNE SUPPORT EQUIP. 4,309 
STAGE ASE 
WASTE PAYLOAD 
FlIGHT SliPPOR 
2,268 
2,041 
WASTE FORM DELIVERED 
COST PER MISSION 
UNIT COST: $/KG 
SPArF SYSTFM SIIl'1MARY COST ESTH'ATE (M$) 
TOTAL COST (PER MISSION) lh 1b ~i 
OPERATIONS 52 14 
LAUNCH OPS 
LV-1 
LV-2 
OTS OPS 
FLT OPS 
GROUND OPS 
PRODUCTION 
INJ. STAGE 
PLACEMENT STAGE 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYST. 
FLl GHT SUPPORT 
LV-l 
78.16 M 
14,344 
27.5 
27.5 
4.64 
1. 25 
3.39 
46.(J2 
30.4 
(J.50 
0.52 
14.60 
F,gure 8.3-11 Space System Performance Assessment: Option SL-9 
out some of the dlfferences between the electric space systems and the chemical 
propellant space systems. Waste form delivered per mission is almost 5500 kq. 
This is the largest sized fully shielded waste form compatible with passive 
rejection of the thermal load. Cost per mission for the electric vehicle is 
approximately $78 million; for the first time, the production cost of $46 
million outweighs the operations cost of $32 million. 
Operation costs, as in the other options, are dominated by the space shuttle 
launch costs. In the production cost category, for the first time, the $30 mil-
lion cost of the solar-electric propulsion injection stage outweighs the $14 
million required for launch vehicle amortization. The high performance of the 
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solar electric stage largely outweighs the relatively high cost per mission 
resulting in a unit cost for deployment of $14,300 per kilogram. 
Option SL-10. This option is similar to SL-9 except for deletion of the 
ejectable waste payload protection system. Figure 8.3-12 shows the system sum-
mary performance assessment. Because the payload is limited by thermal dissipa-
tion considerations, the reduced mass cannot be readily translated to increase 
payloads and since the cost per mission remains the same, the unlt cost is also 
SPACE SYSTEM SUfMARY MASS STATEMENT (KG) 
TOTAL LAUNCH MASS 40,710 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM 17,500 
WASTE PAYLOAD 17,500 
WASTE FORM 5,449 
SHIELDING 12,051 
ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM 16,556 
INJECTION STAGE 
PLACEt-lENT STAGE 
PAYLOAD ADAPTER 
I NTERSTAGE 
16,330 
226 
Al RBORtlE SUPPORT EQUIP. 6,654 
STAGE ASE 2,268 
WASTE PAYLOAD 4,386 
FLI GHT SliPPOR 
WASTE FORt1 DELI VERED 
COST PER MISSION 
UNIT COST: $/KG 
SPArE SYSTEM SUMI~ARY COST ESTl1~ATE (M $) 
TOTAL COST(PER MISSION) 78.16 M 
OPERATIONS 32.14 
LAUNCH OPS 
LV-l 
LV-2 
OTS OPS 
FLT OPS 
GROUND OPS 
PRODUCTION 
INJ. STAGE 
PLACEMENT STAGE 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYST. 
FLI GHT SUPPORT 
LV-l 
LV-2 
5,4L19 KG 
78.16 M 
14,344 
27.50 
4.64 
27.50 
1.25 
3.39 
46.0 
30.4 
0.5(1 
0.52 
14.60 
Figure 8.3-12: Space System Performance Assessment: Option SL-10 
identlcal to that of SL-9 at $14,300 per kilogram. This points out the fact 
that the relative insensitivity of the electric vehicle options allows incorpo-
ration of an ejectable waste payload protection system at essentially no pen-
alty in cost per flight. 
Figure 8.3-13 presents a comparison of the figures of merit for 12 options 
considered. Costs are normalized to the cost of the reference system, 
identified as system SL-3. The dotted lines above and below the cost shown for 
the reference system represent cost increases and decreases of 50%, respec-
tively. To allow for the uncertainty in cost and performance estimates, only 
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(PERCENT) 
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240 
220 
200 
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80 
80 
40 
20 
-.----
D HARDWARE COST 
~ OPERATING COST 
{UPDATED REF SYSTEM 
Sl-10 
Figure 83-13· ComparISon of Total System Performance 
systems wlthin the band were consldered essentlally equlvalent In CO:.t to each 
other and to the reference system. Systems falling outside the band were con-
sidered to be significanty more costly than the reference. It is apparent that 
only five options fall within this category, not counting the updated reference 
system. The two dual-launched systems (DL-l, DL-2) which take advantage of 
economies of scale and the higher efficiency of the cryogenic placement stages 
are the lowest cost options; the two electric vehicles (SL-9, SL-IO), which uti-
lize the high specific impulse of electric propulsion can for all practical pur-
I 
poses be considered equivalent in cost to the updated reference system. Both 
of these systems carry the waste payload shielding all the way to the destina-
tion. This represents a significant decrease in risk compared to the reference 
system. The single-stage cryogenic propellant option (SL-7), unlike the previ-
ously mentioned options, removes all waste payload protection in low Earth 
orbit. ThlS option is equlvalent in risk to the reference concept. 
8.4 SYSTEM RISK EVALUATION 
Risk evaluations were conducted to rank the alternative systems considered with 
respect to the rlsk of the updated reference system (option SL-3). 
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8.4.1 Risk Evaluation Criteria. Relative risk for the alternative systems was 
evaluated by comparing the risk reduction provisions incorporated in each 
option. ,Risk reduction provisions considered included: (1) whether or not the 
payload had an integral hardened shield or whether the shield was removable, 
implying a reduction in hardness; (2) whether or not an ejectable waste payload 
protection system was incorporated for coping with launch vehicle failures; (3) 
whether the waste payload was shipped to orbit in a dry payload bay containing 
no propellants or whether it was packaged in a payload bay, also containinq an 
orbit transfer vehicle fueled with substantial quantities of highly energetic 
hypergolic or cryogenic propellants; and (4) whether or not the payload was 
protected from contingency reentry. Reentry protection for the hardened waste 
payloads is provided by the 50 mm graphite shield which surrounds the steel pri-
mary shield and container. Payloads removing the radiation shield at Earth es-
cape are protected from contingency reentry by fundamental laws of orbital me-
chanics. Payloads with radiation shields and protection removed in low orbit, 
however, remain vulnerable to liberation of substantial quantities of waste 
form during an unprotected contingency reentry (14). 
8.4.2 Option Risk Evaluation. Fiqure 8.4-1 presents the qualitative risk rank-
ing for the 12 options considered. Four differentiable risk levels were 
LOWEST 
RISK 
HIGHEST 
RISK 
DEFINING CRITERIA (RISK AMELIORATION) 
"DRY" 
INTEGRAL WASTE PA'r~OAD PROTECTED 
SHIELD PAYLOAD fAY, WRING 
RISK (HARD EJECTION NO CONTINGENCY 
OPTION LEVEL PAYLOAD) CAPABILITY PROPELLANTS) RE-ENTRY 
DL-L SL-9 1 YES YES YES YES 
SL-L SL-5 2 YES YES NO YES 
DL-2, SL-IO 2 YES NO YES YES 
SL-2, SL-6 3 YES NO NO YES 
SL-4, SL-8 3 NO YES NO YES 
SL-3, SL-7 4 NO YES NO NO 
Figure 8.4-1 Qualitative Risk Ranking 
D 180-26426-2 
182 
identified based on the number of risk reduction prov1s1ons incorporated in the 
option. Risk level one, shared by options DL-l and SL-9, incorporates all prOV1-
sions for risk reduction. Risk level two, shared by opt1ons SL-l, SL-5, DL-2, 
and SL-IO, indicates an option incorporating three of the four risk reduction 
provisions. Options designated as risk level three incorporate two of the four 
risk reduction provisions, and options SL-3 and SL-7, at risk level four, 
represent the highest risk systems considered. All options except SL-7 are 
lower in qualitative risk than the updated reference system (SL-3). 
8.5 SYSTEM SCREENING 
A final screening was conducted to combine the performance and risk evaluations 
to select alternative concepts possessing high mer1t. 
8.5.1 Total System Evaluation Criteria. Five criteria are identified for 
total system evaluation: 
1) Technical feasibil1ty 
2) Risk 
3) Cos t 
4) Environmental impact 
5) Long term risk 
tlr,-,' of the~e Crltena dre not dlfferpntlators. Technlcal feasl~lllty wa~ es 
tabl1shed 1n Tasks 2, 5, and 6 for all of the options considered. Environmen-
tal impact is proport1onal to the number of launches and as such is measured hv 
the system performance. Fewer launches equal less env1ronmental 1mpact. Lonq 
term rlsk was screened 1n Task 7; the destination selected, 0.85 AU hel1ocen-
trlc orblt, had the lowest long term risk of any destination 1dentified. 
The key d1fferentlators are relative risk and performance. Risk cr1teria was 
evaluated by relat1ve rankinq. Systems having a r1sk equal to the reference 
system were rejected. Systems possesslnq a risk less than the reference system 
were judged acceptable for r1sk. Performance was also evaluated relative to 
the reference system. Systems whose costs per m1ssion were more than 1500/, of 
the reference system cost per mlSSlon were rejected. Systems possessing costs 
per mlssion judqed less than or equal to that of the reference system were 
accepted. 
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8.5.2 Space Systems Screening for Performance and Risk. Figure 8.5-1 presents 
the results of the screening for cost and risk conducted on the 12 candidate 
concepts. A 1 in the columns marked "risk score" and "cost score" constitutes 
WASTE FORM 
CA~OIDATE MASS SYS TEM DELIVERED RISK COST 0[5 I G'~ATlOt SUMMARY DESCRIPTION PER FLT( KG SCORE SCORE DISPOSITION ANO COMMENTS 
DL-I DUAL LAUNCH AlB INJ + CRYO SOlS, 8500 I 1 ACCEPT TIES SL-9 FOR LOWEST RISK WPPS + INTEGRAL SHIELD 
DL-Z DUAL LAUNCH AlB INJ + CRYO SOlS, 10,150 1 1 ACCEPT HIGHEST PERFORMANCE SYSTEM INTEGRAL SHIELD ONLY 
SL-l SINGLE LAUNCH AlB INJ + STORABLE SOlS, 15'99 1 X REJECT LOWEST PERFORMANCE SYSTEM 
WPP~ + INTfGRAL SHIELD 
SL-Z 
SINGLE LAU~CH AlB I NJ + STORABLE SOlS, 1800 1 X REJECT PERFORMANCE < REF INTEGRAL SHI(LD ONLY 
SL-3 SINGU LAUNLHA/B lNJ +-nORABLE' SOTS, WPPS + REt-'OVABLE SHIElD iLEO) 408Z X 1 UPDATED REFERENCE SYSTEM 
SL-4 SINGLE LAUNCH AlB INJ + STORABLE SOlS, 1 X REJECT PERFORMANCE < REF 
WPPS + REMOVE SHIELD (E/E) 1977 
SL-5 ~INGLE LAU~CH, SINGLE STAGE CRYO LLOTV, 2099 1 X REJECT PERFORMANCE < RE F WfPS + I'IHGRAL SHIELD 
SL-6 ~l~~ L,''u';C:U, SINGLE STAut (;I{YU LlOTV, INT GRAL S~IELD ONLY 2500 1 X REJECT PE RFORMANCE < RE F 
SL-7 SINGLE LAUNCH, SINGLE STAGE CRYO lLOTV, X 1 REJECT HIGHEST PERFORMANCE SINGLE WPPS + R~ ~0V"~LE SHIELD (LEO) 4989 LAUNCH SYSTEM BUT RISK = REF S)~ rEM 
SL-8 ~ IrIGLE LAUNCH, S INGLE STAGE CRYO LLOTV, 2099 WPPS + REt-'O\Q\SLE SHIELD (E/E) 1 X REJECT PERFORMANCE < REF 
SL-9 SINGLE LAUNCH, SINGLE STAGE EXPENDABLE 1 1 ACCEPT TIES DL-l FOR LOWEST RISK 
sr~ WPPS + INTEGRAL SHIELD 5449 
SI',GLE LAUNCH, SINGLE STAGE EXPENDABLE 1 1 ACCEPT PERFORMANCE + RISK ACCEPTABLE SL-IO 5449 SE~ INTE('kAL SHI[LD 
Figure 8.5-1: Sp«:e $yrtwn Sc,..."ing 
acceptance. An X constitutes rejection. Based on these criteria, four systems 
were found acceptable. Option DL-1 is significantly less costly than the 
reference system and shares with option SL-9 the distinction of being the 
lowest risk concept identified. Option DL-2 is significantly lower in risk 
than the reference system and is the highest performance system considered. The 
other two systems accepted use electrical propulsion for the orbit transfer 
system. Option SL-9 is essentially equal in cost to the reference system but 
the risk is significantly lower. Option SL-10 also possesses identical costs 
to the reference with the same substantial risk benefits. 
8.6 DEFINITION OF SELECTED ALTERNATE SPACE SYSTEM MISSION SCENARIOS 
Composite operation flows and schematic diagrams of the mission operations were 
generated for the selected chemical propellant and electrical propulsion space 
systems. For simplicity, the concepts using the integral shield without the 
waste payload protecti0n ~ystem hl12 been illustrated. 
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8.6.1 Chemical Propellant Systems. F1gure 8.6-1 1llustrates the composite op-
eration flow derived from the generic operations flow for optlon OL-2. Figure 
8.6-2 provides a schematic 1llustration of key mission events for the chemical 
propellant, dual launch option. Key events include: 
1) Launch of the cargo launch vehicle which places the two stage orbit trans-
fer system in low Earth orbit (LEO). 
2) Launch of the waste payload to LEO in the uprated space shuttle. 
3) Rendezvous between the orb1t transfer system and orbiter in LEO. 
4) Transfer of the waste payload to the orbit transfer system from the flight 
support system (FSS) which supports it in the orb1ter cargo bay. Subse-
quent to waste payload transfer, the orbiter waits in LEO for recovery of 
the f1rst stage of the orbit transfer system. 
5) Injection of the expendable SOlS 1nto heliocentric transfer orbit by the 
recoverable f1rst stage. 
6) After a 165 day coast, the SOlS injects itself and the waste payload into 
the destination heliocentric orbit at 0.85 AU. 
7) Recovery of the 1njection stage for reuse following a retro burn and 
aerobraking maneuver which inserts 1t into LEO. 
8.6.2 Electric Propuls1on Systems. Figure 8.6-3 1llustrates the space system 
composlte operations flow derived for option SL-10. Key events in the mission 
sequence are illustrated schematically in Figure 8.6-4. The mission sequence 
1S signlficantly simpler than the dual launch option. Launch vehlcle ascent op-
erations are followed lmmediately by deployment and checkout of the orblt trans-
fer system while stlll attached to the shuttle. At the completion of checkout, 
waste payload transfer 1S accomplished by simply unlatching the waste payload 
from the fllght support system after Wh1Ch the orbiter backs away from the 
orbit transfer system and payload and proceeds immediately to recovery and land-
ing. Following separatlon, the solar electr1c stage begins its inject10n spi-
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Figure 8.6-1: Space System Composite Operations Flow for Option DL-2 
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Figure 8.6~: Space System Composite Operations Flow for Option SL-10 
DE'LOY AND CHECKOUT SOLAR ELECTRIC STAGE 
/ I 
LAUNCH TO 
LOW EARTH ORBIT 
Figure 8.6-4: Orbital Operations for Option SL-10 
SPIRAL TO EARTH 
ESCAPE 
ral. Completlon of the lnJectlon spiral leaves lt on a two-thlrd turn transfer 
splral to the 0.85 AU destination. Placement is accomplished by shutdown 
of the solar electric propulsion system when 0.85 AU is achieved, followed 
by verification of destination orbit parameters by ground control and the 
permanent shutdown of the solar electric stage, completinq the deployment. 
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9.0 LAUNCH SITE SYSTEMS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The primary objective of the launch site systems study was to def1ne the impact 
of the selected space disposal options on facilities and operat10ns at the 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC). In addition, an alternate site was to be selected 
and defined to allow an evaluation of the cost and benefits of accomplishing 
launches at a remote site. A review of the applicable references revealed that 
a great deal of work had been accomplished by the Marshall Space Fliqht Center 
1n this area in the 1978 study (19). Accordingly, we conflned our efforts to 
updating the KSC impact based on the Orbiter Fleet Size Study/KSC Launch 
Capab1lity Analysis Study performed by KSC in 1980. Definition and evaluation 
of alternate sites was based on the Marshall Space Flight Center assessment in 
the reference cited. 
Key flndings are that the facilities impact of selected option~ is not suffi-
cient to make it a primary differentiator between alternative space systems and 
that, while continued evaluation of an alternate site is warranted, this effort 
should be conducted as a part of the domestic and international affairs effort 
rather than as a part of the space systen studies. 
9.2 LAUNCH RATES 
Launch rates for the space system options selected in Task 8 screening are il-
lustrated in Figure 9.2-1. The single launch options, SL-9 and SL-10, require 
approximately 52 flights per year. The dual launch options require, respec-
t1vely, 35 uprated shuttle launches and 35 shuttle derived cargo launch vehicle 
launches per year for option DL-1. Option DL-2 requires 30 launches of each 
vehicle per year. These numbers are approximately equivalent to 70 and 60 
flights per year for the basic uprated space transportation system, 
respectively. 
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OPTION: TOTAL MISSIONS UPRATED STS SDCLV· 
MAX FLTS/YR. MAX FLTS/YR. 
SL-9, 540 52 --
SL-IO 
DL-l 764 35 35 
DL-2 580 30 30 
• THIS IS EQUIVALENT TO 52, 70, AND 60 FLTS PER YEAR FOR THE UPRATED STS 
• SHUTTLE DERIVED CARGO LAUNCH VEHICLE 
Figure 9.2·1: Launch Rates for Selected Options 
9.3 EVAL~ATION OF SPACE SYSTEMS SUPPORT FACILITIES 
The impact of these launch rates on support facilities at the Kennedy Space 
Center ~s shown in Figure 9.3-1. Inspection of the tabulated requirements for 
OPTION SL-S, SL-IO DL-2 
EQUIV. STS FLIGHT RATE 52 60 
EQUIV. ORBITER FLEETSIZE 2 4 
KSC PAD 2 2 
MLP 4 4 
VAB INTEG. CELLS 2 3 
OPF CHECKOUT BAYS 2 3 
LRB BOOSTER PROCESSING 1 1 
ET PROCESSING 4 5 
ORBIT XFER SYSTEM PROCESSINb 1 1 
THE SELECTED OPTIONS ARE APPROXIMATLEY EQUIVALENT. 
FACILITY IMPACT IS NOT A DIFFERENIATOR. 
• FROM OTV 0A STUDY. ASSUMES NEW DESIGN 
DL-l 
70 
5 
2 
5 
3 
3 
1 
, 
1 
Figure 9.3·1: FlICilitift ImpllCt for s.lected OptiOlJl 
pads, mobile launch platforms, vertlcle integration cells, and the other major 
facilities shows that the selected options are approximately equivalent in 
their demands. Accordingly, it was concluded that the facility impact is not 
a primary differentiator between alternate concepts and that further in-
vestigation in the context of this study was not warranted. 
0180-26426-2 
191 
9.4 SPECIALIZED WASTE PAYLOAD PROCESSING FACILITIES 
A comprehensive treatment of waste payload processing facilities at KSC ;s 
presented in Reference 19. A careful review of these results indicated that 
the information provided was sufficient for the purposes of this study. Fur-
ther investigation was not pursued. 
9.5 ALTERNATE LAUNCH SITE 
A review of past studles of alternate launch sites, particularly reference 7, 
shows that the Kennedy Space Center is well located for the maximum overwater 
ground track desirable for safety in the launch of waste payloads. Feasibility 
of a remote launch site has, however, been established in past studies. The 
safety rational used as the basis of the selection of the remote site seems 
tenuous at best. Space disposal, if implemented, will be done on the basis of 
a system design which will preclude catastrophic accidents. On this basis, KSC 
is as suitable a launch site as any and it seems highly doubtful that a waste 
payload system unacceptable for safety reasons at KSC would be acceptable else-
where on Earth. 
The primary payoff of a remote launch site would appear to be political in the 
context of an international space disposal scenario. Until such a scenario 
becomes a part of the evaluation of the space option for nuclear waste isola-
tion, it is suggested that investigation of the Kennedy Space Center as a prime 
launch site continue. 
9.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Primary conclusions reached in a brief survey of launch site systems include 
(1) the selected alternatives would almost double the existing space 
transportation system flight support facilities at the Kennedy Space Center 
(assuming no impact on the existing STS mission model), (2) facilities in 
addltion to flight support facilities at KSC would be limited to a dedicated 
nuclear waste processing facillty, and (3) continued evaluation of the 
alternate launch slte, if pursued, should be conducted as part of the domestic 
and international affalrs portion of the total program evaluation effort. 
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10.0 CONCLUSIONS 
This section summarizes a few of the general conclusions reached as a result of 
this study. 
1. The 0.85 AU heliocentric orbit space disposal destination offers the lowest 
verified risk of any destination studied; an alternate class of destina-
tions in the geolunar system offers the potential for equivalent risk at 
significantly lower program cost (Section 2.6). 
2. Orbit transfer systems for the space disposal mission benefit significantly 
from the use of aerobraking for injection stage recovery, the use of cryo-
genic propellants for the placement mission, and the use of solar electric 
propulsion. 
3. Approximately 99% of rescue missions can be classed as nominal rescue mis-
sions, assuming reasonable reliabilities for orbit transfer systems. Imple-
mentation of the nominal rescue mission is straightforward using systems 
derived from the standard delivery vehicles. 
4. Contingency rescue issues require further study. 
5. A steel graphite composite radiation shield which doubles as primary con-
tainment offers a practical and effective approach to passive protection of 
the waste payload from ascent accidents and continqency reentry. 
6. A waste payload protection system, which incorporates an ejection 
capability to protect the waste payload from ascent accident conditions, 
requires further study and quantification of launch vehicle reliability to 
determine benefits. 
7. For the reference waste mix studied, the liquid rocket booster upgraded 
space shuttle is the most effective launch vehicle for single launch mis-
sion scenarios. For dual launch mission scenarios, the upgraded shuttle 
teamed wlth the liquid rocket booster version of the shuttle derived cargo 
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launch vehicle shows significant life cycle cost savings for a wide range 
of assumptions on DDT&E and recurring costs. 
8. The Kennedy Space Center should be retained as the prime launch site for 
consideration in further studies. Evaluation of an alternate launch site 
should be considered as part of the domestic and international affairs 
effort. 
9. System level cost and performance trades in Task 8 have defined four alter-
native space systems which deliver waste payloads to the the selected 0.85 
AU heliocentric orbit destination at least as economically as the reference 
system without requiring removal of the protective radiation 
shield/container. 
10. No concepts significantly less costly than the reference concept have been 
identified. The increased performance in space systems translates far more 
readily to risk reduction by carrying the fully shielded waste payload to 
the destination than it does to cost reduction. 
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11.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Speclfic recommendations resulting from the space system study effort are summa-
rized below: 
1. Further analysis should be conducted of space disposal destinations in the 
geolunar system. Efforts should be aimed at defining the best geolunar des-
tination and, when selected, validating its stability to the same level as 
the reference 0.85 AU heliocentric orbit destination. 
2. The system safety design requirements for the reference concept should be 
updated to incorporate the STS crash conditions and the revised flight radi-
ation shielding radiation limits set forth in this study. 
3. An analysis of the reference integral shield waste payload system aimed at 
validating its ability to withstand terminal velocity impact should be con-
ducted as the first part of a comprehensive payload effects analysis for 
this concept. This effort would provide preliminary verification of the 
technical viability of the waste payload system and, by implication, 
the entire space disposal system. It would also be the first step in a more 
extensive effort aimed at the validation and qualification of the waste 
payload system. 
4. Thermal loading of any waste form considered should be limited to values 
which will preclude the possibility of post burial melt down. 
5. A preliminary study of the continqency rescue mission in more detail than 
reported in Reference 14 is required to identify concepts and define areas 
for further study more speciflcally. 
6. A system level study is required to determine the impact of alternative 
waste forms and mixes primarily in the area of launch rate and its effect 
on selection of launch vehicles and orbit transfer systems. 
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APPENDIX A 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
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ABOTV 
ACS 
AMOTV 
APOTV 
ASE 
ATP 
AU 
CDR 
DDT&E 
DFI 
DOD 
DOE 
DRM 
EMC 
EPS 
ER 
FFC 
FOSR 
FSS 
FTV 
FY 
GEO 
GEODSS 
GPS 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
aerobrakinq orbital transfer vehicle 
attitude control system 
aeromaneuvering orbital. transfer vehicle 
all-propulsive orbital transfer vehicle 
airborne support equipment 
authority to proceed 
astronomical unit 
critical design review 
design, development, test, and evaluation 
development fllght instrumentation 
Department of Defense 
Department of Energy 
deslgn reference mlssion 
electromagnetic compatib1lity 
electrical power system 
Earth radl; 
final flight certification 
flexible optical surface reflector 
flight support system 
facilities test vehicle 
fiscal year 
geosynchronous Earth orbit 
ground-based electro-optical deep space surveillance 
qlobal posltioninq system 
HEO high Earth orbit 
HLLV heavy 11ft launch veh1cle 
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IMU 
IOC 
IUS 
JSC 
k 
KSC 
kW 
LID 
LEO 
LeRC 
LLOTV 
M 
MCF 
MECO 
MGR 
MPS 
MQF 
MSFC 
NASA 
NEP 
NSTL 
OF! 
ORNL 
OTV 
PFC 
P/L 
inertial measurement unit 
initial operational capability 
inertial upper staqe 
Johnson Space Center 
thousand 
Kennedy Space Center 
kilowatts 
lift-to-drag ratio 
low Earth orbit 
NASA Lewis Research Center 
long-l ife OTV 
mi 11 ion 
mission cost factor 
main engine cutoff 
Mined Geological Repositor 
main propulsion system 
mission quantity factor 
Marshall Space Flight Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
nuclear electric propulsion 
National Space Technology Laboratory 
operational flight instrumentation 
Oak Ridge National Laboratories 
orbital transfer vehicle 
prellminary fllght certiflcation 
payload 
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PPU 
PSMC 
PTA 
QCF 
QTV 
RCS 
REM 
RF 
RSI 
SIC 
SEPS 
SES 
SIRTF 
SOlS 
SSTO 
SSUS 
STA 
STON 
STS 
TORS 
TPS 
TVC 
WPPS 
power processinq unit 
payload and sequential mass calculation 
propulsion test article 
qualitatlve cost factor 
qualification test vehicle 
reaction control system 
reaction engine modules 
radlofrequency 
reusable surface insulation 
spacecraft 
solar electric propulsion system 
solar electrlc stage 
Shuttle Infrared Telescope Facility 
solar orbit insertion stage 
single stage to orbit 
spin stabilized upper stage 
structural test article 
space tracking and data network 
space transportation system 
tracking and data relay satellite 
thermal protection system 
thrust vector control 
waste payload protection system 
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APPENDIX C 
SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEYED SPACE SYSTEMS 
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SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEYED SPACE SYSTEMS 
This appendix summarizes the characterlstics of 36 distlnct space systems for 
the disposal of nuclear waste that were identified in a reVlew of the articles 
listed in Appendix B, References and Bibliography. 
Chief characteristics of each system are listed on a single sheet, along with 
a recommended disposition and its rationale. Item 1 for each case references 
it to the article number in Appendix B from which it was derived. Numbers 
preceded by an R will be found in the reference section; those preceded by a B, 
in the bibliography. 
Five systems are recommended for further consideration on the basis of poten-
tially superior costs or risks with respect to the MSFC reference system. MSFC 
reference systems are identified for the STS, uprated STS, and HLLV. Addi-
tional systems wlll be added for consideration as they are generated. 
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-SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 1 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B23 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: HLW, thermal output 1.3 kW/kg 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Integral with H2 thruster 
4. DESTINATION: Solar impact 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: Saturn V 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes No X 
8. INJECTION STAGE: Saturn IV B/Centaur 
Reuse Expend _X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: AMOS 
Reuse Expend _X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 1000 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
o Saturn V capability no longer exists 
o Waste mix unrealistic 
o Waste configuration unrealistic 
o Performance inferior to MSFC reference (higher cost) 
o Risk higher than MSFC reference (no rescue) 
13. COMMENTS: None 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 2 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B23 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: HLW, thermal output 1.3 kW/kg 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Integral with H2 thruster 
4. DESTINATION: Solar impact 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes No X 
8. INJECTION STAGE: Space tug 
Reuse X Expend __ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: AMOS 
Reuse Expend _X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 600 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
o Waste mix unrealistlc 
o Waste configuration unrealistic 
o Performance inferior to MSFC reference (higher LeC) 
o Risk higher than MSFC reference (no rescue) 
13. COMMENTS: None 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 3 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B31, B32 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: All fission products (no separation) and actinides 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Cyllndrical, spherical end caps 
4. DESTINATION: Earth escape 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes No X 
8. INJECTION STAGE: Space tug 
Reus e Expend _X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: N/A 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 7936 (includes shielding) 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
o Unacceptable destination 
o Generally obsolete 
o Risk greater than MSFC reference 
o Cost equivalent to MSFC reference for normalized mission 
13. COMMENTS: Superseded by later studies 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 4 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B31, B32 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: All fission products (no separation) and actlnides 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Cylindrical, spherical end caps 
4. DESTINATION: Earth escape 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 2 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: (1) STS/payload, (2) STS/tug 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes __ X __ No ___ (LEO, E/E) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: Space tug 
Reuse Expend _X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: N/A 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 14,059 (includes shielding) 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: See Case 3 
13. COMMENTS: Superseded by later studies 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 5 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: R3, BI0 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Actinides 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Conical entry vehicle, spherical 
waste payload 
4. DESTINATION: HEO or heliocentric circular at 0.9 AU 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: Titan III E 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes No X 
8. INJECTION STAGE: Centaur 
Reuse Expend _X ___ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: Spin stabillzed solid 
Reuse Expend _X ___ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 3860 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: Titan Centaur phaseout prior to dlsposal mission IOC 
13. COMMENTS: None 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 6 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: R3, BI0 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Actinides 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Conical entry vehicle, spherical 
afterbody contains spherical waste payload 
4. DESTINATION: HEO or heliocentric circular at 0.9 AU 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: Saturn V 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes No X 
B. INJECTION STAGE: Centaur 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: Spin stablized solid 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 16,005 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: Launch vehicle unavailable 
13. COMMENTS: None 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 7 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: R3, B10 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Actinldes 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Conical entry vehicle, spherical 
afterbody contains spherical waste payload 
4. DESTINATION: HEO or heliocentric orbit at O.q AU 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes No X 
8. INJECTION STAGE: Tug 
Reuse X Expend __ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: Spln-stabillzed solid 
Reuse Expend _X ___ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 4170 
11. DISPOSITION: Superseded by MSFC reference systems, Case 22 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
13. COMMENTS: None 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 8 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: R3, BI0 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Actin1des 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Conical entry veh1cle, spherlcal 
afterbody contains spherical waste payload 
4. DESTINATION: HEO 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes No X 
8. INJECTION STAGE: Centaur (optimized) 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: N/A 
Reuse Expend 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kq): 8470 
1]. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: Centaur capability nonexistent 1n time period 
of 1nterest 
13. COMMENTS: None 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 9 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B14 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic solid waste, 0.3 kW/km 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Inteqral with thermoelectric generator 
4. DESTINATION: Solar system escape 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes No X 
8. INJECTION STAGE: Centaur 
Reuse Expend _X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: RTG/ion 
Reuse Expend _X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 4850 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
o Risk greater than MSFC reference (no rescue) 
o Cost greater than MSFC reference (no vehicle recovery) 
13. COMMENTS: Similar to Case 11 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 10 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B14 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Not specified 
4. DESTINATION: Solar system escape 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes No (Not specified) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: Centaur 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: SEPS 30 kg/kW, 20 kW 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 1320 (est.) 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
o R1Sk greater than MSFC reference (no rescue) 
o Cost greater than MSFC reference (no vehicle recovery) 
13. COMMENTS: None 
Dl80-26426-2 
C12 
SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 11 DATA SHEET 
J. REFERENCES: B1, B2 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Actinides 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Integral with thermoeletric generator, 
removable shield, and thermal control to LEO; ejection provlslons 
4. DESTINATION: Solar system escape 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 2 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: (1) STS/tug, (2) STS/NEWSTAR 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes X No (LEO, E/E) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: Tug 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: NEWSTAR 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 4140 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
o Risk greater than MSFC reference (no rescue) 
o Cost greater than MSFC reference (no vehicle reuse, expend specialized 
vehicle) 
13. COMMENTS: None 
0180-26426-2 
C13 
SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 12 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: R7, RS 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic (mixes 3, 5, 5A) 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Waste payload packaqed in conical 
entry vehicle; ejection provisions 
4. DESTINATION: Lunar surface 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 2 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: (1) STS/OTV, (2) STS/waste payload 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes __ X __ No ___ (LEO, E/E) 
S. INJECTION STAGE: OTV 
Reuse Expend X 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: N/A 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 440S 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
o Cost greater than MSFC reference (no vehicle recovery option) 
o Risk approximately equal to MSFC reference 
13. COMMENTS: Could require complex lunar surface operations (see RS) 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 13 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: R7, RB 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic (mixes 3, 5, SA) 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Waste payload to LEO in shielded 
conical entry vehicle; ejection provisions 
4. DESTINATION: 0.B6 AU clrcular heliocentric orbit 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 2 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: (1) STS/OTV/SOIS, (2) Waste payload 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes X No (LEO, E/E) 
B. INJECTION STAGE: OTV 
Reuse _X_ Expend __ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: Spin stabilized solid 
Reuse Expend X 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 440B 
11. DISPOSITION: Superseded by MSFC reference system (Case 22) 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
o Cost greater than MSFC reference (two STS launches for equivalent 
payload) 
o Risk identical to MSFC reference 
13. COMMENTS: Remains viable option for 65K STS 
0100 -26426-2 
CIS 
SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 14 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: R5 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTINATION: Solar system escape 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: HLLV 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: N/A 
8. INJECTION STAGE: Three-staqe, large, solid 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: N/A 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kq): 3270 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: Risk greater than MSFC baseline (no rescue) 
13. COMMENTS: None 
0180-26426-2 
C16 
SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 15 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: R5 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTINATION: Solar system escape 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 2 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: (1) STS/tug, (2) STS/tuq/WPS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: N/A 
8. INJECTION STAGE: Tug 
Reuse ___ X_ Expend 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: Tug 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 3270 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
o Risk greater than MSFC reference (no rescue) 
o Cost greater than MSFC reference (two launches, tug expend) 
13. COMMENTS: None 
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G17 
SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 16 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: R5 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generlc 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTINATION: Solar system escape 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: N/A 
8. INJECTION STAGE: Tug 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: 120 kW NEP 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 3270 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
o Risk greater than MSFC reference (no rescue) 
o Cost greater than MSFC reference (no vehicle recovery, expend high-
cost vehicle) 
13. COMMENTS: None 
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C18 
SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 17 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: R5 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTINATION: Solar system escape 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: N/A 
8. INJECTION STAGE: 240 kW NEP 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: 240 kW NEP 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 3270 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: Risk greater than MSFC reference (no rescue) 
13. COMMENTS: NEPS technoloqy questionable for 1992-95 IOC 
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CI9 
SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 18 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: R5 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTINATION: Solar orbit 0.86 AU, i = 20 deg 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: N/A 
8. INJECTION STAGE: Tug 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: SEPS 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 3270 
11. DISPOSITION: Superseded by Case 36 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
13. COMMENTS: None 
D180-26426-2 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 19 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: R5 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTINATION: Solar impact 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 2 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: (1) STS/tug,(2) STS/NEP/payload 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: N/A 
8. INJECTION STAGE: Tug 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: NEPS 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 3270 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
o Risk greater than MSFC reference (no rescue) 
o Cost greater than MSFC reference (expend hiqh-cost vehicle) 
13. COMMENTS: NEPS technology questionable for 1992-95 IOC 
0180-26426-2 
C21 
SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 20 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: R5 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTI NATION: Solar impact 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes X No (LEO, E/E) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: 240 kW NEP 
Reuse Expend X 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: 240 kW NEP 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 3270 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: Risk greater than MSFC reference (no rescue) 
13. COMMENTS: NEPS technology questionable for 1992-95 IOC 
DI80-26426-2 
C22 
SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 21 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B7, BI6 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Defense HLW 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Conical entry body, spherical 
waste payload 
4. DESTINATION: 0.86 AU 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 2 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: (1) STS/OTV, (2) STS/waste payload 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes X No (LEO) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: OTV 
Reuse X Expend ___ _ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: Storable SOlS 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 5500 
11. DISPOSITION: MSFC reference for STS disposal of defense HLW 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
13. COMMENTS: Also evaluated in Case 55 for (a) removal of waste payload 
system at Earth escape, and (b) solar escape destination. 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 22 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: R20 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: PW-4b 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Conical entry vehicle, spherical 
waste payload 
4. DESTINATION: Solar orbit, 0.85 AU, i = 1 deg, circular 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: lOOK STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes X No (LEO) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: OTV 
Reuse X Expend 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: Storable SOlS 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 5000 
11. DISPOSITION: MSFC reference system 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
13. COMMENTS: None 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 23 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: R20 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: PW-4b/modified PW-4b 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Conical entry vehicle, spherical 
waste payload 
4. DESTINATION: Solar orbit, 0.85 AU, i = 1 deg, circular 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: HLLV (231,000 kg payload) 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes X No 
8. INJECTION STAGE: OTV (3) 
Reuse _X_ Expend __ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: Storable SOlS (3) 
Reuse Expend _X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kq): Q500 
11. DISPOSITION: MSFC advanced concept reference 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
13. COMMENTS: None 
0100-26426-2 
C25 
(LEO, E/E) 
SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 24 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B16 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTINATION: Solar orbit, 0.86 AU, i = 1 deq, circular 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes X No (LEO, E/E) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: IUS (3-stage) 
Reus e Expend _X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: Spin stabilized SOlld 
Reuse Expend _X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 1456 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
o Risk greater than MSFC reference (no rescue option) 
o Cost much greater than MSFC reference (low payload, no vehicle recovery) 
13. COMMENTS: None 
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C26 
SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 25 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B16 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTINATION: Solar orbit 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes X No (LEO, E/E) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: Centaur 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: Storable SOlS 
Reuse Expend X 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 3158 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
o Cost greater than MSFC reference 
o Risk greater than MSFC reference (no rescue option) 
13. COMMENTS: Also evaluated for (a) solar orbit-WPS protection removed 
at Earth escape = 778 kg, and (b) solar system escape-WPS protection 
removed at LEO = 1424 kg, Earth escape = 517 kg. 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 26 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B16 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTINATION: Solar orbit at 0.86 AU 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes X No (LEO, E/E) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: IUS 
Reuse Expend _X ___ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: SEPS 
Reuse ___ X_ Expend __ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 1315 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: Cost greater than MSFC reference (low payload/ 
1 aunch ) 
13. COMMENTS: None 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 27 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B16 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTINATION: Solar orbit, 0.86 AU 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes X No (LEO, E/E) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: NEPS 
Reus e _X_ Expend __ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: NEPS 
Reus e _X_ Expend __ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kq): 10,260 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject for detailed consideration. Assess as part of 
advanced prop. effort. 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: Insufficient characterization of NEP vehicle 
13. COMMENTS: 
o Assessment of DDT&E and operational constraints are problem areas. 
o Also considered for (a) removal of protection at Earth escape and 
(b) solar system escape destination. 
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C29 
SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 28 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B16 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTINATION: Solar orbit, 0.86 AU 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 2 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: (1) STS/OTV, (2) STS/WPS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes X No (LEO, E/E) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: 58K LLOTV 
Reuse Expend X 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: 58K LLOTV 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 10,773 
11. DISPOSITION: Consider as STS launch vehicle option 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
o Potentially lower cost (no new vehicle development, larqer payload) 
o R1Sk potentially equivalent to MSFC reference 
13. COMMENTS: Also characterized for (a) removal of protection at Earth 
escape and (b) solar system escape definition. 
0180-26426-2 
C30 
SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 29 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B16 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTINATION: Solar orbit, 0.86 AU 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes X No (LEO, E/E) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: OTV 
Reuse X Expend __ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: Storable SOlS 
Reuse Expend _X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 2403 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: Cost greater than MSFC reference (low payload/ 
1 aunch) 
13. COMMENTS: Also characterized for (a) removal of protection at Earth 
escape and (b) solar system escape destination. 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 30 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B16 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTINATION: Solar orbit, 0.86 AU 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes X No (LEO, E/E) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: LLOTV 
Reuse Exoend X 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: LLOTV 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 4327 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: Cost greater than MSFC reference (low payload/ 
launch) 
13. COMMENTS: Also characterized for (a) removal of protection at Earth 
escape and (b) solar system escape destination. 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 31 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B16 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTINATION: Solar orbit, 0.86 AU 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: SDV 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes X No (LEO, E/E) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: LLOTV 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: LLOTV 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 16,241 
11. DISPOSITION: Consider as alternate space system 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: Cost potentially lower than MSFC reference 
13. COMMENTS: 
o Risk issues need investigation 
o Also characterized for (a) removal of WPS protection at Earth escape 
and (b) solar system escape destination 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 32 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B16 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTINATION: Solar orbit, 0.86 AU 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 10 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: HLLV 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes X No (E/E) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: 1207K COTV 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: 1207K COTV 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 51,981 
11. DISPOSITION: Conslder as alternate space system 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
o Cost much less than MSFC reference 
o R1Sk less than MSFC reference 
13. COMMENTS: Restricted to SPS scenario 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 33 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B22 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTINATION: Solar orbit, 0.85 AU, i = 1 deg 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: lOOK STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes X No (LEO, E/E) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: 48K LLOTV 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: 48K LLOTV 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 9145 
11. DISPOSITION: Consider as alternate space program 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: 
o Cost potentially less than MSFC reference (higher payload/launch, 
no SOlS development) 
o Risk equal to MSFC reference 
13. COMMENTS: None 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 34 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B26 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Mix 2 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Conical entry vehicle, hemispherical 
containment vessel 
4. DESTINATION: Solar orbit, 0.85 AU 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 6 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: (All) RASV* 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes X No (LEO, E/E) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: OTV 
Reuse X Expend __ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: Storable SOlS 
Reuse Expend X 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 6000 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOS ITION RATIONALE: 
o Cost greater than MSFC reference 
o SSTO out of scope as 1 aunch vehi cl e 
13. COMMENTS: * Reusable aerospace vehicle, BAC SSTO concept 
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C36 
SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 35 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: B26 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: 9.7-ft diameter, approx. 35 ft long 
4. DESTINATION: Solar orbit, 0.86 AU 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: SSTO 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes No (Unspecified) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: OTV 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: OTV 
Reuse Expend ___ X_ 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): 4173 
11. DISPOSITION: Reject 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: SSTO out of scope as launch vehicle, comparative 
costing difflcult to impossible 
13. COMMENTS: None 
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SPACE DISPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
CASE 36 DATA SHEET 
1. REFERENCES: Current study 
2. WASTE MIXES CONSIDERED: Generic 
3. WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM CONFIGURATION: Generic 
4. DESTINATION: Solar orbit, 0.85 AU, ; = 1 deq 
5. NUMBER OF BOOSTER LAUNCHES PER MISSION: 1 
6. BOOSTER CONFIGURATION: lOOK STS 
7. WASTE PAYLOAD PROTECTION REMOVED: Yes No (Unspecified) 
8. INJECTION STAGE: Aerobraked OTV 
Reuse X Expend __ 
9. PLACEMENT STAGE: Uprated SEPS space base 
Reuse X Expend 
10. WASTE PAYLOAD PER MISSION (kg): TBS est. greater then 10,000 
11. DISPOSITION: Consider as alternate space system 
12. DISPOSITION RATIONALE: Cost estimate less than MSFC reference (payload 
greater than MSFC reference, SOlS reusable) 
13. COMMENTS: Establish performance, fleet size, rescue options 
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APPENDIX D 
REFERENCE SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
(The material in thlS appendix is taken from the Battelle-
Columbus Laboratories Volume II, Technical Report on Analysis 
of Nuclear Waste Disposal in Space--Phase III, to National 
Aeronautics and Space Admlnistration Marshall Space Flight 
Center (Contract No. NAS8-32391), DPD No. 580, DR No.4, 
March 31,1980.) 
Dl 
2.3 Overall Reference M1ss1on 
The overall reference m1SS1on, descnbed 1n th1S sectlOn and devel-
oped dur1ng the course of th1S study, represents the concept for WhlCh most of 
the analyses In th1S report and 1n the NASA/MSFC documentatlon were conducted. 
Because of the many poss1ble varlatlons w1thln the space dlsposal optlon, one 
pOlnt of reference is necessary. The maJor aspects of the reference mlSSlon 
are lllustrated In F1gure 2-3. ThlS mlSSlon prof1le has been dlvlded lnto 
seven maJor actlvltles. The flrst h/o are expected to be the responslblllty 
of the Department of Energy (DOE) and the 1 ast flVe are expected to be ~IASA' s. 
These are: 
(1) Nuclear Waste Processlng and Payload Fabrlcatlon (DOE) 
(2) Nuclear Waste Ground Transport (DOE) 
(3) Payload Preparatlon at Launch Slte (NASA) 
(4) Prelaunch Actlvltles (NASA) 
(5) Uprated Space Shuttle Operat1Dns (NASA) 
(6) Upper Stage Operatlons (NASA) 
(7) Payload Monltorlng (NASA). 
ConslderatlOns of rescue and recovery systems are discussed ln Sectlons 2.4 
and 2.6. Also, see Sectlon 6.2 for a deta1led dlScusslon of rescue m1SS10n 
technology. More complete defln1tlons for lndivldual system elements are dlS-
cussed In Sectlon 2.4. The followlng paragraphs provlde the reader wlth a 
general overVlew of the reference mlSlon. 
2.3.1 Nuclear Waste Processing and Payload Fabrication (DOE) 
Typlcally, spent fuel rods from domestlc power plants would be trans-
ported to the waste processlng and payload fabrlcatlon sltes Vla conventlonal 
shlPPlng casks. USlng the Purex process, hlgh-level waste contalnlng flsslon 
products and actlnldes, lncludlng 0.1 percent plutonlum and 0.1 percent uranl-
um, would be processed from these spent fuel rods (see SectlOn 3.2.1). The 
h13h-level waste \'lOuld be formed lnto a cernet matrlx by a calclnatlOn and 
hydrogen reductlOn process (see Sectlon 3.1.2). The waste form would then be 
fabncated lnto a 5000 kg sphencal payload (see Sectlon 3.5). Wlthln a 
remote shlelded cell, the waste payload lS loaded lnto a contalner, the con-
talner lS then closed and sealed, lnspected, decontamlnated, and packaged lnto 
a fllght-welght gamma radlatlon shleld asserrbly (see Sectlon 3.4.2). DUrlng 
these operatlOns and subsequent lntenm storage at the processlng slte, the 
\Jaste payload lS cooled by an auxlllary cooling system. 
2.3.2 Nuclear Waste Ground Transport (DOE) 
The shlelded waste contalner \o'lOuld then be loaded lnto a ground 
transportatlOn ShlPl-llng cask (see Flgure 2-4). ThlS cask, WhlCh provldes 
addltlonal shleldlng, thermal, and lmpact protectlon for the \'taste contalner 
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SPHERICAL RADIATION SHIELD 
AND WASTE CONTAINER 
FIGURE 2-4. REFERENCE CONCEPT FOR NUCLEAR WASTE PAYLOAD 
SHIPPING CASK FOR TERRESTRIAL TRANSPORT 
to compl y W1 th the Nucl ear Regul atory Comnn ss lOn/Department of Transportat lOn 
regulatlOns, lS then loaded onto a spec1ally deslgned rall car for trans-
port1ny the waste contalner from the waste payload fabrlCatlOn slte to the 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Flor1da launch site. Once the cdsk reaches the 
launch Slte, It lS offloaded lnto the Nuclear Payload Preparatlon Facll1ty 
(NPPF). 
2.3.3 Payload Preparatlon at Launch Slte (NASA) 
The NPPF lS expected to prov1de 1nter1m storage capabll1ty for up to 
three sh1elded waste conta1ners, Wh1Ch affords efflc1ent preparat10n for 
launches plus capaclty for unplanned delays. Durlng storage, additlonal radl-
at10n sh1eld1ng, thennal control, momtorlng and 1nspectlOn of the Haste 
contalner would be prov1ded. 
2.3.4 Prelaunch Act1vitles (NASA) 
In ~reparatlon for launch of the nuclear waste lnto space, the 1nte-
yrated Space Shuttl e waste payload 1 s prel aunch checked 1 n the NPPF. The 
lnte~rated Shuttle payload conS1sts of: the waste fonn; the conta1ner; the 
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rad1at1on shield; the reentry vehicle (RV), Wh1Ch protects and structurally 
supports the waste in the Orbiter cargo bay (see F1gure 2-5); the Solar Orbit 
Insert10n Stage (SOlS), which c1rculanzes the waste payload 1nto the solar 
orb1t disposal destination, and the Orbit Transfer Vehicle (OTV), which pro-
v1des escape from low Earth orbit and lnsertion 1nto the hel iocentr1c transfer 
traJectory. Inteyration and checkout in the NPPF 1S typical of future ground 
flow planning at Kennedy Space Center and parallel to the current use of the 
Vert1cal Process1ng Faci11ty (VPF) by the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS). Pre-
launch checkout 1n the NPPF 1ncludes verif1cat1on of the payload and the pay-
load to Orbiter 1nterface systems. The Orb1ter 1nterface would be slmulated 
by standard1zed equ1pment. TYP1cally, storable propellant load1ng would occur 
1n the NPPF to m1n1mize the hazard of propellant 10ad1ng while the payload 1S 
1n the Shuttle cargo bay on the launch pad • 
.. AOIATION 
SHIELD 
REENTRY 
VEH'CLE 
FIGURE 2-5. REFERENCE CONCEPT OF A LOADED REENTRY VEHICLE 
Transfer of the payload to the launch pad's Rotating Serv1ce Struc-
ture (RSS), lS accompl1shed by a spec1al purpose transporter Wh1Ch ma1nta1ns 
the Shuttle payload 1n the proper poSlt10n for installat10n in the Orbiter 
cargo bay (see F1yure 2-3). The payload lS transferred fran the NPPF to the 
pad after the Shuttle veh1cle 1nstallat10n at the launch pad has been com-
pleted. The payload lS then pos1t10ned by the RSS and lnstalled 1n the 
Orb1ter cargo bay. After payload 1nstallat1on, propellant load1ng of the OTV, 
and f1nal systens checkout the decis10n to launch lS made. 
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2.3.5 Uprated Space Shuttle Operatl0ns (NASA) 
One Uprat~d Space Shuttle vehlc1e would be read1ed for launch for a 
Ylven dlsposal misslon. The to-be-constructed Pad C at KSC Launch Complex 39 
would be used for thlS mission. Pad A or B could be used to launch the 
Shuttle vehlcle that carrles the rescue DTV, should 1t be requlred. 
The Uprated Space Shuttle (45,400 ky payload to low Earth orblt), 
that is to perfonn the di sposal ml SS 10n. 1 s 1 aunched at a 108 degree south 
aZlmuth to a 300 km (160 n.ml.) ci rcul ar orbl t 1 nell ned 38 degrees to the 
equator. A small degree of yaw steering lS requlred such that early land 
overfllght of various populated land masses (West Indies and South Afrlca) is 
avoided. Once on orblt, the loaded reentry vehicle (RV) ln the Shuttle 
Orbiter cargo bay lS remotely translated aft a short d1stanc~ and structurally 
latched to the SOlS. Using the OTV payload bay rotation structure, the OTV, 
SOlS, and loaded RV are deployed from the Orbiter bay. Actual separatl0n from 
the rotation structure lS accomplished by a sprlng powered deployment syst~n. 
After the OTV, SOlS, and loaded RV conf1 gurat 10n has been stabl11Zed 1 n a 
flxed attltude, the Orblter wl11 move to a safe distanc~ away to 11mlt the 
radlation dose to the crew from the unshlelded payload. At th1S tlme, the 
waste payload would be mechanlcally transferred by remote control to the SOlS 
payload adapter, and the OTV/SOIS/waste payload is orlented for the Earth 
escape propulslve burn. The reentry vehicle would remaln in orbit and be 
recovered and returned to KSC by the Shuttle Orblter. 
The traffl c model for the reference space d 1 sposa 1 concept 1 S 9i ven 
below ln Table 1. 
TABLE 1. PROJECTED UPRATED SPACE SHUTTLE TRAFFIC MODEL FOR 
COMMERCIAL HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL 
MISSIONS (1992-2003) 
Uprated Space 
Shuttle Fl1ghts 
Year 
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 Total 
10 20 50 50 50 50 50 60 60 60 60 60 580 
2.3.6 Upper Stage Operations (NASA) 
After the OTV/SOIS/waste payload system has passed final systems 
checkouts, the OTV propulsive burn would place the SOlS and 1tS attached waste 
payload on the proper Earth escape trajectory. Control of the propulslve burn 
from low Earth orbit would be from the aft deck payload control station on the 
Orblter. with backup prov1ded by a ground control station. After the burn is 
complete, the SOlS/waste payload is then released. In about 160 days the 
payload and the storable llqu1d propellant SOlS would travel to its per1helion 
at 0.85 A.U. about the Sun. [One astronomical unit (A.U.) is equal to the 
average dl stance from the Earth to the Sun.] The SOlS would then pl ace the 
payload In lts flnal space dlsposal dest1natlon by reauClng the aphellOn from 
1.0 to 0.85 A.U. To ald 1n obta1nlng the deslred orbltal llfetlmes, thlS 
orblt would be lncllned to the ecliptlc plane by 1 degree. The recovery burns 
of the OTV would use the remalnlnY OTV propellant to rendezvous wlth the 
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Shuttl e Orbi ter for its subsequent recovery, refurbi strnent, and reuse on a 
later mission. The reference OTV/SOIS misslOn profile is shown in Figure 2-6. 
EARTH ORBIT 
""<1"RE ~ 
EARTH 
DISPOSAl ORBIT 
0.85 A.U. CIRCULAR. 
1 DEGREE INCLINATION 
HELIOCENTRIC 
TRANSFER TRAJECTORY 
1-2 Uprated Space Shuttle (45,400 kg payload) ascent from Earth to a 300 km 
circular orbIt with a 38° Inclination 
2-3 PrIme OTV burn of approximately 10 r.lin for escape from low-Earth orbit on 
elllptlc solar orbit transfer trajectory with perigee of 0.85 A.U. and 1° 
incllnation to the ecllptic. The ~V for thlS maneuver is 3350 m/sec. 
3 OTV separatlOn from the SOlS/nuclear waste payload and retro burn to an 
elliptic Earth orbit. The ~V for this maneuver is 640 m/sec. The OTV 
lifetime for return to the Orbiter IS approximately 50 hours. The apogee 
for this orbit is 61,000 km. 
4 OTV clrcularlzation into the 300 km, 38° Inclination recovery orbit. The 
~V is 2770 m/sec. 
5 SOlS and payload clrcular1zatlon lnto 0.85 A.U., 1° lnclinatlon to the 
eclipt1c, solar orbIt. The ~V 1S 1160 m/sec. 
FIGURE 2-6. REFERENCE OTV/SOIS MISSION PROFILE 
2.3.7 Payload Mon1toring (NASA) 
The Earth escape traJectory of the SOlS/waste payload would be 
monl tared by ground-based radar systems dnd tel emetry from the SOlS and OTV. 
The f1nal d1sp05al orb1t ach1eved would be mon1tored by NASAls Deep Space 
Network. Once the proper dlsposal orb1t has been ver1f1ed, no addlt10nal 
mon1tor1ng 15 necessary. However, monltor1ng could be re-establlshed In the 
future, 1f.requlred. 
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2.4 Reference System Element Def1n1t1ons 
The def1nltlOns for reference m1SS1on system elements are descrlbed 
below. These def1n1tlOns have been used 1n almost all cases for the work 
documented 1n th1S report. Twelve major system elements 1dent1f1ed for th1S 
def1n1tl0n document are: 
(1) Waste Source 
(2) Waste M1X 
(3) Waste Form 
(4) Waste Process1ng and Fabr1cat1on Fac1l1t1es 
(5) Payload Conta1ner, Sh1eld1ng, and Reentry Veh1cle 
(6) Ground Transport Vehlcles and Casks 
(7) Launch Slte Facllltles 
(8) Uprated Space Shuttle Veh1cle 
(9) Upper Stages 
(10) Payload EJectlon Syste~ 
(11) Oocklng System 
(12) Space Oest1nat1on. 
Oefln1tlOns for the reference mlSSlon system elements follow. 
2.4.1 Waste Source 
The prlmary waste source would be nucl ear waste generated by the 
operatlOn of commerclal nuclear pO\,/er plants (see Sectlon 3.2.1). Table 2-1 
prov1des the Inost real1stlc proJectlons of ~aste generatlOn (assumlng 200 GWe 
by the year 2000) found In the llterature.\2-14) By assumlng that the waste 
must be at least 10 years old before lt can be dlsposed of In space, and that 
reprocesSlng capacltles should be able to process the waste according to the 
proposed schedule, the annual amount of waste avallable for d1sposal lS glven. 
ProJectlOns of the mass avallable for space d1sposal are also glVen as a 
funct10n of year. The mass of waste ava1lable annually for space d1sposal, 1n 
cermet form, would lncrease to 310 metr1c tons (MT) by the year 2000. 
2.4.2 Waste M1X 
waste generated uSlng the Purex process (f1ss1on products, act1n1des 
1ncludln~ approxlmately 0.1 percent Pu, and 0.1 percent U) is conSldered to be 
the reference waste mlX composltlOn. The SpeC1 flC reference waste used for 
the 1979-1980 Space Optlon study actlvity was deflned as the Battell~ 
Northwest Laboratory P\~-4b waste m1X (see SectlOn 3.2.1 for detalls).l2-15) 
The elemental deflnltlOn of th1S waste 1S ~lVen In Table 2-2, lSOtOP1C 
deflnlt10n 1S y1ven 1n Sectlon 3.2.1. 
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Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
TABLE 2-1. PROJECTED NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION REPROCESSING 
CAPACITY AND COMMERCIAL HIGH-LEVEL WASTE 
AVAILABLE FOR SPACE DISPOSAL 
Annual Nuclear Annual H1gh-Level Purex 
Cumulat1ve Waste Ava 11 ab 1 e Waste in Cermet Form 
Power, ~laste , for 01 sposal , Ava 11 ab 1 e for Space 
GWe MTHM MTHr1j yr Dlsposal, ~T/yr 
61. 9 5890(c) 0 0 
74.8 7690 0 0 
87.3 9790 0 0 
101.1 12,220 0 0 
115.4 14,990 0 0 
131.4 18,140 0 0 
144.3 21,600 0 0 
157.1 25,370 0 0 
164.9 29,330 0 0 
174.0 33,510 0 0 
180.9 37,850 5890 (c) 410 
186.5 42,330 1800 125 
188.9 46,860 2100 146 
190.1 51,420 2430 169 
192.5 56,040 2770 193 
194.0 60,700 3150 219 
195.0 65,380 3460 241 
196.0 70,080 3500 244 
197.0 74,810 3960 275 
198.0 79,560 4180 290 
199.0 84,340 4340 301 
200.0 89,140 4480 310 
(a) From" Yates, K. R., and Park, U. Y., "ProJect1ons of Commerc1al Nuclear 
Capaclty and Spent-Fuel Accumulat10n 1n the Un1ted States", Fuel 
Reprocesslng, pp. 350-352 (June 1979). 
(b) '''THr~ 1 s metrlC tons heavy metal. 
(c) Includes 4400 ~THM PW-4b eX1stlng as of 1978. 
(d) Assumes 40.8 kg/MT waste for space dlsposal and a cermet \'/aste form 
load1ng of 58.7 percent. 
(e) Computed by mu1tlplYlng 5890 MTHM by 0.0408 ~1T/MTHM and dlvld1ng by 
0.587. 
D9 
TABLE 2-2. REFERENCE WASTE MIX COMPOSITION 
FOR SPACE DISPOSAL (BNWL PW-4b) 
I nerts 
Flss10n 
Products 
Const Huent 
Na20 
Fe203 
Cr203 
Nl0 
P205 
Gd203 
Rb20 
SrO 
Y203 
Zr02 
Mo03 
TC207 
Ru02 
Rh203 
PdO 
Ana 
CdO 
Source: Reference 2-15. 
2.4.3 Waste Form 
Amount, 
kg/MTHM 
1.511 
0.345 
0.141 
0.672 
0.354 
1.059 
0.598 
4.944 
5.176 
1.L91 
2.972 
0.480 
1.483 
0.088 
0.097 
Const Huent 
Flssl0n Te02 
Products CS20 
{Coned.) BaO 
La203 
Ce02 
Pr6011 
Nd203 
Prnz 03 
Sm203 
EU203 
Gd203 
Act 1 mdes U308 
Np02 
Pu02 
Am203 
Cm203 
TOTAL 
Amount, 
kg/MTHM 
0.725 
2.880 
1.567 
1.480 
3.323 
1.482 
4.522 
0.123 
0.924 
0.200 
0.137 
1.169 
0.865 
0.010 
0.181 
0.040 
40.8 
The reference waste fonn for space disposal lS the ORNL lron/nlckel-
based cermet. It has been chosen over may other waste forms (see Sectlon 
3.1.1). A cennet lS a dlsperslon of ceramlC partlcles In a cont1nuous metal-
llC phase. The reference cermet lS formed by a process 1nvolv1ng dlSSolut1on 
and preclp1tat1on from molten urea followed by calC1nat1on and hydrogen reduc-
t10n to produce a contlnuous metalllc phase (see Sect10n 3.1.2). Nonhydrogen 
reduclble oX1des form the ceramlC portlOn of the ceram1c/metal matr1x waste 
fonn. Th1S waste fOnll has been shown to have super10r propert1es as compared 
to other potent1al waste fonns for space d1sposal. The 1ron/n1ckel-based cer-
met has hlyh waste loadlng (58.7 percent), a relatlVely h1yh thermal conduc-
tlVlty (14 Watts/m-C at 300 C), a hlgh denslty (6.7 g/cc), a good speclf1c 
heat (0.583 kJ/kg-C), and a hlgh structural lntegrlty. 
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2.4.4 Waste Processing and Payload Fabrication Fac1lit1es 
The waste processing and payload fabricatlOn fac1lit1es are assumed 
to be collocated. The r~ference waste m1X requires a waste procesSlng fdcili-
ty utlllZln~ the Purex process. After separat10n and generatlon of the aque-
ous waste stream, approx1mately 5 years of storage would occur before further 
JJrocess1ny. The waste would then be put 1nto ltS final cenllet waste foml. 
The waste payload fabncatlOn fac1llt1es would prov1de a senes of 
1nterconnected, sh1elded cells for loadlny the waste fonn 1nto conta1ners, 
clos1ng, seallny, 1nspect1n~, decontamlnat1ng contalners, and ult1mate lnser-
tlOn 1nto the fl1yht-weight radlatlon sh1eld assembly. Each cell would have 
prov1sions to connect the waste conta1ner to an aux111ary coo11ng system. 
Each fac1llty would prov1de 1nterlm storage for a nUlilber of shle1ded waste 
packages and equ1pment/systerns for cask handl1ng and ra1l car load1ng. 
2.4.5 Payload Conta1ner, Shield1ng, and Reentry Vehicle Systems 
The pnmary conta1nment for the rad10actlVe waste lS a std1nless 
steel sphencal contalner (1.27 cm th1ck -- see Flgure 2-5). Th1S conta1ner 
must prov1de h1gh 1ntegrlty conta1nment for the waste dunng the varlOUS de-
flned mechan1cal and thermal loads to Wh1Ch the total payload 1S subjected In 
ant1c1pated normal and acc1dent condlt10ns. These loads would be mlt1gated In 
varywg degrees by the waste form 1tse1f, the gamma radlatfon shleld assem-
bly, by the shlpp1ng cask Wh1Ch provldes addit10nal yamma rad1atlon sh1e1d1ng 
for ~round transportatlon, and by the reentry veh1cle (RV) system durlng the 
prelaunch and boost phase of the dlsposal mlSSlon. The conta1ner would be 
des1yned to d1ss1pate the heat generated w1th1n the waste fonn by passlve 
C0011 ny to the space enVl ronment durlng the orbl tal operat lOns. Our1 ng any 
nonna1 operat10n, the maX1mum temperature of the waste fonn should not exceed 
the nonna1 11m1tlng temperature of 1200 C. Ourlng launch and on orblt while 
the waste 1S 1n the RV, the temperature lS to be controlled wlth ass1stance of 
varlOUS auxll1ary coo11ng systems located on the Shuttle Orblter and the RV. 
If dcc1dents occur, the temperature of the waste and conta1ner mater1al may 
exceed the normal llm1t but must not exceed that which would cause loss of 
contd1nment. 
The conta1ner would be housed In d fl1ght-we1yht rad1dtlon shleld 
assef'lb1y for the perlOd prlOr to 1eavwg the waste fabrlcatlOn fac1l1ty unt11 
attached to the OTV 1n Earth orb1t. Th1S fl1ght-welyht shleld1ng would be 
des1gned to llmlt the radldt10n level to 2 rem/hr at 1 meter from 1ts surface 
(see Sect10n 2.5.2.4). Add1tlOna1 sh1eld1ng would need to be prov1ded by 
temporary sh1e1dlng at the NPPF and RSS, and poss1b1y a shadow shleld 1n the 
Shuttle Orb1ter for the crew (see Sectlon 2.5.1.1). The spherlcal radlatlOn 
sh1eld would be of depleted uranlum sandwlched between two layers of sta1nless 
steel. 
The radlatlon shl~lded waste conta1ner would be enclosed 1n a protec-
t1ve reentry and 1mpdct sh1eld prlor to launch and dur1ng the boost phase (see 
F1~ure 2-7). ThiS system would be des1yned to rn1nll.11Ze the probabllity Jf 
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FIGURE 2-7. REFERENCE REENTRY VEHICLE CONFIGURATION AND 
NOSE CROSS SECTION 
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contalrunent breach as a result of acc1dents or malfunct10ns Wh1Ch could occur 
durlny the ~relaunch, launch, suborbital, orb1tal, or unplanned reentry phases 
of the m1SS10n. The protect10n sh1eld would conslst of an outer layer of car-
bon/carbon thermal protection and MIN-K insulat10n and a 61 cm thlck steel 
honeycomb lInpact structure (at the nose p01nt). The thermal protectlOn 1S 
completely around the payload, whereas, the impact structure covers only the 
nose of the RV. The waste payload/reentry veh1cle/SOIS/OTV conflguratlon, as 
pos1t1oned 1n the Shuttle Orb1ter, is shown 1n Figure 2-8. 
FIGURE 2-8. LOCATION OF PAYLOAD/RV/SOIS/OTV CONFIGURATION 
IN SHUTTLE ORBITER CARGO BAY 
2.4.6 Ground Transport Veh1cles and Casks 
For transport from the \'Iaste fabrlcatlOn facll1ty to the launch slte, 
the waste conta1ners and assoclated flight-welght shleldlng would be housed 1n 
a shlpping cask afford1ng add1t10nal sh1eld1ng, thermal and 1mpact protect1on 
to meet the Nuclear Regulatory Commlsslon/Department of Transportatlon 
regulatlOns.(2-16) The cask (see Figure 2-4) lS expected to be llcensed by 
the Nuclear Reyulatory Cornmlss10n. The cask would be transported from the 
payload fabr1cat10n facllltles to the KSC launch slte on a speclal1y deslgned 
rall car that adequately supports and d1strlbutes the welyht of the cask and 
pro'lldes acceptable tle downs. In addltlon. the rall car would carry an aux11-
lary co011ng system to rel1ably cool the waste package. 
2.4.7 Launch Slte Facl11tles 
The reference launch slte for launchlng nuclear waste payloads durlny 
the early phase of the program (early-1990' s) would be Launch Complex 39 at 
Kennedy Space Center F1orlda. New facll1ty constructlOn and equ1pment 
expected durlng th1S perlod 1S noted below • 
• A secure, sealed, envlronmentally controlled, Nuclear Payload 
Preparatlon Facll lty (NPPF) to store, cool, monltor, assemble, and 
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ch~ckout the waste payload systems from the t1me the sh1elded 
nuclear waste container arr1ves at KSC unt11 the t1me the loaded 
payload reentry veh1cle is moved to the launch pad. 
• A dedicated, special-purpos~ transporter to move the nuclear waste 
payload from the NPPF to the Rotating Serv1ce Structure (RSS) at 
the launch pad. Th1S 1ncludes constructlon of a roadway or tracks 
for the transporter to use. 
The other currently planned Shuttle and upper stage launch facll1t1es 
mayor may not b~ adequate to support the additlonal Shuttle launches requ1red 
by a hlgh launch rate (60 per year) nuclear waste dlsposal program. Further 
analysl s of the nucl ear waste dl sposal traffic model coupl ed Wl th the Space 
Shuttl e trafflc model and current turnaround time 11 nes is needed. It 1 S ex-
pected that add1tional facllit1es would 11kely be needed at the h1gher launch 
rates. Fac11ities envis10ned are: 
• A d~d1cated Space Shuttle launch pad (Pad C) for launching nuclear 
waste payloads. The waste payload would be 1nstalled in the 
Shuttle Orb1ter at the pad. A spec1ally deslyned RSS 1S requ1red 
for th1S m1SS1on. 
• A thlrd Moblle Launch Platfonn (MLP) for transport1ng built-up 
Shuttles from the Veh1cle Assembly SU11d1ng (VAS) to the launch 
pads is requ1red. 
• A th1rd firlng room 1n the Launch Control Center (LCC) would have 
to be act 1 vated to handl e the 1 ncreased number of Space Shuttl e 
fl1ghts dedlcated to the nuclear waste dlsposal program. ThlS 
flring room would be used excluslVely for the waste disposal 
m1SS10ns. 
2.4.8 Uprated Space Shuttle Vehlcle 
Duriny the early years of a space d1sposal program, the Uprated Space 
Shuttle (45,400 ky payload to low Earth orbit--see F1gure 2-9) would represent 
an 1deal veh1cle to carry out the boost phase of the space transport. The 
Nat10nal A~ronaut1cs and Space Administrat10n 1S now managing the development 
of the Space Shuttle (to be operat1onal at Kennedy Space Center 1n 1981), a 
new class of space booster that is a highly reliable, reusable, low-cost veh1-
cle that can transport payloads to low Earth orbit and back. It 1S ant1ci-
pated that the Space Shuttle veh1cle expected to fly space missions wlll be 
uprated around 1990. Th1S uprat1ng involves the use of a higher perfonnance 
and enVl ronmentally cl eaner 11 quid Rocket Booster (LRB) as a repl acernent for 
the SOlld Rocket Booster (SRB). 
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FIGURE 2-9. UPRATED SPACE SHUTTLE VEHICLE 
The Uprated Space Shuttle consists of a. piloted reusable orbiting 
vehicle (the Or-biter) mounted on an expendable External Tank (ET) containing 
hydrogen/oxygen propellants and two recoverable and reusable Liquid Rocket 
Boosters (LRB's). The propellants for the LRB's are RP-1 (kerosene) andliq-
uid oxygen (LOX), having an oxidizer to fuel ratio of 2.9. The Orbiter will 
have three main hydrogen/oxygen liquid rocket engines and a cargo bay 18.29 m 
lony and 4.57 m in diameter. At launch, both the LRB's and the Orbiter's 
three liquid rocket engines would burn siwultaneously. After about 140 
seconds and after the Space Shuttle vehicle attains an altitude of about 45 km 
(28 miles), the LI~B'S would be separated and subsequently recovered from the 
Atlantic Ocean. The ET is jettisoned before the Orbiter goes into orbit. The 
Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) is then propels the Orbiter into the desired 
Earth orbi t. The Orbiter with its crew and payload (wei ghi ng up to 45,400 kg) 
would remain in orbit to carry out its mission, normally from 1 to 7 days, 
but, when required~ as long as 30 days. When the mission is completed, the 
Orbiter would t)e deorbited and piloted back to the launch site for an unpow-
ered lanuing on a runway. The Orbiter and LRBis would subsequently be refur-
bished and reflown on other space missions. References 2-17, 2-18, and 2-19 
provide additional information about the standard Space Shuttle and its capa-
b i 1 it i es. Reference 2-20 prov ides data on l.RB I S for the Uprated Space 
Shuttl e. Tab] e 2-3 provides a reference mass summary for the Uprated Space 
Shuttle Vehicle. 
Small changes to the Space Shuttle system may be required to provide 
a safer and more reliable launch vehicle. These modifications have not yet 
been i dent ifi ed. 
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TABLE 2-3. MASS SUMMARY FOR UPRATEO SPACE SHUTTLE VEHICLE 
Vehlcle 
Component/Element 
Orblter 
Dry (Less Englnes) 
Englnes 
Personnel and Equlpment 
Residuals and Reserves 
Total Inert 
OMS/Res Pro~ellants 
Total at Llftoff 
External Tank (ET) 
Dry 
Residuals and Reserves 
Total Inert 
Usable Propellants (LOX/LH2) 
Total at Llftoff 
Llquid Rocket Boosters (Both) 
Dry 
Reslduals 
Total Inert 
Usable Propellants (LOX/RP-1) 
Total at Llftoff 
Payload 
Total Vehlcle at Llftoff 
Source: Reference 2-20. 
Mass, kg Wel ght, 1 b 
63,875 140,821 
9,063 19,980 
1,197 2,640 
4,212 9 2285 
78,347 172,726 
12,322 27 2166 
90,669 199,892 
32,757 72 ,217 
4,276 9 2428 
37,034 81,645 
711,196 1 1 567 1918 
748,230 1,649,563 
126,269 278,376 
4 1853 10 2700 
131,122 289,U76 
12080 2480 2 1 382 2050 
1,211,602 2,671,126 
45 2360 100 2000 
2,095,861 4,620,581 
-----~-----------------
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2.4.9 Upper Stages 
Two dlfferent upper stages have been deflned for use for the nuclear 
waste dlsposal m1SS10n: (1) an Orb1t Transfer Vehicle (OTV), and (2) a stor-
able propellant Solar Orbit Insert10n Stage (5015). The OTV lS a completely 
reusable and recoverable stage; the SOlS lS expendable. Orbital rescue capa-
b1l1ty would be performed by the OTV and SOlS systems. 
The OTV lS defined as a reusable LOX/LH2 chern1cal propulsl0n stage 
sl1011ar to the cryogenlc OTV def1ned 1n the past few years for poss1ble devel-
opment and use w1th the Space Shuttle. Th1S vehlcle would have separate pro-
pellant tanks, an oxidizer/fuel (O/F) mixture rat10 of 6 and a del1vered spe-
c1flc impulse (Isp) of 470 seconds. It would also have an advanced, redun-
dant, aV10n1CS and attitude control system. F1gure 2-10 1S a p1ctoral of the 
OTV. 
SOl.A.R CEl.l.S 
S TCIUOlE 5 TACt: (501 SI 
RE.JSAOLE CRYOCENIC STACE 10TVI 
r- ACS 
,1-00---- 8.53. -----------i 
------ 11.80 m--------------; 
FIGURE 2-10. REFERENCE OTV/SOIS/WASTE PAYLOAD CONFIGURATION 
The storable-propellant, pressure-fed SOlS would be slzed to prov1de 
a spec1flc lmpulse of 289 sec. The NASA/MSFC scallng relat10n for the SOlS is 
glVen below: 
MS.O. = 810 + 0.0522 Mp 
where MS.O. and Mp are the SOlS stage burnout mass (kg) and propellant 
loadlng mass (kg), respectlVely. The propellant loadlng lncludes a 15 percent 
fllght reserve. Th1 s sta,::)e would have three off-the-shel f (Space Shuttl e-
ReactlOn Control System) prt;!ssure-fed englnes at a thrust level of 3370 N (370 
lb) each, monornethylhydrazlne/nltrogen tetroxlde (MMH/NTO) propellants, a 
gUldance and control system, and a payload docklng adapter system cOiOpatlble 
wlth the do:kln~ system. The std~e would be deslyned to adequately wlthstand 
017 
the adverse nuclear radiat10n, and space enV1ronments exper1enced wh1le 
coast1ng 1bO days before f1r1ny. 
The rescue vehicle would be a Shuttle launched OTV/SOIS system. It 
would include appropriate prov1sions for target1ng and dock1ng w1th the 
nuclear waste conta1ner attached to an OTV/SOIS, the nuclear waste conta1ner 
attached to an SOlS only, a payload reentry veh1cle assembly, or an un-
sh1elded, separated waste conta1ner. It would be reusable or expendable 
depend1ng upon'the rescue mission. Th1S veh1c1e would be requ1red to have an 
on-orblt stay t1me of at least 300 hours w1th llttle reductlon expected 1n 
re1 labl1 lty or performance. The rescue veh1c1e may be returned to Earth by 
the Shuttle Orbiter at the end of the cycle for refurb1srunent, lf recoverable. 
Defln1t10n of other rescue requirements are expected as stud1es progress. 
2.4.10 Payload Ejection System 
A payload eJect10n system would be fncorporated 1nto the pallet which 
supports the reentry veh1c1e (see Figure 2-8). This system would employ 16 
small SOlld propellant rocket motors Wh1Ch would be ign1ted to eject the 
loaded reentry vehicle from the Orbiter cargo bay 1n the event of a ser10US 
on-pad or ascent failure. The reentry vehicle would be des1gned to w1thstand 
the expected sea or yround 1mpact enV1 ronlnent. 
2.4.11 Payload Docking and Transfer System 
The payload dock1ng and transfer system would be launched lnto orbit 
attached to the reentry vehlcle. The docking/transfer system would be used to 
transfer the waste payload conta1ner fran the reentry vehicle to the SOlS 
payload adapter. The payload adapter would be designed to Jett1son the nucle-
ar payload dur1ng the very low probab1lity occurrence of a grossly 1naccurate 
OTV propuls1ve burn. Th1S actlOn would prevent poss1ble reentry and allow 
subsequent recovery by a Shuttle or OTV rescue veh1cle. 
2.4.12 Space Dest1nat10n 
The reference space destination for the nuclear waste d1sposal mis-
Slon 1S an orbltal reg10n between the orbits of the Earth and Venus. The 
nom1nal c1rcular orb1t is defined as 0.85 + 0.01 A.U. The orb1tal incl1nat10n 
about the Sun 1S spec1fied as 1 degree from the ecllptlc plane. 
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APPENDIX E 
SYSTEM SAFETY DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR THE REFERENCE SYSTEM 
(The material in this appendix is taken from the Battelle-
Columbus Laboratories Volume II, Technical Report on Analysis 
of Nuclear Waste Disposal in Space--Phase III, to the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration Marshall Space Flight 
Center (Contract No. NAS8-32391), DPD No. 580, DR No.4, 
March 31, 1980.) 
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2.5 System Safety Design Requirements for Reference Concept 
Thi s sect ion defi nes system safety des 19n requirements for the 
reference nuclear waste disposal 1n space m1ssion (also see Sectlon 3.3 and 
Appendix C). These requirenents provide the gU1delines aga1nst WhlCh nuclear 
waste payloads may be considered acceptable frOin a radl010g1cal safety pOint 
of view. These requirements should be used for future studles, and mod1fled 
as changes In the concept occur. 
The general safety deslyn obJectlves for the nuclear waste payload 
and/or its assoclated system components are: (1) to contaln the SOlld radl0-
active waste materlals and (2) to limlt the exposure of humans and the envi-
rorment to the radioactlVe waste matena1s. For normal operatlons, complete 
conta1nment and minlmum exposure are required; for potentlal accldent sltua-
tl0ns, the degree of containment and degree of interaction shall result In an 
acceptable r1sk to humans and the environment. 
The followlng subsections descr1be the general and spec1flc system 
des1gn requ1rements for the nuclear waste d1sposa1 1n space miss10n. 
2.5.1 General System Safety Design Requirements 
The general systern safety deslgn requirements for the nuclear waste 
disposal In space mlSSlon 1nvolve cons1dering of the following: 
(1) Rad1at1on Exposure 
(2) Conta1nment 
(3) Acc1dent EnV1rOnnlents 
(4) Crltica11ty 
(5) Postacc1dent Recovery 
(6) Mon1toring Systems. 
The follow1ny paragraphs define the requ1rements that should be followed for 
the reference system concept des1gn act1v1ty. 
2.5.1.1 Rad1ation Exposure 
Rad1at1on exposure llm1ts for normal operatlons for the pub11C and 
ground crews w11l be those conta1ned in ERDA-MC-OS24 and shown 1n Table 2-4. 
Rad1at10n exposure 111nlts for Space Shuttle crew members dur1ng normal opera-
t10ns w111 be those conta1ned 1n the Space Shuttle Fl1ght and Ground Spec1f1-
catlon, JSC 07700, Volume X, Rev1S10n A, Chapter 7.4 and shown 1n Table 2-5. 
The nonnal rad1atlOn exposure 11mlts for the current terrestrlal 
transportat10n of nuclear waste mater1als would also apply to yround 
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TABLE 2-4. NORMAL OPERATIONS EXPOSURE LIMITS FOR INDIVIDUALS 
IN CONTROLLED AND UNCONTROLLED AREAS 
INDIVIDUALS IN CONTROLLED AREAS: 
Type of Exposure 
Whole body, head and trunk, 
gonads. lens of the eyeb, red 
bone marrow, active blood 
fonning organs. 
Unllmlted areas of the s~ln 
(except hands and forearms). 
Other organs, t'ssues, and 
organ systems (except bone). 
Bone. 
Foreanns.d 
Handsd and feet. 
Dose Equivalent (Dose or 
Exposure Period Dose Comml tmenta , rem) 
Year 5c 
Cal endar Quarter 3 
Year 15 
Calendar Quarter 5 
Year 30 
Calendar Quarter 10 
Year 30 
Calendar Quarter 10 
Year 75 
Calendar Quarter 25 
INDIVIDUALS IN UNCONTROLLED AREAS: 
Annual Dose EqulValent or Dose Comml tment (relll)e 
Type of 
Exposure 
Whole body, gonads, 
or bone marrow 
Other organs 
Based on dose to lndividuals 
at polnts of 
maXlmum probable exposure 
0.5 
1.5 
Based on an a~erage dose 
to a sUltable sample of 
exposed populatl0n 
0.17 
0.5 
(a) To meet the above dose c~mltment standards. operatlons must be conducted 
1n such a manner that lt ~/ould be unllkely that an indlvldual would 
asslmllate ln a crltlcal organ. by lnhalatlon, lngestlon, or absorptlon, 
a quantity of a radl0nucllde(s) that would commlt the indivldual to an 
organ dose which exceeds the llmlts speclfied ln the above table. 
(b) A beta exposure below an average energy of 700 Kev wlll not penetrate the 
lens of the eye. therefore, the applIcable limIt for these energles would 
be that for the skl n (15 ,'em/year). 
(c) In speCial cases Wl th the approva 1 of the Director, DiYl Slon of Opera-
tional Safety, a worker may exceed 5 rem/year provided hlS average 
exposure per year Slnce age 18 wIll not exceed 5 rem per year. 
(d) All reasonable efforts shall be made to keep exposures of forearms and 
hands to the general 1 Iron t foro the skI n. 
(e) In keepIng wlth ERDA pollcJ on lowest practlcable exposure. exposures to 
the publlc shall be lln.lted to as small a fractlon of the respectlYe 
annual dose 1 ltnltS as is practlcabl e. 
Source: See Section 4.5. Reference 4-7. 
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TABLE 2-5. RADIATION EXPOSURE LIMITS FOR SPACE SHUTTLE FLIGHT CREws(a) 
Constraints, Bone Marrow, Skin, Eye, 
Testes(c) rem 5 cm 0.1 mm 3 mm 
1 year average daily rate 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.1 
30-day maximum 25 75 37 13 
Quarterly maximum(b) 35 105 52 18 
Yearly maximum 75 225 112 38 
Career 1 imi t 400 1200 600 200 
Notes: 
(a) These exposure limits and exposure rate constraints apply to all sources 
of radiation exposure. In making trade-offs between man-made and natural 
sources of radiation, adequate allowance must be made for the contingency 
of unexpected exposure. These data are from Space Shuttl e Fl ight and 
Ground SpeCification, JSC 07700, Volume X, Revision A, Chapter 7.4. 
(b) May be allowed for two consecutive quarters followed by six months of 
restriction from further exposure to maintain yearly limlt. 
(c) These dose and dose rate limits are applicable only where the possibillty 
of oligospermia and temporary_ infertility are to be avoided. For most 
manned space f1 ights, the allowable exposure accumulation to the Germinal 
Epithelium (3 cm) will be the subject of a risk/gain decision for partlc-
ular program, mission, and individuals concerned. 
transportation of nuclear waste payloads. 
173.393) are given as: 
The radiation limits (49CFR 
• 1 m from external container surface ••• 1000 mrem/hour 
• External surface of transport vehicle ••• 200 mrem/hour 
• 2m from external surface of transport vehicle ••• 10mrem/hour 
• Normally occupled positl0n of transport vehlcle ••• 2mrem/hour. 
For accident conditl0ns of terrestrlal transport, dose rates are limited to 
1000 mrem/hour at 1 meter from the external surface of the waste package. For 
launch/reentry accidents, higher dose llmits are expected because of the 
anticipated lower probab111ty for these accidents. 
2.5.1.2 Conta1nment 
The contalnment requlrements (also see Sectlon 3.3) are d1fferent for 
the varlOUS port 10ns of the dl sposal m1 SSlon. For the current reference 
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m1SS1on, four different types of containment conf1gurations are used: (1) 
shipP1ng cask/aux1liary shielding/flight-we1ght radiation sh1eld/container/ 
waste, (2) auxiliary shielding/flight-weight radiation shield/container/waste, 
(3) reentry shield/impact sh1eld/flight-weight radiation shield/container/ 
waste, and (4) container/waste. For all normal operations, the systems will 
be des i gned such that no release of radi oact i ve materi a 1 occurs. Confi gura-
tion (1) must survive probable shipping accidents without major release. Con-
figuration (2) must survive probable handling accidents without major contain-
ment breach. Conf1guration (3) must survive all handling, on-pad, booster 
ascent to orbit, and reentry acc1dents wlthout major contalnment breach. Con-
f1guration (4) must be designed to surV1ve the two postulated reentry condi-
tions (see Section 2.5.1.3.4) with only mimmal release possible. The acci-
dent environments for Wh1Ch the deslgns of these generic conf1guratlons must 
survive are given below. 
2.5.1.3 Accident Environments 
The accldent environments that need to be considered in the design of 
containment and other auxiliary systems are as follows: 
• 'Sh1pping accident 
• Ground handling accident in NPPF 
• On-paa or near-pad Uprated Space Shuttle vehicle failure 
• Reentry accidents. 
2.5.1.3.1 Shipping Accident Environments (for Configuration 1) 
DOT and NRC regulations, as defined in 49 CFR 170 to 179 and 10 CFR 
71, will be assumed for the ground shipment of nuclear waste payloads from the 
waste payload fabrication facility to the launch site. The following 
sequential test env1ronments for shipping cask accidents are given below. 
In1tial condltions are to be assumed the same as the normal condition. 
• A 9-m drop in worst or1entation onto an unY1elding surface 
• A I-m drop in the worst orientation onto the end of 15-cm-
d1ameter, 20-cm-h1gh bar (mild steel) 
• A 30-min. ground flre at 800 C followed by 3 hours of no 
artlflcial cooling; wlth a cask emissivity of 0.9 and cask 
absorbtlvlty of 0.8 
• An 8-hour e~erSlon 1n 0.9 m of water. 
At the end of thlS test, surface radlatlon of the shipping cask should not 
exceed 1 rem/hour at 1 m from the surface, the contents must rema1n 
subcrit1cal, and only mlnute radloactlve material releases are allowed (see 10 
CFR 71). 
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2.5.1.3.2 Handling in NPPF (for Configuratlon 2) 
The payload systems, auxillary support equlpment and facll1t1es must 
be des1gned to m1nimlZe the occupat1onal radiat10n exposure to \'lOrkers (see 
Table 2-4). Care must also be taken to 1nsure that lf certaln subsystem 
fa1lures occur during handing in the NPPF. radiat10n exposure and contamina-
tion is kept to as low as reasonably achievable. The hanrJl1ng area in the 
NPPF w1ll be deslgned to be a total containment vessel. 
2.5.1.3.3 On- or Near-Pad or Ascent Booster 
Accident (for Configurat10n 3) 
The payload package must be deslgned to w1thstand the follow1ng nom1-
nal accident enVlronments (developed in SectlOn 4.2) ln seguence without a 
~aJor breach of primary containment. Initlal condltlons are assumed to be the 
normal cond1t10n. 
• A blast slde-on overjJressure of 250 N/cm2, a reflected over-
~r~ssure of 1700 N/cm2 and side-on and reflected lmpulses of 2.0 
and 15.0 N-s/cm2, respectlvely, 1n worst or1entatlon. (Based 
upon a 10 percent Yleld of the ET propellants--see Table 4-9, 
Section 4.2.3) 
• A potentlal edge-on penetratlon of 1 per m2 of mpactlng frag-
ments, assumed to be discs 100 cm in d1ameter and 0.56 cm thlck, 
havlng a mass of 12 kg, and rnovlng at 500 meters per second. The 
worst orientat1on 1S assumed. (Based upon data 1n Sectlon 4.3.4) 
• A heat flux of 3500' kW/m2 for 15 seconds from a 11qUld propel-
lant fireball. (Based upon results described in Sectlon 4.2.1.3) 
• A 60-ml n. ground f1 re at 1100 C fo 11 o\,/ed by 2 hours of no art 1 fl-
clal cooling. (Based upon results descrlbed 1n Sectlon 4.2.2.3) 
• An lmpact ln the worst orlentation onto an unyieldlng surface at 
10 percent hlgher than the predlctpd terminal veloclty. 
• An lmpact ln the \'1orst orlentatlon lnto 25 C \"later at a veloclty 
10 percent hlgher than the predlcted termlnal veloclty. 
2.5.1.3.4 Reentry Accidents (for Conflgurat10n 4) 
The payload contalner and waste must be able to \'/lthstand reentry 
lnto the Eartll's atr,losphere and lmpact onto the Earth's surface \Ilthout the 
dlspersion of Sl]nlflcant quantltles of radloactlv~ I'laterlal. The reentry 
enVlronments are deflned as follows: 
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• A decaYlng reentry traJectory to provlde maX1mum heat1ng energy 
• A reentry traJectory WhlCh prov1des the maX1mum heatlng flux 
• An lmpact on an unYleldlng surface and 1n the ocean at a veloclty 
10 percent hlgher than the predlcted termlnal veloc1ty. 
The response of the contalner and waste to the reentry enV1ronments must be 
cal cul ated after the spec 1 f1C reentry condit 10ns have been detenm ned by 
analys1s. 
2.5.1.4 Criticality 
The rad10act 1ve waste package shall be subcrlt 1cal (K-effect 1ve < 
0.95) for normal operat10ns or any posslble cred1ble accident during process~ 
;ng, fabricatl0n, handllng, storage, or transport to the space destinatlon. 
2.5.1.5 Postaccident Recove~ 
Postacc1dent recovery teams w111 be made part of the operat10nal d1S-
posal system. They wl11 be respons1ble for all acc1dent recovery operat10ns, 
1nclud1ng acc1dents lnvolv1ng processing, payload fabrication and rallroad 
sh1pment, payload preparat10n at the launch site, the launch and poss1ble 
reentry. 
2.5.1.6 Mon1toring Systems 
Monitorlng systems wl11 be developed for the overall system such that 
overall m1SS10n safety can be assured. Examples of such systems include 
dev1ces for measurlng radiat1on, temperature and, possibly, pressure 1n the 
waste package, and 1nstruments to prov1de data for tracklng the payload after 
1t lS placed 1nto 1tS solar orb1t d1sposal reqlon. 
2.5.2 Specific System Safety Des1gn Regu1rements 
The follow1ng paragraphs def1ne specific des1gn requlrements estab-
11shed for the elements of the reference dlsposal concept (see Sect10ns 2.3, 
2.4, 3.3 and Append1x C). As the reference concept changes, these requ1re-
ments are also expected to change. 
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2.5.2.1 Waste Form 
. 
For normal conditions, the cermet fabrication temperature of 1200 C 
shall not be exceeded. For accident conditions, the cennet decomposition 
• temperature of 1450 C shall not be exceeded. 
2.5.2.2 Waste Processing and Payload Fabricati~n Facilities 
The deslgn and operation of these fac1lities w1ll follow current pro-
posed regulations, as specified for reprocessing plants. 
2.5.2.3 Payload Primary Container 
For normal conditions, the primary stainless steel container shall 
not exceed the creep 1 imit temperature of 427 C. No chemical and physical 
interaction will occur between the ceOllet waste fOOll and the container. For 
accident conditions, the primary conta1ner must not exceed the melt 
temperature of 1450 C. 
2.5.2.4 Flight Radiation Shielding 
Radlat10n sh1elding for fl1ght systems \'#111 be des1gned to llm1t 
radiation to no more than 2 rem per hour at 1 meter from the shield surface 
under nonnal conditlons. Aux11iary shielding will be designed such that 
radiation exposure 1 imits (see Tables' 2-4 and 2-5) for ground personnel and 
flight crews are not exceeded during handling or fl1ght operations. 
For norma 1 cond1 t ions, the temperature 11mi t for the depl eted 
uranium/stainless steel f1 ight radiation shield is 427 C. For accident con-
dltions, the radlatlon shield must not exceed the uranium melt temperature of 
1130 C. 
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APPENDIX F 
ORBIT TRANSFER VEHICLE RETURN TRAJECTORY TRADES 
F1 
l..IA circular Heliocentric orbit of .85 AU radius has been s~lected for sPoce 
disposal of nuclear waste. The objective of this task was to characterlze 
the mission profile used by a chemical OTV in transferring the waste fn~m 
LEO at an altitude of 160 n. mile to the destination orbit. For purpos~s 
of analysis the mission can be separated into Geocentric and Heliocentric 
segments. 
Heliocentric Mission Segment 
Figure 1 illustrates the Heliocentric mission segment. A two bum Hothll\ann 
transfer is used to transit from the Earth's orbit at 1 AU to the dispo~al 
orbit at .85 AU. 
ra, -= LA II - 1 ,(1.S I( 10' ~ 
1~7o~Xlo'A-
= 
Folf 
for elliptical orbits: V = Jft (~- ~ ) ( I) 
'10..= ~g'.S3CJ ~/<J v~::. 33.S?3kj"c 
for circular orbits 
o:t 1 A LJ Vc:.= ;)'1.771 ~/.A 
at .85" AU 
The required velocity changes for the transfer are: 
A vD.- = ~ ct. 17 I ,L/A ';(~.~3'" Jo-,./~ = I. ::l ~ e1 ./ --/-<J 
LJ,. Vp -= 33.S7:) j~/A - 3';l.=:l90 A-jIQ 
-
I. ~8:3 ...I,_/A 
F2 
A circular Heliocentric orbit of .85 AU radius has been selected for space 
disposal of nuclear waste. The objective of this task was to characterize 
the mission profile used by a chemical orv in transferring the waste from 
LEO at an altitude of 160 n. mile to the destination orbit. For purposes 
of analysis the mission can be separated into Geocentric and Heliocentric 
segments. 
Heliocentric Mission Segment 
Figure 1 illustrates the Heliocentric mission segment. A two burn Hothmann 
transfer is used to transit from the Earth's orbit at 1 AU to the disposal 
orbit at .85 AU. 
r4,; -= 1 A II == 1'-/'f.S,(IO' ..A-
1~7 O~XIO"A-
= 
for elliptical orbits: 
for circular orbits 
at 1 A tJ Vc.= ;;l'l.771 ~/A 
at 
.85" AU 
The required velocity changes for the transfer are: 
~9./71 L/A 
'3 :3 . S- 7 :1 j-:..-. / A 
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The period of the elliptical transfer orbit is defined by: 
n- == c;I. 7T 3/~ 
c.. -~ 
..r;;;:-
1" = ~'if.O"i'XIOC..A = 77'7 k 
The transit time from 1 AU to .85 AU is 3898 hours. 
Geocentric Mission Segment 
The objective of the Geocentric segment of the mission is to achieve the de-
sired apohelion velocity for the transfer from 1 AU to .85 AU. This requires 
escaping the earth's gravitational field with an excess velocity, in a dir-
ection opposite to earth's heliocentric motion, that will reduce the helio-
centric velocity to the transfer orbit apohelion velocity. Earth escape is 
achieved via a hyperbolic orbit. The required hyperbolic velocity at perigee 
is given by: 
VJ.. = fi~ +v~ 
t"" 
(".3) 
where 
"P- = :398"OI.~ 
./a-, :J/.., ~ 
"00 - L:::. "0- == Vc..- Vo- -
r = Y\.E" 0 = t.c. Co 7 Cit ~ 
then "J..;' 11.000 ~/J(j 
At LEO y c.. == 7 7'30 lA-j-o, the change in velocity is: 
A V.." ~ //.000 - 7.7'30 -= '3.;) 70 A-/-<) 
The geometry of the escape orbit is shown in Figure 2. Its characteristics can 
be determined from the following relationships. 
e = 
~ ~ 
-f'p Vp _ \ (Lf) 
~ 
a.. = ~ t"p (5 ) 
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The orbit parameters are: 
e ::. j.oO?S""3 
0.... = ~"3Y"~ ~ 
1 == I ~.1 i 
0 
k- == s- .., l. " 5"' ~ 
Figure 3 depicts the orientation of the escape orbit with respect to the 
Heliocentric transfer orbit. The right ascension of the low earth orbit must 
be selected such that intersection of the LEO plane and the plane of the 
Heliocentric transfer orbit is perpindicular to the radius vector from the 
sun. It's value varies directly with the time of year and inclination of 
the orbit. For any inclination and launch site location there is a daily 
launch opportunity that allows the hYperbolic injection to be achieved with-
out any A V penalty for plane change. 
In the reference mode of operation for the nuclear waste mission the OTV boosts 
a Solar Orbit Insertion Stage (SOlS) carrying the waste p~load into the hy-
perbolic orbit. The OTV then retro fires into an elliptical orbit returning 
it to LEO. At LEO a further reduction in velocity circularizes the orbit. 
The braking maneuver can be accomplished by propulsion or by aerobraking. 
Several issues are involved in characterizing the return orbit. There is a 
discrete amount of time required to separate the OTV from the SOlS and re-
orient it for the retro maneuver. This time has an impact on the magnitude 
and direction of the velocity change. The magnitude of the retro A V de-
termines the semi-major axis, lIa", of the return ell iptical orbit and as a 
result its period. In addition the total ~ V required for the return to LEO 
is affected by the magnitude of the retro A V, for cases in which the retro 
F7 
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maneuver occurs after perigee of the escape orbit. Since the actual time re-
qui red to stage the SOlS and re-orient the OTV prior to the retro maneuver 
was not known, a parametric analysis was made of the impact of staging time. 
For a hyperbolic orbit the time from perigee is given by: 
tj,:: a.. 3/;1 [e ~ ~ a _ k ([e-t\ -t Je:\ t-,. S/;t) J (~) 
..r;;;:- I -t e ~ a J e. .... I -.re:\ to..-, a lot 
Where e is the angle from perigee to the current orbital position. 
The radius of a hyperbolic orbit can be expressed as a function ofeby: 
r= rp(I-te.) 
\+ e. c..ao e ~4 
The velocity can be determined from the equatien shown previously for hyper-
bolic orbits, ~ l,-)· 
• Table 1 presents values of radius, velocity and time from perigee as a function 
of the angle from perigee. 
{degrees) Radius {km) Velocitl {kIn/s) Time from Perigee {sec) 
9 6714 10.97 100 
19 6861 10.85 200 
27 7062 10.70 300 
35 7344 10.49 400 
43 7722 10.23 500 
49 8078 10.01 600 
55 8509 9.76 700 
61 9026 9.48 800 
66 9536 9.23 900 
70 10005 9.01 1000 
74 10535 8.79 liDO 
78 11138 8.55 1200 
Two different methods of performing the braking maneuver out of hyperbolic 
orbit were analyzed. 
(1) Tangential ~ V, in which the braking velocity vector is applied 
tangentially to the orbital path. 
(2) Co-apsidal A V, in which the braking velocity vector is oriented 
such that there is no shift in the orbit line of apsides. 
F9 
Two equations are required in addition to equation (6) to fully describe 
motion along an orbit. 
ti,... 8 = 
e;1 = 
( r vo/.Ak) ~ ~ £.c-:> f3 
(r "~/AA-) ~ ~ - 1 
~ ;;( ~ ';( (~_I)~(3+~/G 
( ~ ) 
The physical relationship of the variables is shown in Figure 4. For the case 
of a tangential A V applied after perigee there is a rotation in the orbit 
0.0 ~ ~ F"'1r'" s. 
line of apsides along with the change in semi-major axis. "a"~ Equation (9) 
can be differentiated holding ~ constant and simplified. 
dtJ ::. _ ;} ~ ~ olv (II) 
e v 
Integrating gives the relationship for the change in 9 due to a tangential bV. 
14- B~/~ __ ( ~)- dole (1;/) • 
t4-, a/Iii}. Vi 
where Va = '1,- b V and VI is the velocity prior to retro. The value of 
/.9 can be determined in equation (10) from the original orbit values of e. r 
and v. Inserting the new velocity ~ gives the eccentricity of the new orbit. 
ez. The new value of semi-major axis, II ai' • can be determined from ~ and ,.. 
using the following expression: 
~ = (1"3) 
r ~-(rV'·/.AA-) 
The new ~pogee and perigee radii can then be calculated using equation (5) and 
the velocites ~ using equation (1). A computer code was developed to run 
through this sequence of calculations and determine the total ~ V to return ~ 
circular LEO for a range of times from perigee and braking ~ V's. The results 
~ 
are plotted in Figure'. It indicates that total return A V is sensitive to 
the size of the initial retro A V, extremely so for the longer times from 
perigee. For a recoverable OTV it is important to complete staging and re-
orientation as soon as possible after injection into the escape orbit. This 
may be a problem for SOlS that must be spun up and oriented prior to separation. 
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A more useful parameter against which total return ~ V can be evaluated is 
period of the return orbit. This can be determined from the semi-major axis 
7 
using equation (2). Figure ~ is a plot of total return ~ V as a function of 
return orbit period and time from perigee. For short staging times there is 
only a slight increase in A V to achieve orbit periods consistent with 
proposed OTV mission times of about 60 hours. 
~ 
The co-apsida1 retro maneuver requires that Figure I illus-
trates the co-apsida1 retro maneuver. Re-arranging equation (9): 
4-Since rand e are constant for the maneuver.tf~can be determined for any V2. 
In this case V2 and VI do not have the same direction. The required ~ V to 
change from VI to V2 is given by: 
~-------------------------
.6 V = J VI;l t v;J. ";l - ;;{ V, v~ Gcy.:) ((.3, -(9~ ') 
The remainder of the necessary orbit variables can be calculated in the same 
manner as described previously for the tangential~ V case. A computer code 
similar to the Tangential~ V code was developed to run through these cal-
culations for various staging times and initial retro~ V's. Figure 9 is 
a plot of total return A V as a function of orbit period and staging time. The 
relationship is similar to the Tangential A V case, but with greater~ V re-
quired, as shown in the comparison of the two cases in Figure 10. The in-
crease in total A V is due primarily to the cosine loss incurred by applying 
f3;;-f3, 
the retro ~ V at some angle (8f-B1) to the original velocity. 
Based on these results the tangential retro A V was selected for the nuclear 
waste mission. Because no plane change is involved in either the escape or 
retro maneuvers the shift in line of apsides caused by Tangential ~ V is not 
a problem. An intermediate orbit can be used to phase back into LEO. 
F13 
u 
~ \) ~ IJ 0 'L ..J IL ~ ~ \l, cr ~ ~ t :;: ..... 
'. I- ~ 0'" 'l ~J 
cr ~ ~ 
"l I! t 0 ~ V 3" 011 ~ V) ~ ';:) 
I:<) ) ~ 0'" < J ~ III 
~ -.\)\') 
'<;l 
~ '::> ~ ~ <J 
') 
-b .~ \ ~ ~ 
~ }~ r.l ct <i '< ~ 1\0 ~ <:I ..j .J 
"-
" 
'" i: 1-- ~ ;: <::> ... 
.. t- ~ ... 
I- .. < t\ ~ ~ ~ 
Ik:" ~ < ~ () '< 
~ <l -.J 
\u ... "- } \.... ~ .. " 4: ~ ~ -0 0( <::) V <I .. ~ ...::. -l -~ " w lI.. -b 
I 
'" 
~ ~ < I-
" 
~ ~ CC II'} ~ <t ... CI; In ~ !.JJ 
'" 
~ -J ~ 1"6 .. ~ 
" 
.l:: () (} f: 
...l II -..I ~ ~ 
.1 ~ ~ <t ~ -:. d ... "'> I- CV t- ~ ..., 
... ~ 'Il .., ~ 4- . r~ 
H H 
• 
v , \ 
-::!.. 0 ~ ~ ~ ....... <') J ... 
", 
" i-
'-
'" 
/' 
f. "'-
. 
ENG. REVISED DAlE "'/.7e', (..) c:- -<:'C /I/.I",v 
-0 L ~-,., ..,. ~,AL 411' 
CHlCI( r:; I'~ ~ - , 
'I ; , / / . 
A'. 7-1/' ~- / /' ,A / - . -~ 
"'I I. BOEING I Ii F14 60-. ,I 
51:1~1~ 
I k'l/~ 
I I ' . 
3 S"-
.. 
~=: -rOTJ\L " RETIHU-l _ I I " AV I 
...., 
..... 
(J"I 
.... 
I 
m 
(0 
o 
I~ 
I~ 
(') 
o 
I~ 
> z 
-< 
"? 
~ 
~ 
~ (' 
':J 
::> 
- -\ 
; '" 
, d 
- If' 
~ .... 
1: 
. 
I: ~ 
.. 
1- ::. 
.. "" 
-1 
» .... 
: lJ\ 
i' 
~ 
'3,~ -
; I 
I I 
I I 
, 
, 
l 13-,,-
I ! 
, I 
, I 
I· I I-
1 ! 
I ' 
, 
: 1_ I 
, I i 
, I 
I , I 
, , j 
'j f 
I 
I " : 
, , 
FI G-URt: 7. -r~ Rj-~ ~V ) I~ ~ L:iV 
vs ~o~ p~ ¢ s~-~ 
;i II , ' \ 
, I I : II I I I '" \' I I I 
I '.. 'f1' ".",,; "I I ' Ii I!: I I 'I, " " 
I ii , , 
t 
! '" ":'1" i" + J 
1 
I' h ::! 'I I, 'l',II! I r 1~'TI~\..IE" 'R I ,,\ 
I 
I l' '- f'\ 1-1 ~c.1\"'E" v"hlf 
• I ' ' ., • 
: I I 1,1 'I '1"~;;'iO~S"~: 
- I .' I • -1 I I , , " ' , ,! \ r i ? t 3 Ii U' p'''' I 
,I 
I' 
, I \ ,I I :: i I ; '\ - : 1-" 1-
, 1 ' I ' ," 'I' I I' I I" I '! ',I ,I', 1 ! 
I I I; 'I \: 
I I ' l  I ' -
'I I " " ' ' ii" :' : I , I ,i' r "1,, , 1 , -
1
,,1 ' ~ I I I _I :1;; I:ii ;:, I i"I'1 \1': TAN&-l.NT'"l 
: 11'1 I P, i' 'I ~. .:-, L : i ~ E:.,' LlRrv 0 RT'I T 
I _ , Ii:!! ,; , II' , I I : I' I - :i, I ' 
I I
' I' I I I , ' ' ,'I I I - I j 
I I I I ' - i ' '- - - ~,- L :1. ' 
"I j '1,;1'1: '! I: j I"TI 
, I" r I I'! I 
, --"'I-- L , , I t I I I, I:! i - -, iIi I ! - .1' , 
, 1 I' , :!, I,I1 I; "I, ,I 
, I", ' " i : - ., ': : :': 'J ,: f 1 : r ~ 
1 1 I I ii' \. J~I ," 1, I' '",'" ! :R~"'RO 6V 
I I - ' I 
I
, , " TIME I FROM 
, I 
! I I ,. I' ,I PcR'''''''' (S,<L) 
! \' I ct70 
'\i " : N i I I ! I 
I ' I I J r : I 
, I I 6btY 
'110 
I I 
I ' 1'10 \ 
I 
l 
r r. 
1::--' .. 
0, 1 I 
I I 
I ,,0' I I I 
li'-
... 
" 
' .' I I I J 0 
I ' R 1:., 1 ~" IV a R i" : P.R fO.P i L : ol r CI' ttll S 
,I I I 'I I J ,\ I I I . I I 
, :: ! Ii. ',!. i : I : 
\ 
\ 
\ 
I 
\ 
\ 
I 
\ \ 
/ 
\' 
~ 
/ 
/ 
\ 
\\ 
/ 
/ 
\ 
\ 
/ 
/' 
- --
" "'-
'\.. 
\ 
ELLIPTI CAL 
R E"-[L/~N O~8~ 
H'fPtRI?OL-A At-JO 
~I..LI P5t: LINE 
OF", P5 I DE. 5 
L 0 vJ t:1'I R,I-\ 
ORSIT 
\ 
Co-/1P5/f)PL 
t1 f. I.., E iJ V E.. " 
F16 
\ 
AV 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
/ 
/ 
8RAkIN6-
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
H yp t)\-ISO LI c. 
ES,C.AFE 0,.8 1', 
/,c 
:I:I~I~ 
...., 
...... 
...... 
-t 
I 
m 
tD 
o 
t!:! 
Z 
(j) 
() 
'0 
... ... 
-0 
> Z 
-< 
~: 
G 
.. 
~ 
" 
" ::. 
lD 
~ 
01\ 
., 
a 
0 
~ 
d 
-L 
-..:. 
.z. 
I> c.. 
;t. (' 
c 
IJ ~ 
'-
> 
-.. 
-4 :: 
'" ;Z 
'-::. 
" I ~ ~ 
. .. 
- ~ \: 
'1a 
r ::. 
<: I 
.... 
l" 
.' 
~ 
<::-
. 
~ 
! 1\ HI!:! I , 
I ' 
! 
! 
I 
I 35' 
I 
TOT~L 
RETeJRN 
I 
boy 
• I 
3.'0/ 
I ! . 
13.3 
I 
! 
-I 
F I G-lJR£ 9 
I ' 
:' I II I : .! 
_ I, I : i 
I" I i j N. i I 
" I 
I ' 1 
..I i i 
, : 
, I 
I i 
I. 
r ' 
~ 0- APA~l ~ ~v- -r~ ;;('~ L>" 
Vs u~ p~~ tt s~ 7-~J-o 
I 
I I I 
I ' I 1 
1 
" ~ 
1,1 
I 
, . I 
II! 
I i 
I I I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
" 1 
I 
I r. I 
• I I. 
,', I " ," I '! . 
f 'i 'I I 
'II I I j I' I 'I' 
'I " 
,i -j '~~j " ; 
, ' ;.: 
I' , 
1 1 :, , ' I I , 
" I : I I '; 
'I 
r f' 
"11 " 
, I. 1 
I I I 
I I 
: I ·1 
' \ 
1 
i ' 1 , 
ri I I 
: I ' ,. I I ~" .1. "' ! I ; I" ' 
, 'tITI~L 1!E"~RTHj i Syf\t"E' vl\l>l r 
, . ! ~ 'f I o~S'~ I I I , : 
I ~ I"; tl"3'irf' I ;¥h I I ,r~T, I 
'; i. -"t -! II : I 
I i-
. J 
I I, ' I 
I , " , I I , , 1 ' 
co"'''' PSI 01. L. ! RETLJ~N O~ ((I T 
. 
( 
RE.TRO Av 
1 I T/t1f f~O"'\ 
I fE"'~t:E 
, (!.,-c.~) 
r- Q70 
I I I 
I ' 
I 1 j" I I ' 
I 
I 
I 
I 
whO 
410-
r '1 0 
til.:' 
) 
-" ..: 
~ 
W 
l. 
ot. 
I) 
'" 1 w
- .. 
:z. 
• 
,/ 
,/' 
--
/ 
/ 
/ 
-
-
/ 
/ 
,/ 
,/ 
') ~ 
4 () 
% 
I 
I 
-: I 
-f 
-t -. 
J 
J 
--~-
----/- ----
-' -1-
- -- - .~-
I 
/ 
/ 
/ 
... 
,/ 
/ 
- - / 
I 
/ 
/ 
f 
/ 
I 
/ 
/ 
/ 
I 
/ 
! 
I 
/ 
/ 
/' 
/' 
,/ 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
'""> 
~~ 
-.!> 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
, ' 
t. I 
;.' / 
/ 
--
-- > ~:-----// 
--
-;r=' 
- -==- -- --
I 
:: ~I cO 
- r-
I 
I I 
, l 
- ,-
- I I ' 
I / 
- J I 
I / 
I I 
! 
, ! 
I I 
j 
/ 
i 
C- .j, 
I 
i 
I 
I I 
I , -
:J--
f-- -
I -
J 
\ , 
... 
l: 
o 
C 
"l 
IlL 
-r=--
l'!l-
0:: Cl - -
~~§:;:~~-~-~:=:=::~" ! J iii iii i ~ '= 
I., ~ 
"l ..J 1 " 
"" -:-t- I- , 
C -J I- =c ~1 
CALC A;VISED DATE II 0:. 'A' l' f ~~-------+--~-----r--~ 
CN5CX -~to·.n r-Ol'l -Q-A"~.':7"'·_ f TAIJ.-t:1-J ,/ _ ~~+--------+----*------r---1 
APR 
APR 
F1B THE BOEING COMPANY PAG' c: e 
Aerobraking technology was assumed to be already developed in the time frame 
of interest in the Nuclear Waste study. Since an aerobraking OTV has much 
better performance than an all propulsive OTV.this mode was selected for 
the reference mission. The impact of staging time on total return A V is 
lessened when an aerobraked OTV is used. Aerob~aking system weights are 
essentially independant of the magnitude of velocity reduction in the aero-
braking maneuver for the range of velocities of interest here. As a result 
the initial retro ~ V essentially becomes the total return ~ V. (The ~ V 
at apogee of the ellipse is ~10 m/s). The plot of initial retro ~ V as a 
function of return orbit period in Figure 11 shows the effect of staging 
time reduced to 10-50 m/sec. It also indicates that the Phase A OTV mission 
duration is appropriate for this mission. 
The mission profile shown in Figure 12 was developed for an aerobraked OTV 
with an initial retro ~ V of .4 km/sec and a staging time of 410 seconds after 
perigee. The mission timeline and A ViS are listed in Table 2 and a mission 
sequential mass statement for a L02/LH2 OTV and a storable SOlS is shown in 
Figure 13. 
A series of parametric performance curves for different OTV/SOIS combinations 
were developed to support the Nuclear Waste study. Figure 14 shows the per-
formance capability as a function of OTV propellant capacity. It indicates 
the excellent performance capability of a reuseable OTV for earth escape 
missions. The method developed here and the computer codes are ideally 
suited to general analysis of earth escape or planetary missions involving 
reusable OTVIS. 
FIg 1 
CALC 
:t a 
f-. ~ 
, ~ ~ ~-
'-<. q 
.MUD DATii Nt-'C 
CH5CX ~---+----------~----~------+----; ~ . 
..... 1 
API! 
:: 
to fllJ 
." 0 
II ~~ 
~.:. 
c <)1:-
r r ,.; 
.... - ;0.. 
a:: I-
~ C"oQ~ 
"ll ...... 0- (J ",~ .. 
\ f J 
'f 
I----- --__ _ 
J-- --
- f- -----
o 
t-~6J.Q----
---,-+H_------ r-~---
- , 
'-1-- -
----- ------- H----
~ ---
~ 
~ 
~----. 
o 
.J 2 
It ~--__ _ 
;:~ 
- -c: ----
2 < 
: _::l.--__ 
Q 
>< 
~--­
./". 1: c:: _ 
~ 
~ --
f------- r- ~ - -
-- ----- --- ,--
~ 
~-;---
4.J 
\(" 
--------- r---- ------
--- --~---
.-- ----~ ----
--~-
,-- L I~ .. 
F20 THE BOEING COMPANY 
..,., 
N 
..... 
- \ 
~ 
MSFC 
NWC- 104 
') -
r+- I;;;. 
OTV INJECTION MISSION PROFILE 
ANAl. YSIS OF-sPACE SYSTEMS STUDY FOlfTFltSPACE DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR-WASTE BOEING 
1. INJECTION INTO EARTH ESCAPE 
2. SOlS STAGING AND OTV RETRO 
3. ADJUST PERIGEE 
4. AERO BRAKING MANEUVER 
6. RAISE PERIGEE 
6. LEO CIRCULARIZATION 
EARTH ORBI 
RETCLRN ELLIPTICAL ORelT 
L'NE OF APs'OES 
) " /1 (//1 r f I 
/ 
b:; r 5 T 
R£iRO 
CO/'SI 
:"'E..? c.'(c. 
.:501S 
Ov ~IA6-E 
/ ')f J fiN T 
~ ~ ::"'0f5\ 
j ~ ofloJi 
'{ Y' L t l ::; e,f?:::.. ~ 
5 :;. r E::- '-.-,.. ,- S ~ -~ 
IV (~) 
10 
~ It) (~) 
10 
"-130 
.s-
30 
S-
£j ~ 09 
~S 
F22 
o 
II 
-~ 
. "'-
, 17 
, / 
~ 
.01 
~ 
.0 ~ 
O~ 
'( 
.~ 
'3 89 'I 
.~ 
.";;1 
~D.Od' 
;:;0 Of: 
~6 l'lo.l~:'79 
RUN 
JNOTV2 11:05 AM 
USABLE MAIN PROP. MASS 
'~MINAL BURNOUT MASS 
SlART MISSION MASS 
INJECTED MASS 
SOlS PROP. MASS 
SOlS BURNOUT MASS 
PAYLOAIt MASS 
/ A~~ 
O:.!-lIec-lJO 
130000 
1:?:?79 
249750 
105300 
39665.4 
6981.02 
58653.6 
DO YOU WANT DETAILS(YES OR NO)? YES 
MAIN ENG. ISP = 464.6 
AUX. PROP. ISP = :?20 
EVENT 
STARTMISSION 
SEPERATE 
PHASE 
ESCAPE INJECT 
STAGING 
RETRO INJECT 
COAST 
TRANS. INJECT 
1AST 
, ,fROMANEUVER 
COAST 
PHASE INJECT 
COAST 
LEO CIRC. 
TRIM 
DOC" 
RESERVES 
NOMINAL 
RESERVE 
NOMINAL 
RESERVE 
MAIN 
MAIN 
AUX. 
AUX. 
TOTAL LOSSES 
DELTA V 
10 
o 
10743 
10 
131:? 
o 
10 
65 
o 
o 
220 
o 
400 
10 
o 
250 
PROPELLANT 
PROPELLANT 
PROPELLANT 
PROPELLANT 
= 
SOlS MASS SEQUENCE 
EVENT DELTA V 
~AGING 
uRIENT 5 
COAST 30 
ORIENT .,. ..J 
HELlO CIRC. 4209 
RESERVES 85 
= 
= 
= 
= 
pr~op. USAGE 
352.6 
o 
127825 
171.5 
1345.8 
o 
20.6 
68.7 
o 
o 
192.1 
o 
341.5 
17.8 
o 
208.1 
1:?9999 
208.1 
544.733 
54.4733 
360.842 
PRor' • USAGE 
60.6 
343.7 
60.4 
38589.4 
611.2 F23 
13 
LOSSES 
13.9 
21.7 
48.5 
.3 
19.:? 
39.5 
o 
58.5 
105.64:? 
1:?06.34 
19.1 
5.9 
19.1 
.1 
7.9 
54.4733 
MASS 
105300 
105239 
104896 
104835 
66245.9 
65634.6 
MASS 
249750 
249384 
:?49362 
121488 
16016.3 
14651.:? 
14611 .7 
14591.1 
14463.9 
14358.3 
13151.9 
12940.7 
12934.8 
12574.1 
12556.3 
12548.4 
12285.8 
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(NE,) 
/ 
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APPENDIX G 
ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM DETAIL MASS STATEMENTS 
Gl 
C /pO(./~ W E7~f7'T J7?l%4tEVT 
,J'CJL-'1A' O.-f/j/T /A/..!EYm(),v ,J7?f6E 
(;,(JI"fdtr .;O"".!J/,,!~4/Ali' /fer) ~7;;// LB 
J"77fVC~E - L'K cruc:v A/~ ~1;'/1C:.C 
O/fCUA7f" J'l\7u ;od7/CZ - /,u.vbf 
C/.rlrV~/f;(l .J'K/~ ;'99vfl- ClO7Z"Jf 
/?/!7.J//1£ J'I\'/;(/ ~dYE2.J'6;) 
Lot.c/C>e /)ECk' Jk/A./ p~.JEZ 
U~EJf' LJECK L)/A60.vA'l e~-1CtJ (/z) 
/A/,ljBf /?/A./6.f
J 
C/,.o~~ /tut:) L.olA/E7t (Z) 
OUlE'f' /f/A/t:J", C/~/.l~ ~u() L.Ow81{Z) 
ClltMtJ.J" v,4~S? /fro/Q £Uc/et -/f,n)//fC ,c~£2t(/z) 
A1CX/II/T/ A/t:;/ J'vF",a~r .f7/fVCTV/1E.f 
1~7Y?F/9CE /?/PG., .)'OIC-77) -071/ ,oh AVIfiO~ 
/!.J'JY. Y /A1J'T/fU~L7A.! lT~tJW/h'f~ 
I I __ 
,&Jt// t:PV I C j 
~O~ JuP~l.Y f .o1.;m/~G/l7tPV 
J'o~ /97fA'/lY (/S""o ~T 1 P 
~47f C~JV17f'O£/,()/ .Ii?(I/,lC/77tOA.I 
/H/17,v ,..oA'o.-Pc/LJ'/ov -/AKLu~lVt: 7/n./J("ft::€ 
A/7ZJ 7/PJ-+'J' ~ ) 
#,#1/1 T~A'l (7) 
,HB../(.//;1 ,(fCJT7ZE.J(J) 
,EM:;/"ue -/OTJ L/.! ,Fo/fCE J /lTlO-/~o (q 
",o/fOr'ELlA7C/T J'YJ'lC/H 
P/PEJ' J'f//?,,#/T JY..J'"7E"/14 
/f7777V/./C COA/ppdL f!;> 
7/T/pt/.J/EX" -2S- a /OI'f'Cc, O/'f~/7Or /f'cj' l/£)PNl~(/zJ 
~A'cl.<JEUAVT J'YJ'7/i'Af 
v"'-!: J 
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/72. 
97 
81 
SO 
24-
c"o 
:74-
s-o 
60 
20 
~o 
.70 
/uS-
/U" 
9tJ 
-'18 
~o 
/2. 
.70 
.70 
l!:;:::> 8-A1/~ eElL/', Co -rH1£. C¥;y~.I, 2 -/11IL Jv~flJPtf7E f /'JT8'?C',,/Va./EC?]' (.-c. Z. LI1 /Pr z.) 
't:> A./TZ) /,+1",.,/1 J''1.r;;/I'f. ".o,.,o,.oEZL/fT./T .{)"",.-fWA/ Ic-A"~ A"!/,7A.1 T..-'YkJ'. 
G2 
72LJ 
20 
-
/' ? 
./LJO-
/ :: () 
.6>C-
; of ;.,.. I") 
.s-20 
~o 
; 
7 
~226-
0' ~ 
-I-7d6-L/3 
-;( () f'i 
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• ./'0£# Qr,/.T/T /,uJ'PfWoU .,"'7;;C:E 
VJ'Ml.E ~/('~(,?H7A/"l-/fCJ') : 13/1 L.IS 
/pEJ/t}v4'Z r~C/luJ' &' ~;"fJ'£J' 
" A./JZ:) 7;7\'/1~/-J£r) /A./ 77f7VKJ' "'-..J -/w 
/h.41H 7l?/11"'.I"'<Q:) /u 7/'17J"'1' A. J '/. 
A/lZJ 77f'/IT-'I"'EY.J /A.I p;v~ 
Af4111 77f'~,t?BJ /AJ L./#EJ' 
/7EZ/CHI"f 
G3 
,." 
:J2Z 
/-1/ 
87 
~7 
29 
18 
~'f '2: LB 
;; if t) f~ 
73/1 
~'J'3~ ~/7 
1717 
G4 
f;\\, K)I 
'- - , 
::t I ~ I 
~ 
I j 
C/20V,o WE7~ JT/'I7Z4~EVr 
.I~T(/ 
REUJt'9/.Ju ,/)E2/(/~Y 4t//'J/(J~ 70 GCZ> 
~CTV/r'E - ,Q/I.!IC I/EJI/Ca-
L#2 T/9YKs ;'.JV'p~ri'7J' 
L02 7/nI/KJ 2.' J'o,o",.aaf'TJ' 
"tPO£) Y J'#EU. :EI 07H~ J77PvcTUPE]' 
J~w/c# ~/1VEZJ' -r-t«J Or ~t//c1X//c:J' J'£C~ 
J'/97./0k//CH ~I""fJCIJEZJ - /1/7" a&" dV/t::Ju/Cj J'ECT/dA.! 
",cw,o /P/iUG. (' ~A:. .40/'f?C'~ LowOP /r/A/a.) 
/??4"/,;vJ't/,P/-lHf'T /P/~ .... /"wLJ y~ Lo/90J' 
L/Y2 7/hIK Jt/P/7P11'T /f'/-u:;. 
L 02. 7/?YK ,ft./F7",oQTfT /1'/ ~ 
/9,,&T /f'/AfG. (,6'E1P7///~ /h:)/flo/Z)f oA4JDf /FJ'AK» 
/7///t:7N/CJ' /P//.I6 )'ECpa;v /lJ'J'E.4?/yLY 
/?7/J'c. ~CJC/,Q77~~ J'7/ftKW/?Gj-/lW(}.v/c.t/ ~(//P. 
-4'1/9/AJ JV,4,oVriT //777#4 ~ ~ Yi! LOI'9t7J'(:r'j(Ti) 
/P~ ~/f7970~LE F/777N~S(2F;';:) 
7?frF'vrJ'T -'7Tr'£:K' 7V~~ 
...6'~/~ ./"/f'eJPE-r 
C-#7;'5'/L/CRZ /A/7i9'PF/'fC£/OTV 7Z> /1.l'£ 
A.I'/'E~QlY f/,uJ7/fU/f77~ /I~O~ 
,Pd)'" L.a-1.O/t7~/..</G. /?LJ/970.T.IX'J' 
.I",a /1~ /1?B:;tVfU/J'-HJ -U72:H /leELG'AJ'E /f"At9:¥OY 
C/"u/V,EnJ'/1£ L)OCk/~ /f £J~ -OTV J'//7,F 
.6'ALLL/?r / A./J7?IZVf77dX/ /9 xcz) ~47Pt:Jt,c/A7f'£ 
~~ Ct:7N mOl 
ACT/VE 771"S'f'#14L Cd~L 
/r"/9L)//"I7lJx' .1'YJ'?rA-l -,.c""G/Q C~ 
/N' J'U L./9/7t:711./ 
C/?YO /UW£/17"7tfrf,/ - L/yZ T/f7VK 
C,RYO /NJv~/f"F/t:7,v -Lo"Z TdA./K 
C"A"Yo /"vPLn77tt71(/ - .F,PJ' T/fPKf' 
~ CdNT717.v4"£JvT - LIYZ 7?97vK 
,...oL//f'c.~ CPl/7/?7.11//J4'£JvT - Lo ~ Trf7t/K 
~ V-41i6'/ A./G. - /'V,lf6.:> / /PE ~/f'Ej'J' 
r?;?/Jc. 
/A../Ct:J-f,-Jorfd/ZJ ,;c;. _ ';T~// /l'E,CC£?-7';7rLE /"/77//J6J Ci:Vo.,s- L8 EAe"" 
G5 
(- ---) 
(24~4- ) 
S07 
4/~ 
14-f1 _ 
3te2 
/28 
~Q­
-/78 
35"'_ 
_ ~o_ 
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+ 300 
2~ 
90 
20 
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_ /00 
lOP 
( 3 15") 
_ u>O_ 
~o 
G"/P(}C/JO WE76.IYT J'T/f7E4IrvT 
I/I.A::>rV 
/fEUJI"'J/.J/.E L)E2IVE)QY /11/./'hdAl m GEZ) 
A 1// 1J1't//C.r 
C:V/4-ht/C6 y A//h//647/d'>V 
.B/fJ'IC C y' A/ 99 
G"PJ' 
C0 4J41VXJ/C/f77d1VJ' 
Mm 4-7/f7V/lGE41~r 
/ ,uJ'mVA-1&')u T/f77d>V 
",o,f'~~ LO;?,£J/VC/4-?E4J'tAfE/HE)f./T 
o TV ~S9.JVYr>/ ~ J'Y.J7;:""1 
EZn:mlc~ ,.oc:::14/~ J'YJ7r4'f (E"IO.r) 
Pd4EX' J'O~C£ 
~£Z CEZLJ' (2) 
8~y (2S" /'1;ttI"'-/hfJ) 
C'Z 77?7Jk AJ'.fE",nO/.y 
8"2 T47VK Al'J~4"1d't 't 
,r:'LUd--7(f'/u6 JY~.-nJ 
C t1"vt/&>'P.I/ ~ s;I /)/.!77P1 DO 77t!Jll1 
EZEC7/PiPVIC.1' 
.h:Y/.I1'c /7'~NEf J' 
__ /..s-6. 
214-
A1/177./ 'p/p()/-'t/~j'/~ J'YJ%A? f-n/,J) 
~~A./ .t.:VQ'A/£ 
/7f'oFJEZ.L/hvT J'Y'.J'7E.,n 
L#z FE"ED 
LHZ /7UIP/1'~/N, L)GJ??;fO #92 
~Z ~EEZJ 72 
Lo Z ~/ t..t..,. t//P471<1, PO;H,.o 7 f 
( _LIl_) 
_d04 
_g4-f-
~C/.J'T t/'EC 7i?JJ'P Cd7C/77POL -/A/C~ /JC7V//7lJIIf J'UI'T. L/,(/A;7'9GE S-O 
~/fej'J~/ U776V f VCX/T JY~ -/A.k'£ r'P£U#'H?7CJ' 279 
L "" Z 7?9;v/(' AV?Z:>~ ~I'J' ft/JI?;a~y __ "2.S-
Lo ~ T/77v/:' /'907ZJt:=evpvJ' ;P/PU.I ~~ Y _ 20 
~#2 77?";uK t/evr//pEZ/~ -~(){./.MJ/~T _S2 
Lh~"2 7/'J7'JK V~//?EZIEF - .l''p/'/C£ :10 
LOz 77'hJ/<r' l/E"Yr//f&Z/cr-Wf'~~T _ /~ 
L to z 7?hv-<:' ~,E7VT / A'c L./cr - J'FWcc 30 
~d£U/?1/J77c J'YJ'TE41 ;;8 
G6 
G/fovro WE76Hr JT~/J1.9./T 
I/'1 r:'eJ 7// 
/'PEVf/?7:1t.E .£)E2/t/D2Y 41/./'.1/(7;'(/ 7i!) ~ 
/l7717Z4:JE e~~L J7.l7F-n (/'Ie!') 
77t7'PV~J' ?A--~oov~ t!:J' //Z:. TH7t'U.iTDf'J' ) 
~fo'/lCE/~/E'O,P~r JY.t7F4-f 
Al2./t~ ~ A.t./'£414L.1e-j" (:7) 
A/ 2./-/ ~ /"~ 
WE7~ C/PoU/77V ~~,v -..:xcc. PI'9LU/lE' 4?4/f~A./ 
~~t:::..oJ dN ,A/£H./ #.;'f7PLlt</rME ('/.)70) 
4-?/fn>~~ t:JAI CX/JT/A./~/"PAJOTi?JTY,dE #4',>P.a:..,.,-1'71'.£(S%) 
/'l?r'J /PEJ/W41 /ZunJJ ycAJ'c,j 
T/fJ/t70A£]) L. # 2 
77P4790E.O La z 
L/T Z R/EZ. /.J //'f.J' 
Ch'2- / A./ ~/H/<7TY Lh'2 ~K 
G02 /AI ?.-n~TY Lo'2. 'M7Vk' 
G#e r&fr1> ;P/c/Ev.+U77CJ 
/??/.I'.I'/t>V /'PC7;>u/ri'E#?E"JVT -/A/C~ /P&t9Pt/e 
/?E:J£>'f'(/L" /J'?/f7'i't»o./ -.rv~ 17'/'lVK 
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77F'/J70,,;OEV ~2.N ~ 
(;;A./2.. 
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/I e J' /f~ fCYtVE ".o"pOPEZ.u-/7UT 
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APPENDIX H 
DATA FOR RADIATION SHIELD TRADES 
HI 
TABLE 1 
REFERENCE COMMERCIAL ELEMENTAL WASTE MIX COMPOSITION (PW-4b) 
Amount. Amount. 
Constituent kg/MTHM Constituent kg/MTHM 
Inerts Na20 Fission Te02 0.725 
Fe203 1.511 Products Cs 20 2.880 
Cr203 0.345 (Cont'd.) Baa 1.567 
NiO 0.141 La203 1.480 
P205 0.672 Ce02 3.323 
Gd203 Pr 6011 1.482 
Nd203 4.522 
Fisslon Rb20 0.354 Pm203 0.123 
Products SrO 1.059 Sm203 0.924 
Y203 0.598 Eu203 0.200 
Zr02 4.944 Gd 203 0.137 
Mo03 5.176 
Tc207 1.291 
Ru02 2.972 Actinides U308 1.169 
Rh 203 0.480 Np02 0.865 
PdO 1.483 Pu02 0.010 
A920 0.088 Am203 0.181 
CdO 0.097 Cm203 0.040 
TOTAL 40.8 
H2 
TABLE 2 
RADIONUCLIDE COMPOSITION OF COMMERCIAL WASTE (PW-4b) 
Nucllde PaylOad(a) OXlde Payload(a) 
Mass, Nucllde Mass, Actlvlty Activity, 
Isotope kg/MTHM Mass, kg kg/MTHM C1/MTHM C1 
Rb-85 0.092 7.821 0.101 0 0 
Rb-87 0.232 18.360 0.253 1.90E-5 1.50E-3 
1'OtiiT 0.32ll 25.641 0.354(Rb2O) 1.90E-5 1. 50E-3 
Sr-88 0.406 32.129 0.480 0 0 
Sr-90 0.492 38.935 0.579 6.95E+4 5.50E+6 
Total 0.898 71. 064 r:059"" ( S rO ) 6.95E+4 5.50E+6 
Y-89 0.471 37.273 0.598 0 0 
Y-90 <0.001 ( 0.079 «(l.001 6.97E+4 5.52E+6 
Total 0.471 37.352 O.598(Y 203) 6.97E+4 5. 52E+6 
Zr-90 0.142 11.237 0.193 0 0 
Zr-91 0.587 46.453 0.793 0 0 
Zr-92 0.641 50.727 0.864 0 0 
Zr-93 0.715 56.583 0.961 1.83E+0 1.45E+2 
Zr-94 0.774 61.252 1.037 0 0 
Zr-96 0.822 65.050 1.096 0 0 
Total 3.681 291. 302 4.944(Zr02) 1. 83E+0 1.45E+2 
Mo-95 0.066 5.223 0.094 0 0 
Mo-97 1.060 83.885 1.590 0 0 
Mo-98 1.140 90.216 1.626 0 0 
Mo-100 1.260 99.712 1.866 0 0 
Total 3.526 279.036 5.T76(M003)* 0 0" 
Tc-99 0.976 77 .237 1.291 1. 66E+1 1. 31E+3 
Total 0.976 77.237 1:29f(Tc207 )* 1.66E+1 1. 31E+3 
Ru-lOO 0.061 4.827 0.080 0 0 
Ru-101 0.806 63.784 1.062 0 0 
Ru-102 0.008 63.942 1.061 0 0 
Ru-104 0.588 46.532 0.769 0 0 
Total 2.263 179.085 2.972(Ru02)* 0 0 
Rh-103 0.389 30.784 0.480 0 0 
Total 0.389 30.784 0.480(Rh203)* 0 0 
(a) For 5,500 kg CERMET payload 
H3 
TABLE 2 
RADIONUCLIDE COMPOSITION OF COMMERCIAL WASTE (PW-4b) (Contlnued) 
Nuclide Payload(a) Oxide Payload(a) 
Mass, Nuclide Mass, Activlty Activity, 
Isotope kg/MTHM Mass, kg kg/MTHM Ci/MTHM Ci 
Pd-104 0.197 15.590 0.257 0 0 
Pd-105 0.233 18.439 0.304 0 0 
Pd-106 0.366 28.964 0.476 0 0 
Pd-107 0.188 14.878 0.244 8.98E-2 7.11E+0 
Pd-108 0.128 10.129 0.166 0 0 
Pd-110 0.027 2.137 0.035 0 0 
Total r.TI9 90.137 1.438(PdO)* 8.98E-2 7. 11E+O 
Ag-109 0.082 6.489 0.088 0 0 
Total 0.082 6.489 0.088(A92O)* 0 0 
Cd-110 0.043 3.403 0.049 0 0 
Cd-111 0.018 1.424 0.020 0 0 
Cd-112 0.009 0.712 0.011 0 0 
Cd-114 0.012 0.950 0.014 0 0 
Cd-116 0.003 0.237 0.004 0 0 
Total (f.Q8'5" 6.726 0.097(CdO)** 0 0 
Te-125 0.011 0.871 0.014 0 0 
Te-125 0.138 10.921 0.173 0 0 
Te-130 0.428 33.871 0.535 0 0 
Total o:5TT 45.663 0.722(Te02)** 0 0 
Cs-133 1.200 94.964 1. 257 0 0 
Cs-134 0.007 0.554 0.007 8.55E+3 6. 77E+5 
Cs-135 0.370 29.281 0.392 3.27E-l 2.59E+l 
Cs-137 1.160 91. 799 1.224 1. 01E+5 7.99E+6 
Total D37 216.598 2.880(Cs2O) 1.10E+5 8. 71E+6 
Ba-134 0.202 15.986 0.226 0 0 
Ba-136 0.020 1.583 0.022 0 0 
Ba-137 0.241 19.072 0.269 9.45E+4 7.48E+6 
Ba-138 0.940 74.388 1.049 0 0 
Total 1.403 111. 029 1. 567(BaO) 9.45E+4 7.48E+6 
La-139 1.260 99.712 1 480 0 0 
Total 1.260 99.712 1.480(La203) 0 0 
(a) For 5,500 kg CERMET payload 
H4 
TABLE 2 
RADIONUCLIDE COMPOSITION OF COMMERCIAL WASTE (PW-4b) (Contlnued) 
Nucllde PaylOad(a) OX1de Payload(a) 
Mass, Nuclide Mass, Activ1ty Act1V1ty, 
Isotope kg/MTHM Mass, kg kg/MTHM C1/MTHM C1 
Ce-140 1.420 112.374 1. 749 0 0 
Ce-142 1.280 101.295 1.574 0 0 
Total 2.700 213.669 3.323(Ce02) 0 0-
Pr-141 1. 230 97.338 1.482 0 0 
Total l.23O 97.338 1. 482 (Pr 6011 ) 0 0 
Nd-142 0.022 1. 741 0.026 
° 
0 
Nd-143 0.746 59.036 0.871 0 0 
Nd-144 1. 270 100.504 1.484 0 0 
Nd-145 0.651 51. 518 0.759 0 0 
Nd-146 0.665 52.626 0.774 0 0 
Nd-148 0.354 28.014 0.411 0 
° Nd-150 0.171 13.532 0.198 
° 
0 
Total 3.879 306.971 4.522(Nd203) 0 0 
Pm-147 0.106 8.388 0.123 9.82E+4 7.77E+6 
Total 0.106 8.388 0.123(Pm203) 9.82E+4 7.77E+6 
Sm-147 0.078 6.173 0.090 0 0 
Sm-148 0.087 6.885 0.101 0 0 
Sm-149 0.354 28.014 0.411 0 0 
Sm-150 0.191 15.115 0.221 0 0 
Sm-151 0.021 1.662 0.024 5.63E+2 4.46E+4 
Sm-152 0.048 3.799 0.055 0 0 
Sm-154 0.019 1.504 0.022 
° 
0 
Total 0.798 63.152 0.924(Sm203) 5.63E+2 4.46E+4 
Eu-151 0.003 0.237 0.004 0 0 
Eu-153 0.137 10.842 0.158 
° 
0 
Eu-154 0.033 2.612 0.038 4.78E+3 3.78E+5 
Total 0.173 13.691 0.2200(Eu203) 4.78E+3 3.78E+5 
Gd-154 0.016 1.266 0.019 0 0 
Gd-155 0.005 0.396 0.006 0 0 
Gd-156 0.084 6 647 0.097 0 0 
Gd-158 0.012 0.950 0.014 
° 
0 
Gd-160 0.001 0.079 0.001 0 0 
Total 0.118 9.338 0.137(Gd203) 0- 0 
(a) For 5,500 kq CERMET payload 
H5 
TABLE 2 
RADIONUCLIDE COMPOSITION OF COMMERCIAL WASTE (PW-4b) (Contlnued) 
Nuclide Payload(a) Oxide Payload(a) 
Mass. Nucllde Mass, Act1V1ty Act1 Vlty, 
Isotope kg/MTHM Mass, kg kg/MTHM C1/MTHM C1 
U-235 0.008 0.633 0.010 1.81E-5 1.43E-3 
U-236 0.004 0.317 0.005 2.69E-4 2 13E-2 
U-238 0.979 77 .475 1.154 3.26E-4 2.58E-2 
Total Q.99f 78.425 1.169(U308) 6 13E-4 4.85E-2 
Np-237 0.762 60.302 0.865 5.37E-1 4.25E-1 
Total D.762 60.302 0.865( Np02) 5.37E-1 4.25E-1 
Pu-239 0.005 0.396 0.006 3.22E-1 2.55E+1 
Pu-240 0.003 0.237 0.003 5.82E-1 4.61E+1 
Pu-241 0.001 0.079 0.001 9.80E+1 7.86E+3 
Total o:oog O. 712 o 010(Pu02) 9.89E+1 7.83E+3 
Am-241 0.129 10.209 0.142 4.41E+1 3.49E+4 
Am-243 0.035 2.770 0.039 6.83E+0 5.41E+2 
Total 0.164 12.979 o . 181(Am203 ) 4.48E+2 3.55E+4 
Cm-244 0.036 2.849 0.040 2.94E+3 2.33E+5 
Total 0.036 2.849 0.040(Cm203) 2.94E+3 2.33E+5 
Reprocess-
lng 
Chemlcals 211.1 
(a) For 5,500 kg CERMET payload 
H6 
TABLE 3 
GAMMA SPECTRUM FROM ORIGEN 
Group No. Upper Bou nda ry Rate (part/sec) 
1 5.5 MeV 1.27 x 10 8 
2 5.0 1.94 X 10 8 
3 4.5 4.11 x 108 
4 4.0 6.51 X 10 8 
5 3.5 1.02 x 10 9 
6 3.0 1.63 X 109 
7 2.6 3.50 x 109 
8 2.2 2.55 x 1012 
9 1.8 8.22 x 1014 
10 1.35 1.04 x 10 16 
11 0.9 3.37 x 1017 
12 0.4 1.39 x 1016 
13 0.225 3.57 x 10 12 
14 0.175 8.37 x 1012 
15 0.125 8.39 x 1011 
16 0.075 4.46 x 1014 
17 0.045 5.85 x 1012 
18 0.035 3.49 x 1013 
0.025 
TOTAL 3.63 x 1017 
H7 
TABLE 4 
GAMr~A SPECTRUM INPUT TO ANISN 
Group No. Upper Boundary Rate (pa rt/sec) 
1 100M 0 
2 8.0 0 
3 6.5 1. 22 x 10 8 
4 5.0 6.04 X 10 8 
5 4.0 1.67 X 10 9 
6 3.0 2.51 X 10 9 
7 2.5 1.27 x 10 12 
8 2.0 2.57 X 10 14 
9 1.66 1.03 x 10 15 
10 1.33 7.65 x 10 15 
11 1.0 6.97 x 10 16 
12 0.8 1.35 x 10 17 
13 0.6 1.35 x 10 17 
14 0.4 7.96 x 10 15 
15 0.3 5.97 x 10 15 
16 0.2 1.06 x 1013 
17 0.1 3.72 x 10 14 
18 0.05 1.15 x 10 14 
0.01 
TOTAL 3.63 x 10 17 
H8 
TABLE 5 
SPONTANEOUS FISSION NEUTRONS FROM 244Cm 
Abundance, neutrons/(sec)(g of nucllde) 
4.2 x 105 2.1 X 105 
8.7 X 10 5 2.2 X 105 
8.9 X 10 5 2.9 X 105 
7.7 X 105 2.4 X 105 
7.9 X 10 5 1.8 x 105 
7.8 x 10 5 1.4 X 105 
6.8 X 10 5 1.1 X 105 
6.1 X 105 8.2 X 104 
5.5 X 105 5.9 X 104 
5.0 X 10 5 4.1 X 104 
4.6 X 105 3.1 X 104 
4.4 X 105 2.5 X 104 
3.6 X 105 2.8 X 104 
3.0 X 10 5 8.2 X 103 
2.8 X 105 8.6 X 103 
2.7 X 10 5 5.7 X 103 
2.6 X 10 5 3.9 X 103 
H9 
TABLE 6 
NEUTRON SPECTRUM INPUT TO ANISN 
Group No. Upper Boundary Rate (n/sec) 
1 14.92 Mev 6.48 x 106 
2 12.2 3.28 x 10 7 
3 16.0 9.04 x 10 7 
4 8.18 4.52 x 108 
5 6.36 1.14 x 10 9 
6 4.96 1.48 x 109 
7 4.06 3.36 x 109 
8 3.01 2.59 x 109 
9 2.46 5.36 x 108 
10 2.35 3.43 x 109 
11 1.83 6.64 x 109 
12 1.11 6.11 x 109 
13 0.55 4.65 x 109 
14 0.111 5.76 x 108 
15 3 35 x 10- 3 2.96 X 106 
16 5.83 x 10-4 2.15 x 105 
17 1.01 x 10-4 1.42 X 104 
18 2.9 x 10- 5 2.05 X 10 3 
19 1.01 x 10- 5 4.41 X 10 2 
20 3.06 X 10-6 6.87 X 101 
21 1 12 x 10-£ 1. 51 X 101 
22 4 14 x 10 4.38 
10- 8 
TOTAL 3.05 x 10 10 
HlO 
Element 
H 
He-4 
Be 
B-10 
C 
N 
o 
Na 
Mg 
Al 
Sl 
K 
Ca 
T1 
Cr 
Mn 
Fe 
N1 
Cu 
Zr 
Mo 
Sn 
Ta 
W 
Pb 
U-235 
U-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
TABLE 7 
CONTENTS OF THE DLC-23/CASK 
22-18 LIBRARY OF COUPLED NEUTRON AND GAMMA-RAY CROSS SECTIONS 
(Revised March 1975) 
MAT Number 
1001 
1270 
1007 
1009 
1040 
4133 MOD 3 
1013 
1059 
1014 
1015 
530 
5005 
540 
1016 
1121 
1019 
4180 MOD 0 
1123 
1087 
7033 
1111 
7039 
1126 
1060-1063 
43 
102 
1()3 
104 
1105 
Source 
ENDF /B-II 
ENDF/B-IV 
ENDF/B-II 
ENDF /B-II 
ENDF/B-II 
DNA 
ENDF /B- II 
ENDF/B- II 
ENDF /B-II 
ENDF/B-II 
PDS-16 
ENDF/B-III, Pre. 
PDS-16 
ENDF /B- 1 I 
ENDF /B- 1 II 
ENDF /B- II 1 
DNA 
ENDF /B-II 1 
ENDF /B- I I 1 
LENDL 
ENDF /B-I II 
LENDL 
ENDF/B-III 
ENDF/B-III 
ORNL-UK 
ENDF/A-700 
ENDF/A-700 
ENuF/A-700 
E"NDF /8- I I 
H11 
POPOP4 ID 
010101 
No - prod. 
040101, 040401 
050201 
060102, 060301 
See Note 4 
086301, 080201 
110101, 113301 
120101, 120301 
130101, 130301 
140101, 140301 
190101, 190301 
200101, 200301 
220101, 220301 
See Note (9) 
250101 
See Note 4 
See Note (9) 
290101 
See Note (10) 
420101 
See Note (10) 
731303, 731107 
740107 
820102, 820301 
925101, 925301, 925801 
928112, 925301, 925801 
928112, 925301, 925801 
928112, 925301, 925801 
TABLE 8 
CERMET COMPOSITION 
Element Percent Element Percent 
0 12.13 Ba 2.02 
P 0.42 La 1.81 
Cr 0.34 Ce 3.89 
Fe 24.01 Pr 1.77 
Ni 6.29 Nd 5.58 
Cu 7.36 Pm 0.15 
Rb 0.47 Sm 1.15 
Sr 1.29 Eu 0.25 
y 0.68 Gd 0.17 
Zr 5.30 U235 0.0115 
Mo 10.39 U236 0.0058 
Tc 1.40 U238 1.409 
Ru 3.26 Np237 1.10 
Rh 0.56 Pu239 .0072 
Pd 1. 64 Pu240 .0043 
Ag 0.12 Pu241 .001 
Cd 0.12 Am .164 
Te 0.83 Cm .036 
Cs 3.94 
Denslty 6.7 g/cc 
H12 
TABLE 9 
COMPOSITION OF SHIELDING MATERIALS 
Stalnless Steel 
Fe 
Cr 
Nl 
Mo 
7.98 g/cc 
68.75% 
17 % 
12 % 
2.25% 
Alr 10- 3 glee 
N 80 % 
o 20 % 
Depleted Uranlum 18.7 glee 
U235 0.3 % 
U238 99.7 % 
Tantalum 16.6 glee 
Ta 100 % 
Graphlte 2.25 glee 
C 100 % 
H13 
TABLE 10 
NEUTRON GROUP STRUCTURE, SOURCE SPECTRUM, 
AND 
FLUX-TO-DOSE CONVERSION FACTORS 
Fl ux-to-Dose 
Neutron Upper Energy Converslon Factors 
Group (eV) [(mrem/hr)/neut/cm2/sec] 
1 1.492 7 2.088 -1 
2 1.220 7 1.656 -1 
3 1.000 7 1.476 -1 
4 8.180 6 1.476 -1 
5 6.360 6 1.404 -1 
6 4.960 6 1.332 -1 
7 4.060 6 1.296 -1 
8 3.010 6 1.260 -1 
9 2.460 6 1.260 -1 
10 2.350 6 1.296 -1 
11 1.830 6 1.332 -1 
12 1.110 6 1.188 -1 
13 5.500 5 5.400 -2 
14 1.110 5 6.480 -3 
15 3.350 3 4.320 -3 
16 5.830 2 4.680 -3 
17 1.010 2 4.680 -3 
18 2.900 1 4.500 -3 
19 1.010 1 4.320 -3 
20 3.060 0 4.140 -3 
21 1.120 0 3.960 -3 
22 4.140 -1 3.780 -3 
1.000 -2 
H14 
TABLE 10 (Continued) 
GAMMA-RAY GROUP STRUCTURE, SOURCE SPECTRUM, 
AND 
FLUX-TO-DOSE CONVERSION FACTORS 
Flux-to-Dose 
Gamma Upper Energy Converslon Factors 
Group (eV) [ (mR/hr/g-r/cm2/sec] 
1 1.000 7 9.792 -3 
2 8.000 6 8.280 -3 
3 6.500 6 6.840 -3 
4 5.000 6 5.760 -3 
5 4.000 6 4.752 -3 
6 3.000 6 3.960 -3 
7 2.500 6 3.492 -3 
8 2.000 6 2.988 -3 
9 1.660 6 2.412 -3 
10 1.330 6 1.908 -3 
11 1.000 6 1.602 -3 
12 8.000 5 1.260 -3 
13 6.000 5 9.216 -4 
14 4.000 5 6.372 -4 
15 3.000 5 4.392 -4 
16 2.000 5 2.376 -4 
17 1.000 5 1.404 -4 
18 5.000 4 3.024 -4 
1.000 4 
H15 
TABLE 11 
QUADRATURE COEFFICIENTS USED IN ANISN 
COSlne 
-1.0 
-0.8535534 
-0.3535534 
+0.3535534 
+0.8535534 
Coslne 
-0.9759 
-0.9511897 
-0.7867958 
-0.5773503 
-0.2182179 
0.2182179 
0.5773503 
0.7867958 
0.9511897 
54 Quadrature 
58 Quadrature 
H16 
o 
0.1464466 
0.3535534 
0.3535534 
0.1464466 
Welght 
0 
0.0604938 
0.0907407 
0.1370371 
0.2117284 
0.2117284 
0.1370371 
0.0907407 
0.0604938 
TABLE 12 
Shleld / 2 r/hour 
Maten a 1 em 
Tantalum 9.4 
Depleted 
Uranlum 8.0 
Steel 23 6 
Compound shleld 
8.5 em TA - 10 em qraphlte 
8,477 kg @ 0.9 r/hour 
Weight* 
7,865 kg 
7,385 kg 
11,166 kg 
1 r/hour 
em Welght* 
11.0 10,179 kg 
12.7 12,452 kg 
27.0 13 ,504 kg 
* Welghts for Ta, DU and compound shlelds lnelude .77 em inner and .13 em 
outer steel shells. 
HI7 
APPENDIX I 
FLIGHT SUPPORT SYSTEM DETAIL MASS STATEMENTS 
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